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Preface 
The present study is an expansion of a doctoral dissertation 
written for the Department of History at the University of Ne-
braska. It is based upon research conducted in 1953-1954 while 
the author was a student at the University of Munich under the 
Fulbright program. It treats election systems as instruments of 
power, as indicators through their uses and justifications of pre-
vailing social and political conditions and attitudes. It attempts 
in this manner to reveal from a specialized study of proportional 
representation during the Second Reich something of the nature 
of the Weimar heritage. 
While aware of his own responsibility for whatever errors the 
study may contain, the author acknowledges the many contribu-
tions, both direct and indirect, of his professors in the Department 
of History. He is especially indebted to Edgar N. Johnson for an 
approach to history which emphasizes the goodness and the rational-
ity of man, and to Glenn W. Gray for his method of patient and 
painstaking search for the truth. His thanks also go to Robert L. 
Koehl for giving so generously of his time in reading and criticizing 
the manuscript. To Eugene N. Anderson, now of the University 
of California, Los Angeles, the author expresses his deep appreci-
ation for the friendly interest with which he directed the research 
and the writing. Whatever may be the merit of the study as an 
interpretation of German society and politics stems largely from the 
stimulus of his ideas. 
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So profound has been the influence of the Fulbright year abroad 
upon the author that he should like to acknowledge his indebtedness 
to those in this country and in Germany who administer the pro-
gram, and to the people of the United States and their elected 
representatives in Congress who have so wisely begun and continued 
this experiment in international understanding. 
To the Studies Committee of the University the author ex-
tends his thanks for making possible this publication. To the 
person, finally, who has contributed beyond measure to his life 
and to his work this study is affectionately dedicated. 
Carroll College DJZ 
Waukesha, Wisconsin 
viii 
Table 01 Contents 
Introduction . ........................ ..... ... ................ ... ... ... ....... ........... ...... 1 
1. Proportional Representation in Europe: A Historical 
Sketch ...................................................................................... 4 
2. The Setting...... ........................ ............ ... ........... ........... ....... ..... ..... 12 
3. The Participants: Proposals for Suffrage Reform.................... 18 
4. The Participants: Experimentation with Proportional 
Representation ........................................................................ 32 
5. The Reichstag and Proportional Representation.................... 44 
6. The National Assembly Elections.............................................. 57 
7. The Electoral Law of 1920.......................................................... 71 
8. The Implications ................. .......................... ........... ...... .............. 89 
Notes .............................................................................................. 105 
Bibliography ................................................................................ 123 
ix 
Introduction 
Surprisingly little has been written in critical analysis of German 
election systems. Herman Finer, Sigmund Neumann, and Carl 
Friedrich, among others, have dealt for the most part with political 
parties. James Pollock has written descriptions of election ma-
chinery and procedures. Ferdinand Hermens has produced the 
standard work on proportional representation, one confined in the 
section on Germany to its alleged role in the disintegration and 
collapse of the Weimar Republic. With the recent exception of 
Eugene Anderson's excellent analysis of Pruss ian politics, however, 
treatments of election systems have been for the most part unrelated 
to the context of German society and politics.1 
The following study deals with an election system undoubtedly 
the most controversial in German political history. It presents an 
analysis of proportional representation, or as commonly abbreviated, 
P. R., from the founding of the Second Reich through the first 
elections under the Weimar electoral law. Its purpose is to relate 
the development of P. R. to prevailing social and political condi-
tions and attitudes, and in this manner to shed light on the nature 
of the Weimar heritage. 
Simply stated, P. R. is a technique designed to mirror in the 
parliament the opinions and wishes of the voters (Chapter 1). Its 
theoreticians call for representation of voter preferences exactly 
in accordance with respective numerical strengths; and insofar as 
all voters theoretically have equal opportunities to achieve repre-
1 
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sentation of their particular points of view, the system or technique 
is alleged to be the most democratic in existence. The idea of 
P. R. was first expounded in developed form by French Utopians 
and later incorporated in the programs of Marxian Revisionists 
throughout Europe. It became attractive to political liberals like 
John Stuart Mill concerned with the problem of the individual 
and his survival from the pressures of modern civilization toward 
"collective mediocrity." It assumed increasing significance to poli-
ticians of all persuasions in the conflicts arising out of industrializa-
tion between power elites and mass movements, between those who 
wished to preserve and those who wished to alter or abolish the 
existing order. 
It is this latter context that forms the setting of the present 
study (Chapter 2). Industrial production during the Second Reich 
was expanding in phenomenal proportions; agricultural output was 
dropping off sharply; rural areas were being drained of population 
as urban centers mushroomed. Tensions mounted with the emerg-
ence of new social and political groups to challenge the dominate 
positions of the old. Conservative agrarians became alarmed by the 
rising mass of socialist-led workers which threatened their control 
of the state, while middle-class liberals wavered between conserva-
tive antipathies and fears of the socialist movement. 
Participants in the ensuing conflicts seized upon P. R. as one 
means for achieving or maintaining power (Chapters 3, 4, 5). To 
socialists with voting strengths scattered all over the Reich the 
adoption of P. R. for all Landtag and Reichstag elections seemed 
to offer the best likelihood of increased representation. To numeri-
cal minorities like the middle classes and the agrarians who feared 
the potential power of socialist majorities among the industrial 
workers, P. R. became useful both as a protection of their respective 
minority positions and as a weapon against their opponents. It 
could be introduced in urban districts where socialist majorities 
were present, and withheld from others where the socialists were 
in the minority. It could be adopted for elections to the numerous 
boards and agencies which had arisen with social and factory 
legislation to the end of undermining socialist monopolies in the 
representation of workers' interests. Although hailed by its theore-
ticians as the most democratic system of election in existence. P. R. 
was used almost extensively in Germany as an instrument of power 
against those who had as their ultimate political objective the demo-
cratization of the Reich. 
The paradox of P. R. in the social and political conflict was 
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heightened by the profound ignorance of democratic ideas and 
institutions revealed by the participants (Chapters 6, 7, 8). The 
idea of popular sovereignity was incomprehensible; responsible 
government through an elected parliament seemed un-German. 
Political parties were viewed, not as means for assessing responsi-
bility for public policy, but as organs for asserting minority points 
of view in the social and political conflict. The mere adoption of 
P. R. for parliamentary elections in 1918-1919 revealed at once the 
background of division and conflict and the naivete of German con-
ceptions of democracy. Supposedly the democratic system of elec-
tion par excellence, P. R. was adopted by the Germans as a natural 
consequence of republican government. Serious consideration of its 
possible effects in practice upon political parties and the Reichstag 
was conspicuously absent. Only with the first elections under P. R. 
in 1919 and 1920 did the effects and their attendant dangers be-
come manifest with the growing numbers and influence of splinter 
groups and vested minority interests in the Reichstag. 
Lacking the most elemental understanding of democratic ideas 
and institutions, divided in the power struggle between those who 
upheld the old regime and those who wished to tear it down, 
possessing an election system which encouraged division rather than 
consolidation, rigidity rather than compromise among their political 
parties, the German people appeared strikingly ill-prepared and ill-
equipped to assume the responsibilities of self-government so sud-
denly thrust upon them by the collapse of Kaiser Wilhelm's Reich. 
The prelude to Weimar democracy was ominously undemocratic. 
I / Proportional Representation in Europe: 
A Historical Sketch 
T HE idea of proportional representation, or P. R., dates at least to the French Revolution.1 In a speech before the Assembly of Provence in January, 1789, Mirabeau allegedly 
expressed the metaphor which later became so popular with pro-
portionalists. "A representative body," he stated, "is to the nation 
what a chart is for the physical configuration of its soil: in all its 
parts, and as a whole, the representative body should at all times 
present a reduced picture of the people-their opinions, aspirations, 
and wishes .... "2 The words reflect one facet of the Revolutionary 
demand for egalitt!, in this case for an equality among votes, for a 
reflection in the parliament of all points of view in accordance 
with their respective strengths among the electorate. Although 
attempts were made subsequently by the Girondins, notably through 
Condorcet's draft constitution of 1793, to introduce proportional 
voting, the idea of electoral egalitt! became obscured in the ensuing 
tumult of war and revolution. 
The idea reappeared during the 1830's in French Utopian 
circles, where discussions produced an ardent proportionalist in 
Victor Considerant, Paris mathematician and social reformer.3 As 
formulated by Considerant, the argument for P. R. became one of 
electoral justice, a necessity of including "all opinions, the most 
absurd ones, the most monstrous ones even," in the parliament "in 
a number proportional to their strength in the electorate."4 The 
requirement of political egalitt! would otherwise be violated. 
Not content merely with propagandizing in Paris journals, 
Considerant journeyed to Switzerland during the 1840's in attempts 
to persuade assemblies in that country to adopt proportional sys-
tems of election. So new and impractical did the idea of P. R. 
appear to the Swiss, however, that apparently they regarded him 
4 
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as a crank. With incredulous smiles, even laughter, members of 
the Geneva Council in 1842 and the National Council in 1846 
summarily rejected his proposals without discussion.1i The idea was 
as yet too untried, too utopian in nature to attract practical poli-
ticians. 
The attractions emerged as P. R. came to be widely publicized 
and discussed throughout Europe. In 1859 the first major publica-
tion about proportional elections appeared in England. Written 
by Thomas Hare, a London barrister, The Election of Representa-
tives6 elaborated a system of election termed by subsequent pro-
portionalists the "single transferable vote." Voters according to 
the plan could designate preferences among candidates on the 
ballot by using numbers ("I" for the first choice, "2" for the second, 
etc.). In the tabulation of results, the first-preference candidates 
who acquired the necessary quota7 were declared elected, with votes 
in excess of that number transferred to the credit of those listed 
second in preference. The process continued through successive 
preferences until the total number of seats had been filled.8 
Response to the Hare plan was immediate and emphatic. In his 
considerations on Representative Government, published in 1861, 
John Stuart Mill found so may advantages in the plan that he could 
place it "among the very greatest improvements yet made in the 
theory and practice of government."9 The reasons for Mill's un-
qualified acceptance of proportional or "personal" representation, 
as he and Hare termed the procedure, were to be found in his views 
on representative government. Representation and government 
were for him mutually exclusive, with parliaments regarded as 
"radically unfit" for the "function of government." The latter 
were to "watch and control the government," i.e., the ministries, 
offices, etc., which administered the state. They were to form "the 
nation's Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions"; 
they were "an arena" where "every interest and shade of opinion 
in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded."lo It 
followed for Mill that one of the most important advantages of 
Hare's plan of election was its protection of numerical minorities 
against the "despotic majority." By granting representation to 
minorities, "distinguished" persons without party affiliations or 
"local influence" could become elected, thereby raising "the in-
tellectual standard of the House of Commons."l! The "instructed 
elite" thus could withstand the "natural tendency of representative 
government, as of modern civilization . . . towards collective 
mediocrity. "12 
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Mill's enthusiasm for Hare's "personal representation" did not 
pass unchallenged. In articles published in the Fortnightly Review 
in 1865 and 1867 and in the first edition of his work, The English 
Constitution, published in 1867, Walter Bagehot, a fellow liberal 
and economist, took sharp issue with the famous utilitarian. As 
contrasted with Mill's dismissal of the parliament as "radically 
unfit" for the "function of government," Bagehot found in that 
institution the mainspring of political action. Governmental 
policies were formulated and implemented by the majority, criti-
cized by the minority. The parliament might become inadequate, or 
"radically unfit," to perform these its essential functions, he con-
tended, only if the Hare plan of election were adopted. The aboli-
tion of districts envisioned in the plan would encourage the 
formation of "voluntary constituencies," or groups of like-minded 
people scattered throughout the country. Each would rule "un-
flinchingly" the members which it returned to Parliament. The 
individual M. P. would become "like the minister of a Dissenting 
congregation: that congregation is collected by a unity of sentiment 
in doctrine A, and the preacher is to preach doctrine A; if he does 
not, he is dismissed."13 The result, Bagehot predicted, would be 
disastrous for the composition and function of the House of Com-
mons. "Instead of a deliberative assembly of moderate and judicious 
men, we should have a various compound of all sorts of violence," 
one which would be "inconsistent with the extrinsic independence 
as well as with the inherent moderation of a parliament."14 In-
judicious minorities would usurp the will of the majority, and the 
parliament would become "radically unfit" to perform the "function 
of government." 
The views expressed by Mill and Bagehot have remained the 
classic statements of the case for and against P. R. As viewed by 
the proponents, representation is a means of "photographing" the 
electorate, of reflecting as accurately as possible in the parliament 
the variegated opinions and desires of the voters. The view has 
been shared by practical politicians concerned with tactics of sur-
vival and gain, and by political and mathematical theorists seeking 
to protect individual rights and assure electoral "justice." Neither 
group among the proponents has concerned itself to any apprecia-
ble extent with the related and fundamental problem of work-
ability, with the capacity of what they term a "representative" 
parliament to function effectively. Seemingly without question 
each has equated proportional representation with efficient and 
responsible government.11i 
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The chief question for the opponents has been: What will be 
the effects of P. R. upon the capacity of the parliament for action? 
Will the increased representation under P. R. of minority groups 
and parties be an aid or deterrent in this regard? Their conclusions 
have been denunciations of the system as incompatible with the 
functioning of democratic government, as contributive to the 
splintering of parties, and consequently to the paralyzation of 
political initiative and the decay of democratic institutions and 
procedures. For the opponents P. R. thus becomes in the last 
analysis a Trojan horse capable of destroying the individual rights 
which proportionalists so vigorously assert.16 
Undeterred by Bagehot's objections to P. R., Mill moved an 
amendment in the House of Commons attaching the Hare plan to 
the electoral reform bill of 1867. Only by adopting the plan, he 
contended during debate on the amendment, could the "principle 
of democracy," i.e., "equal representation," be achieved in England. 
At a time when political power supposedly was passing to the 
"most numerous and poorest class," conservatives might well con-
sider seriously a plan by which "no considerable minority could 
possibly be swamped" at the polls.u Subsequent comments by 
members of the House, however, revealed slight sympathy for the 
plan. The House might well tum from such useless discussions 
of "philosophical eccentricities" to "more serious business," sug-
gested one M. P. who concluded rather unkindly, "God help them," 
if the House ever came to be formed entirely of philosophers.18 
Under pressure from his colleagues, Mill shortly withdrew the 
amendment, and the House turned to "more serious business." 
Subsequent attempts by other proportionalists to introduce the 
Hare plan during the 1870's and 1880's likewise failed to move the 
opposition. 
Although P. R. movements achieved some success in the Eng-
lish-speaking countries of the world,19 the principal gains were in 
Europe. There, despite the influence of Hare and Mill, parliaments 
invariably adopted list systems rather than the single transferable 
vote plan. Instead of one ballot containing the names of all the 
candidates, voters were presented with several lists of candidates 
submitted by the various parties. The act of voting hence became 
essentially a choice among the lists, with seats being assigned among 
the latter in proportion to the number of votes polled. The "per-
sonal" representation of Hare and Mill became "party" representa-
tion on the Continent. 
Switzerland took the lead in the P. R. movement in Europe. 
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A national organization, the Association Reformiste, appeared as 
early as 1865, being founded, according to a report issued by the 
Association the following year, for the purpose of studying "the 
works of Mr. Hare."2o Members of the Association soon became 
convinced, however, that the Hare plan was "too bold and too 
foreign to our customs," presumably due to its personal rather than 
party or group basis. They began shortly thereafter to advocate a 
list system of representation patterned after one which the French 
Utopian, Considerant, had vainly tried to persuade the Swiss to 
accept more than thirty years previously.21 Despite the propagan-
dizing efforts of the Association, however, P. R. was not adopted in 
Switzerland for several decades. Beginning with Ticino in 1889, 
the system then spread to eight other cantons by the outbreak of 
the first world war, and finally was adopted in 1918 for elections 
to the National Council, the lower house of the federal parliament. 
List systems of election soon began to appear in other European 
. countries. Serbia, which already had adopted one for local bodies 
in 1888, extended it in 1899 for the election of most members of its 
national parliament. Belgium did likewise the same year. Other 
countries in Europe to adopt list systems for national elections 
prior to the war were Finland (1906), Sweden (1909), Portugal 
(1911), and Bulgaria (1911).22 Denmark (1915) and the Nether-
lands (1917) shortly followed suit. Despite the pressure of an 
organized group of deputies within the French Chamber of Deputies 
dating from the turn of the century, a proportional system using 
lists was not adopted in that country until 1919. 
Germany shared in the general movement toward P. R. in 
Europe. Articles stimulated by the writings of Hare and Mill began 
to appear during the early 1860's in South German journals.23 
Although the Hare plan was debated in the assemblies of Frank-
fort, Baden, and Wiirttemberg during the same decade,24 the adop-
tion of proportional systems in Germany did not begin until after 
1900. Then began a period of experimentation in various munici-
pal, state, and federal bodies which led to the extension of P. R. 
in 1918 for elections to the Reichstag. The National Assembly of 
1919-1920 and subsequent Reichstags during the Weimar Republic 
were elected under P. R. 
Numerous variations among list systems emerged with the de-
velopment of P. R. on the Continent. The first canton in Switzer-
land to use P. R. departed from the Hare plan by using lists, yet 
adopted a similar method of allocating seats. Districts were re-
tained, rather than abolished (as Hare desired), and a so-called 
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"simple quota" was established by dividing the number of deputies 
for each district into the total number of votes cast. Seats were 
allocated among the lists by dividing the resultant quota into the 
respective vote totals. A quota of 50,000, for example, would accord 
one seat to the party list with 50,000 or more votes, two to the one 
with 100,000 or more votes. 
Politicians were plagued, however, by mathematical complica-
tions. What could be done with the votes for each list which were 
not used in the allocation of seats? Assuming a seat quota of 50,000, 
a party list with 60,000 had 10,0000 leftover, unutilized, wasted 
votes. If the number of such votes for all party lists exceeded the 
quota, then the allocation procedure failed even to allot all the 
necessary seats in a given district. Not only votes, but also seats 
might remain. With some misgivings about the matter of mathe-
matical justice, proportionalists for a time merely distributed the 
leftover seats among the lists with the largest vote totals. Eventually 
they began to add one numeral to the divisor, i.e., to the number 
of deputies to be elected, a procedure which decreased the quota 
and hence the likelihood of leftover seats. 
Mathematicians soon held out new and ever-more-complicated 
solutions to the problem of achieving proportionality. Most im-
portant in terms of longevity was one constructed by the Belgian, 
Victor d'Hondt.25 As illustrated by the following example from a 
hypothetical election, the vote totals of each list are divided by 
the numerals I, 2, 3,4, etc.: 
Divisor 
I 
2 
3 
4 
Consenmtive 
151,000 (I) 
7.5,500 (3) 
50,333Ys (4) 
37,750 
Progressive 
83,000 (2) 
41,500 (5) 
Radical 
34,000 
Independent 
32,000 
Seats are allotted among the lists with the largest quotients. As-
suming five seats to be distributed in the above example, the Con-
servatives would receive three and the Progressives two. 
Still another problem for the proportionalists concerned the 
allocation of seats among candidates within the party lists. Should 
the seats be allotted among those at the top of the list or ticket? 
Or should the voter be allowed some choice in the matter? The 
most common solution in Germany was the "closed" list system 
which denied voters choices among individual candidates. Seats 
allotted to the ticket were distributed according to the sequence in 
which candidates had been placed by the nominating party. For 
the politicians this was "party" representation par excellence. An 
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element of Hare's "personal" representation was introduced by the 
so-called "open" lists. Voters according to the plan were permitted 
to express one or more preferences among candidates on the ticket, 
the most popular ones receiving the seats allotted to the ticket. As 
refined in some Swiss cantons, voters even could distribute their 
choices among candidates drawn from several tickets. 
Such were the principal variations among Continental list 
systems of election. Each was subjected to innumerable refinements 
by mathematicians, jurists, and others possessing talents for ab-
straction. New ones of astounding complexity appeared as a con-
sequence. So extensive was the experimentation that a British 
parliamentary commission on electoral systems could report the 
probable existence by 1910 of three hundred different systems of 
proportional representation.26 
Subsequent experimentation throughout Europe and other parts 
of the world, including the United States, increased both the num-
ber and the complexity of proportional systems of election. Italy, 
Austria, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Greece, Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Norway, Finland, and even Luxembourg 
adopted P. R. for national elections between the two world wars. 
Perhaps the ultimate in complexity was achieved by the Germans 
in the Weimar electoral law. Not only districts, but even groups 
of districts, and finally a general clearing house or "Reich list" 
provided successive stages for the utilization of leftover votes. 
Clearly the parliament was to reflect as precisely as possible the 
wishes of the electorate, with its capacity to govern a secondary, 
indeed, an academic consideration. 
Much the wiser from their tragic Weimar experience with self-
government, West Germans following the second world war con-
sequently reassessed their positions on representation and parlia-
mentary government. The resulting election law was a compromise 
between the proponents of Mill and Bagehot, between those who 
viewed representation as an end in itself, that of reflecting in the 
parliament all shades of opinion among the voters, and those who 
viewed it as a means to the end of responsible and efficient govern-
ment. Each voter is empowered by the law to cast two ballots,one 
for an individual candidate in his district, one for a party list of 
the Land in which he resides. Candidates in the first instance are 
elected by majority vote, those in the second from the party lists 
according to the proportion of votes received by the list throughout 
the Land. Majority elections in the districts favor large parties 
capable of assuming and wielding political power, with the con-
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sequent contributIon to governmental stability. Proportional elec-
tions in the Laender afford representation to small parties and 
hence facilitate the expression of minority points of view. "Per-
sonal" representation obtains in the districts, "party" representa-
tion in the Laender. 
The West German law poses one solution to a fundamental 
problem of modern government: the relation of individual rights to 
the collective good, of the minority viewpoint to the majority will. 
Formulated for the first time with reference to P. R. by Mill and 
Bagehot, the problem has been one of general concern for political 
philosophers from Locke to Rousseau through the political liberals 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It has assumed increas-
ing significance with the far-reaching changes in society which have 
accompanied industrialization. Agrarian minorities have sought 
to maintain positions of power against rising industrial majorities, 
which in tum have attempted to obtain power comparable to their 
growing numerical as well as economic importance. It is in the 
context of this struggle of minority versus majority, of power elites 
versus mass movements that the present study seeks to analyze the 
development of P. R. in Germany during the years 1871-1920. 
2 / .The Setting 
I NDUSTRIALIZATION during the Second Reich fostered conditions which were highly conducive to the development of P. R. Stimu-lated by the achievement of political unification, the economy 
was transformed as coal and iron production spiraled to new and 
unprecedented heights and major though less spectacular advances 
took place in the textiles, chemical and electro-technical industries, 
transportation, banking, and finance. Radical alterations of the 
social picture occurred with the ensuing growth and shift of popu-
lation.1 Despite an over-all gain of more than sixteen million per-
sons in the Reich between 1871 and 1914, the number of rural 
dwellers remained almost stationary as the urban share of the 
population increased from slightly more than one-third in 1871 
to almost two-thirds in 1914.2 Conflicts followed as urban groups 
arose to challenge the traditional domination of German society 
and politics by the agrarians. In the Reichstag and in the Landtage 
each among the competing groups sought means to extend its 
representation and to divide and weaken the opposition. Each 
found in P. R. an electoral technique easily adaptable to such ends. 
Opposition to the old regime in Germany was centered in the 
rising socialist movement. Each year, each decade witnessed slow 
but steady increases of socialist strength in the Reichstag and in 
state and local assemblies. Although founded by Marxists like 
August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, the movement very early 
reflected the peaceful revisionist sentiment of other leaders, notably 
Ferdinand Lassalle. From the first political organization of workers, 
the German Workingmen's Association founded in 1863, through 
the Social Democratic Labor Party of 1869, the Socialist Labor 
Party of 1875, and the Social Democratic Party of 1891, the plat-
forms called for peaceful means to achieve the ends of democratiza-
tion and socialization of the state. Conservative agrarians were 
12 
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nonetheless horrified by the implications of the socialist movement 
for their positions of power. As landowners they were disturbed 
by the attack on private property; and as members of the conserva-
tive elite which controlled the state they looked askance at socialist 
intentions to democratize government in Germany. 
The chief conservative bulwark against the socialist movement 
was the dominant position of Prussia within the Reich. The 
former's king and the latter's emperor were the same person. The 
chancellor of the Reich was Prussia's prime minister, and as such, 
headed his state's delegation to Germany's upper chamber, the 
Bundesrat, and also presided over that body. Within the latter, 
Prussia controlled the two-thirds majority necessary for any amend-
ment to the constitution. State secretaries for the Reich also were 
members of the Prussian state government. Neither they nor the 
chancellor were responsible to the popularly elected body, the 
Reichstag. Both held office at the pleasure of the emperor-king. 
Despite Pruss ian domination of the federal government, how-
ever, conservatives found much to fear in the latter's parliamentary 
features. Although neither the chancellor nor his ministers were 
responsible to the Reichstag, the latter might impose important 
checks on the actions of the government. It could initiate legisla-
tion, and block or amend bills presented by the government. Most 
disturbing to the Prussian conservatives was the Reichstag's elec-
toral law. Following the inclusion of Alsace-Lorraine in 1873, three 
hundred ninety-seven districts were apportioned on the approximate 
basis of one representative for each one hundred thousand in-
habitants.3 A majority of the votes cast was required for election.4 
The right to vote was not contingent upon tax payments or the 
possession of property. All German men who had completed their 
twenty-fifth year of age were enfranchised. No distinctions were 
made among votes, each being theoretically equal to all others in 
the election of deputies. Voters chose their representatives directly, 
not through designated electors, and they cast their ballots in 
secrecy. 
The provisions were striking when compared with those of the 
law regulating elections to the Prussian Lower House. Although 
every Prussian male twenty-five years of age could vote, the suffrage 
was not equal, direct, nor secret. Voters were divided into three 
classes according to the amount of taxes paid. The members of 
each class selected by public voting one-third of the electors. The 
latter then met in each district for the selection of usually two, 
frequently one, and in some cases as many as four deputies. Since 
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selection was by absolute majority, electors from the first two classes 
could combine to outvote those in the third.5 
The electoral law for the Reichstag accorded political expression 
to the emerging socialist movement in Germany; therein lay its 
significance for the Prussian conservatives. Workers were free in 
the privacy of the voting booth to elect socialists without fear of 
reprisals from their employers. The tremendous increases in popu-
lation which had gone to swell the movement were not deprived of 
political significance in the Reich as they were in Prussia by re-
stricting the overwhelming majority of the voters to a fraction of 
representation in the Reichstag. Although urban areas where 
socialist voting strengths were concentrated eventually became 
grossly underprepresented as a consequence of population growths 
and the lack of redistricting, the composition of the Reichstag 
nevertheless reflected, if imperfectly, the surge of the movement. 
From one of the smallest among Germany's political parties at the 
founding of the Reich, the Social Democrats by 1912 had become the 
Reichstag's largest single party. 
Conservative fear of the socialist movement was shared by 
Gennany's industrialists. Although most employers in compara-
tively small enterprises eventually came to terms with both 
socialist and nonsocialist trade unions and recognized the value 
of collective bargaining in harmonizing relations with employees, 
representatives of heavy industry for the most part reacted violent-
ly against any suggestions of altering the subordinate position of the 
workers in industry. The head of the Krupp munition works in 
Essen, for example, asserted his intentions to remain "master in 
his own house," and stubbornly refused to deal with trade union 
leaders. Baron von Stumm, who controlled a huge iron and steel 
empire in the Saar, declared his dislike of "artificial creations" like 
trade unions between himself and his employees, even forbidding 
the latter to read certain newspapers on threat of dismissal.6 The 
common ownership and control of all productive enterprises ad-
vocated by Social Democrats was a frightening prospect for em-
ployers in small and light industries. For individuals like von 
Stumm and Krupp, who wielded such tremendous economic power, 
the prospect was anathema. 
Antisocialist feeling also penneated large sections of the middle 
classes in Gennany. As reported by one observer, "the Rhenish 
shopkeeper, the Black Forest clockmaker, the Pomeranian peasant 
farmer,-all have shuddered alike at the growing power and in-
fluence of Social Democracy and regarded almost any means as 
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holy that would tend to defeat its ultimate success."7 A deep gulf 
separated the socialists from the "respectable" elements of German 
society. They were abhorred for their advanced views on marriage 
and the family and the position of women in society, for their at-
tacks on religion and the monarchy, for their internationalism and 
consequent opposition to narrow patriotism. The socialists them-
selves widened the gap by developing during the decade of Bis-
marck's antisocialist legislation and passing on to the new genera-
tion an almost caste like attitude of hostility toward all other 
groups in society.s 
Middle-class feeling against the socialists was modified only 
gradually toward the end of the Second Reich. When food prices 
rose to unprecedented heights during the first decade of the cen-
tury, members of the consuming public, both middle class and 
proletarian, became aware of a common enemy, the agrarian-
industrialist alliance which enforced high import duties on food-
stuffs. Left-liberals like Friedrich Naumann, leader of the Progres-
sive party, began to inveigh against the conservative agrarian 
domination of Germany, calling openly for an alliance of the middle 
classes with socialist working groupS.9 
Under the influence of revisionists within their own party, 
socialists also began to move towards a modus vivendi with the 
middle classes. The new approach was illustrated by an assertion 
of the Bavarian leader, Georg von Vollmar, that "the German work-
ing classes would have better promise of success, if, in addition to 
the three millions whom we number, three millions more in the 
Bourgeois camp might be counted ready to ally themselves with 
labour in a work of resolute political and social reform."lO A 
gradual softening of mutual antipathies was to be seen in an in-
creasing cooperation between the socialists and left-liberal groups 
like Naumann's Progressives. The cooperation took the form of 
electoral alliances in second or runoff elections to the Reichstag 
and the mutual support of common social and political objectives 
within the Reichstag and various state legislatures. 
The rapprochement heightened the significance of the suffrage 
for the agrarians and the industrialists. Entrenched in Prussia by 
the three-class voting system, the agrarians could easily thwart 
parlimentary reforms demanded by the socialists and left-liberals. 
In the Reichstag, however, they were handicapped as a numerical 
minority by the presence of universal manhood suffrage, and main-
tained political power chiefly due to that body's political incom-
petence. The danger of the socialist-left-liberal rapprochement be-
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came apparent as the Reichstag gradually began to check and in-
fluence policy decisions by the chancellor and his ministers, to move 
slowly and hesitantly toward parliamentary government after the 
English model. Control of the state by a coalition opposed to the 
conservative elite appeared imminent. Proposals to abolish or at 
least to restrict the workings of universial manhood suffrage began 
to pour from conservative pens. Parliaments of experts, representa-
tion by occupation, proportional representation, and complex com-
binations of these and other plans were offered in the attempt to 
diminish or abolish the Reichstag's competence or potential com-
petence in the direction of national affairs. 
Suffrage reform also became an important issue within the 
various federal states. Despite efforts by property-owning groups to 
bar industrial workers from a voice in local affairs, socialist pene-
tration of municipal government had increased with each decade. 
The representation of socialists on the city council in Berlin, for 
example, rose from five (out of one hundred forty-four seats) in 
1884 to sixteen in 1895 to forty-five by the outbreak of the war. 
Permanent majorities were acquired on the councils of some cities 
and towns smaller than Berlin.!1 Socialist deputies also began to 
appear in increasing numbers in state legislatures, particularly in 
South Germany, where there were fewer restrictions on the suffrage 
than in Prussia. Even the latter's three-class system of voting could 
not completely deprive them of representation; by 1913 there were 
ten socialists in the Lower House. Property-holding or tax-payment 
qualifications for voting consequently were raised in several places. 
Proportional representation was introduced in urban areas where 
socialist voting strengths were concentrated, hence assuring repre-
sentation to minority groups at the latter's expense. With these 
and related manipulations of the suffrage, nonsocialist groups 
sought to preserve political power. 
The course of suffrage reform in Germany clearly reflects the 
significance of election systems in modern societies.12 As popularly 
elected assemblies and councils played larger roles in both local 
and national affairs, the suffrage became as never before a means 
of achieving or maintaining political power. Liberals fought to 
maintain property qualifications and other restrictions upon voting 
which accorded them representation in proportion with their eco-
nomic importance in the state, out of proportion with their numeri-
cal strength. Socialists strove for universal suffrage and other means 
of achieving representation in accordance with their growing num-
bers. Even the conservatives were forced into the rough-and-tumble 
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of parliamentary politics which they disliked in order to achieve 
protection of traditional rights and interests. 
That each found in some form of proportional representation 
a means to such diverse ends illustrates the adaptability of this 
electoral technique. As a way of achieving proportionality of 
deputies to votes it was attractive to the Social Democrats whose 
scattered electoral strengths failed to secure representation under 
the majority system. To numerical minorities like the liberals and 
the conservatives who feared the potential influence of industrial 
worker majorities, P. R. seemed useful both as a protection of their 
respective viewpoints and as a way of splintering the socialist move-
ment, of destroying its unity through affording expression to de-
viant or revisionist tendencies. P. R. had become a potent instru-
ment of power in a setting of change and conflict. 
3 / The Participants: Proposals for Suffrage Reform 
Universal suffrage is communism in politics!" exclaimed an elderly Gennan conservative, a self-styled "old deputy" writ-ing in the midst of Bismarck's antisocialist crusade.1 No-
where in the world, he lamented, had social democracy made such 
progress as in Gennany; nowhere had the number of socialist voters 
grown to such "colossal dimensions." Gennany was imperiled by 
an electoral law which gave full expression to those seeking to de-
stroy the state. Quietly but effectively the law was subverting the 
Gennan way of life. Even without prompting from socialist agita-
tors, the common voter was beginning to reason: "If I am able to 
decide the fate of the nation, if I have just as much political power 
as the pastor and the baron, then I must also be entitled to eat just 
as well as the pastor." "Political communism" in the electoral law 
was fostering "economic communism" in the social order. 
Salvation lay for the "old deputy" in electoral reform. Only 
restrictions on the suffrage, he asserted, could save Gennany from 
the threat of communism. Universal suffrage should be abolished 
and the Reichstag filled with deputies drawn from the municipali-
ties and the occupations.2 From one-half to two-thirds were to be 
selected from the memberships of municipal and city councils and 
from municipal electors, with the remainder distributed among 
rural and urban workers, industrialists, merchants, and professional 
men like university professors, jurists, doctors, etc. Even journalists 
were to be extended representation provided they kept their 
organizations free of all "unclean," presumably socialist, elements. 
At least a majority of the Reichstag deputies thus would be chosen 
by the municipalities, the greatest share of whom would be elected 
under systems of restricted suffrage or perhaps appointed directly by 
local authorities. Social Democrats would be conspicuously absent. 
Confronted by a Reichstag so constructed, even the most ignorant 
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peasant could not mistake his political and social inferiority. None 
could presume an equality with the pastor or the baron. Germany 
would be saved from the threat of communism. 
Similar manipulations of the suffrage were contemplated by the 
middle classes. As expressed by one contemporary of the "old 
deputy," Germany was confronted by the "spectre of a social revolu-
tion."3 Spectacular gains had been made by a socialist party seek-
ing to overthrow the existing order in Germany. Opposing measures 
and social legislation had not halted its meteoric rise. Other means 
must be found to preserve the state from its "threatened dissolution." 
The "rotten fermentation" of socialism could be eliminated 
from the body politic, the writer contended, by a revision of the 
electoral system. Large numbers of the discontented who voted 
socialist would remain loyal to the existing order if given the op-
portunity to express themselves and to obtain redress of their 
grievances. Offer means for the peaceful expression of such interests, 
he predicted, and the ground would be cut from under the 
socialists. Two working groups would appear in the Reichstag, one 
of doctrinare socialists who would continue to reject compromise, 
and another which, in return for consideration of its interests, 
would work peacefully and constructively within the existing order.4 
The electoral reform proposed by the writer combined pro-
portional representation with a representation of occupational 
groups. Political parties could present in each electoral district 
lists of candidates from six different occupational groups (agri-
culture and forestry; industry; commerce and communications; 
domestic services; public and private services; the unemployed). 
Each voter would cast his ballot for the list of his occupational 
group. The number of seats in the parliament for each occupational 
group was to be established in proportion to the number of persons 
engaged in each.1i The writer offered a comparison of seats by 
occupation in the Reichstag at that time (1885) and seats if divi-
sion were made according to the proportion of persons engaged in 
each occupation.6 The former are listed below in the first column, 
the latter in the second column: 
Agriculture and Forestry 
Industry 
Commerce and Communications 
Domestic Services 
Public and Private Services 
Unemployed 
130 
41 
21 
172 
33 
174 
143 
40 
8 
15 
17 
A Reichstag composed proportionally by occupation hence would 
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have brought in 1885 a substantial increase in the representation 
of industrial interests. The latter, when combined with those of 
commerce and communications, would have approximately balanced 
agricultural interests. Within the industrial classification the intro-
duction of proportional representation would have deprived the 
socialists of their monopoly in the representation of working class 
interests. The body politic would have been saved in this manner 
from the "rotten fermentation" of socialism. 
Both the socialists and the agrarians would have lost representa-
tion in the Reichstag through another proposal termed by its author 
"the ideal electoral system."7 Every candidate who received 30,000 
votes would be elected. To thwart an excessive accumulation of 
votes for popular candidates, the election would last two days. 
Votes would not be wasted the second day on candidates already 
elected. The system was "ideal" for two reasons. Since representa-
tion was accorded by population, rather than by area or district, 
an "overwhelmingly agrarian representation" of an "industrial 
state" would be eliminated. The system might also destroy the 
Social Democratic party. The millions who voted for the party in 
Reichstag elections, so the author asserted, did not read Das Kapital 
and swear by the Communist Manifesto. "They are much more the 
mass of discontented who vote Social Democratic with justifiable 
resentment because it is not possible for them to elect a man of 
their own point of view."8 Adopt the "ideal electoral system," the 
author proudly predicted, and the Social Democratic party would 
fall apart. It would splinter into a multiplicity of particularistic 
groups, revisionists, and doctrinaires. The united front of working-
class interests led by the socialists thus would disintegrate. The 
socialist movement would collapse. 
Such proposals revealed, not only the instrumental significance 
assumed by the suffrage in a society of conflict, but also the changing 
attitudes in Germany toward traditional electoral techniques and 
institutions. Territorial districts were for the most part discarded 
as anachronistic. Political parties frequently were abandoned as 
inadequate expressions of new and changing interests. Even the 
legislative assembly itself came under fire as unsuited to the needs 
and demands of modern political life. 
The criticisms of territorial districts found in proposals for 
suffrage reform during the Second Reich were summarized by one 
writer in the following words: 
The electoral district system was good in a period when the 
population was still basically homogeneous, and when our 
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modern means of communication had not yet developed. 
Those living in close proximity had common interests and 
common points of view. Today the situation is different. 
The population is much more differentiated, yet more close-
ly-knit than before. Each of us today has more in common 
with hundreds and thousands of peoJ?le scattered all over 
the Reich than with the people who hve in the same street 
or even in the same house.9 
To give expression to these new political relationships the writer 
offered a plan noteworthy for its simplicity: abolish electoral dis-
tricts and send to the Reichstag the four hundred candidates who 
received the most votes. Among the consequences, he predicted, 
would be a complete destruction of existing political parties, a fate 
not undeserved, since they had failed to afford expression to the 
important economic and social interests of the voters. Their places 
would be taken by the various occupational groups, which would 
send their respective representatives to the Reichstag. 
Would not the breakdown of the party structure and the emer-
gence of numerous interest groups, large and small, be detrimental 
to the workability of the parliament? The writer professed to see 
no difficulties in this regard: 
... If the bimetalists, the enemies of alcohol or the vaccine 
opponents wish to organize to obtain a representative of their 
views, on what grounds should they be prevented from doing 
so? These representatives could be quite sensible in other 
respects; for everybody probably has one screw loose, and he 
who doubts that has two.1° 
The writer betrayed his own peculiarity in the latter regard by his 
stipulation for proportional voting in the Reichstag. Each deputy 
would have one vote for every thousand ballots or fraction thereof 
which he polled in the election. Would not voting in the Reichstag 
become hopelessly complicated? Not at all. The writer recom-
mended a comptometer especially designed for the purposel ll 
The widespread criticism of political parties in Germany 
stemmed in part from the nature of the Reichstag. Restricted in its 
competence by the absence of constitutional checks upon the actions 
of the chancellor, and by the preponderance of Prussia in the 
quasi-federal organization of the Reich, the Reichstag, at least until 
during the war, wielded very little political power. Strong per-
sonalities were conspicuous by their absence; administrative posi-
tions with the government offered more favorable opportunities 
for personal advancement than membership in the national legisla-
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ture. The parties were accused by their critics, moreover, of 
exercising a "tyranny of ignorance" in the Reichstag.12 Deputies 
were, for the most part, lawyers, editors, journalists, party secre-
taries, and professional politicians. Representatives of industry and 
commerce, asserted the critics, were too few; only agriculture was 
represented adequately. How could deputies from such nonmaterial 
vocations, they demanded, deal intelligently with the intricate and 
technical problems of legislation in modem society? 
The media which many Germans wished to substitute for polit-
ical parties were new organizations which had begun to assume 
important social and political functions. During the 1860's em-
ployers' associations began to appear to promote the general in-
terests of various branches of economic activity and to protect 
employers' interests against consumers' and workers' organizations. 
The number of such associations jumped from less than 700 by the 
tum of the century to more than 3,000 shortly before the war.1S 
Although hampered by the hostility and suspicion of the govern-
ment and dominant economic groups like the employers, a trade 
union movement also had emerged by the tum of the century. 
Approximately 2,500,000 workers belonged shortly before the war 
to so-called "free" unions which were Social Democratic in orienta-
tion, and 500,000 others were distributed among the "Christian," 
"Hirsch-Duncker," and independent unions.14 Salaried employees 
also formed their own organizations, numbering 600,000 in member-
ship by 1914. In addition to the Agrarian League, which by 1907 
included almost 300,000 members, several organizations of peasants 
were to be found in Germany following the turn of the century. 
Consumers' unions by 1914 included almost 2,500,000 persons.111 
As government increased in complexity with industrialization, 
the Landtage became more and more dependent upon such organiza-
tions. Special legislative committees obtained their assistance in 
drafting detailed and complicated legislation. Extraparliamentary 
advisory bodies were formed out of their membership. In 1880 a 
permanent economic council was established in Prussia at Bis-
marck's instigation.l6 Although the Reichstag rejected an attempt 
by Bismarck to create a similar council for the Reich the following 
year, ad hoc commissions of enquiry were established with increas-
ing frequency, especially during the warP 
What implications did expert assistance in the legislative process 
hold for the future of representative assemblies in Germany? "We 
are thus confronted by the fact," concluded one observer, "that ... 
popular assemblies . . . are becoming decreasingly suited to the 
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pOSItIVe demands of the total organism. Increasingly must they 
abdicate ... functions to other organs which have developed out 
of the natural arrangement of the total organism."18 A leading 
political analyst in Germany, Georg Jellinek, pointed out that "in-
creasingly diverse and inter-related groups unite the innumerable 
human interests to which we vainly attempt to accord expression 
in the formation of a parliament."19 The problem could be re-
solved, according to many observers, by abolishing the Reichstag and 
creating a parliament of experts. Only representatives chosen by 
vocational groups, they maintained, were competent to sit in the 
parliament. Only they were qualified to conduct the important 
business of the latter solely in accordance with factual considera-
tions. Only they could be trusted never to confuse important issues, 
never to transpose a "yo. for a "z." Unquestionably they would 
comprise, in the words of one writer, a "chamber of experts, par 
excellence."2o 
One enthusiast for the superiority of experts in the lawmaking 
process wished to give Germany not one, but three parliaments.21 
Each voter, according to his proposal, could belong to five different 
political parties, organizations, associations, etc. He could cast 
five ballots, one apiece for candidates of his choice presented by 
his five respective parties, organizations, etc. Each of the latter 
could elect three deputies for each unit of 100,000 members. The 
deputies elected were to be distributed equally among three separate 
parliaments of specialists: a Kultttrparlament for religious, educa-
tional, and "national" affairs; a Wirtschaftliche Parlament for 
trade, industry, production, social matters; a Fachparlament fur 
Staatsnotwendigkeiten for finance, administration, foreign and mili-
tary affairs, etc. The activities of the three parliaments were to be 
coordinated by a committee at the top composed of representatives 
from each. 
The author was quite certain that his three parliaments not 
only would reflect the "common will" but also would provide 
Germany with an instrument for political action. He neglected to 
inform his readers, however, concerning the ways in which religious, 
educational, and "national" affairs differed from those concerning 
industry, production, and social problems, and how all could be 
separated so arbitrarily from matters of finance and administration. 
The curious reader, for example, might have inquired how the 
three parliaments would have dealt with the insurance legislation 
passed during the 1880's by the Reichstag. Would the extent of the 
insurance have been the concern of experts in industrial and social 
24 / Prelude to Democracy 
problems, or those in finance and administration? Or perhaps it 
would have been a "national" problem? 
Proportional representation was offered increasingly by the 
middle classes in Germany as a solution to the criticism that elected 
assemblies no longer represented adequately the important social 
and economic groups. Abolish false divisions of the electorate by 
territorial districts, argued many advocates of P. R., and allow the 
voters separated by distance but united by occupation or other com-
mon interests an opportunity to elect persons more qualified by 
expert knowledge than by vote-getting abilities. Professional poli-
ticians, the rabble-rousers with their mass appeals to emotion and 
ignorance, would be swept from office. The parliament elected 
under P. R., they asserted, would contain persons competent to 
legislate on the important social and economic problems confront-
ing the German people. 
The above view was well illustrated in the writings of Karl 
Gageur, a Baden lawyer who took up the cause of P. R. during the 
1890's.22 Gageur attacked the majority system and election by dis-
trict as inadequate media for the representation of economic and 
social interests. In what manner, he asked, were the important 
interests of trade, commerce, industry, and religion represented in 
the popular assembly? Purely by chance, he replied. Arbitrary 
divisions of the electorate by territorial district denied the "natural 
arrangement" of human society into social classes. Society was 
atomized; classes were chopped up and reduced to impotence. The 
process was furthered, he maintained, by the majority system, with 
its denial of representation to classes which within the arbitrarily 
created electoral districts were minority groups. 
A proportional representation of social classes was Mr. Gageur's 
solution to the problem of representation in modern Germany. A 
Reichstag so contituted would afford expression to the "natural ar-
rangement" of human society. The bitterness and antipathy fostered 
among classes by the majority system would disappear. No longer, 
he contended, would competing groups have the opportunity to 
acquire a monopoly of political power; no longer could they 
anticipate exclusion of others from political life. Each would be 
assured by proportional elections of its fair representation in the 
parliament. Conveniently relieved in this manner of the bitterness 
and antipathy fostered in the struggle for political power under 
majority elections, secure in the knowledge that each could not 
eliminate the other or become eliminated, representatives of labor 
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and management would sit down in peace together to "carefully 
weigh and consider the claims of each."23 
Would the Reichstag, split into more factions than ever before, 
have become a more effective instrument of political action than 
it had been in the past? Would the smiling representatives of 
management and labor, relieved of their political antipathies as a 
consequence of proportional elections, have inaugurated important 
new social and economic policies? Such results were so obvious to 
Mr. Gageur that he neglected to discuss them. The claims which 
he made for proportional representation at least reflected a softening 
of the middle-class attitude toward the workers and their socialist 
leaders. The latter were regarded by him as potent forces on the 
social and political scene, forces whose importance had grown 
with each stage of Germany's rapid industrialization. The fact of 
their presence could not be denied; neither could the necessity for 
including them in constructive political activity through the elected 
parliament. 
The contention that P. R. was more suited than the majority 
system to the requirements of representation in modern society ap-
peared in the writings of another middle-class liberal, Dr. Ernst 
Cahn, whose claims for the system rivaled in certain respects those 
of Mr. Gageur in abstraction. Germany's traditional political par-
ties, Dr. Cahn asserted in one of his numerous publications, repre-
sented so-called "idealistic" points of view, i.e., those which were 
predominantly religious, constitutional, or cultural in emphasis.24 
Industrialization, however, had given rise to numerous and diver-
gent economic interest in Germany which clamored for expression. 
It was Dr. Cahn's contention that voters were entitled to send to 
the Reichstag representatives of the new economic as well as of the 
older "idealistic" points of view. They were denied the opportunity 
to do so, he asserted, since the majority system hindered the repre-
sentation of minority groups. The introduction of P. R. would 
guarantee that opportunity: 
It seems especially to be an attraction of the system of pro-
portional representation that it grants the voters complete 
freedom to group themselves around the viewpoints of their 
choice. If they wish to group themselves around an economic 
point of view, they are free to do so; if they wish to rally 
around an idealistic point of view, they will not be hindered 
in doing so. The system of proportional representation 
. allows in this manner for the endless variety of modern 
social, economic, religious-moral, cultural situations which 
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underlie the psychological motivation of the individual per-
son.211 
The distinction between parties which were predominantly 
"idealistic" and those which were "economic" must have aroused 
some curiosity among Dr. Cahn's readers. In which category, they 
might have asked, did he place Germany's Conservative party? Un-
questionably it was one of the "older" parties, Protestant, Prussian, 
and monarchical in conviction, yet it also represented the agrarian 
interests in Germany. Or what about the left-liberal or Progressive 
party to which Dr. Cahn belonged? Were not the left-liberals among 
Germany's oldest political groups? Had they not followed, with 
some deviations, the traditional liberal emphasis upon individual 
rights and parliamentary government? Did they not also represent 
the economic interests of the merchants, the shopkeepers, the hand-
workers, etc.? 
Had the curious reader pursued further his inquiry into Dr. 
Cahn's views on political parties, he might have discovered an 
article published by him in 1909 in a left-liberal journal. The 
article was entitled "The Political Significance of the System of 
Proportional Representation." Had he perused the article, the 
reader might have found Dr. Cahn's conclusions highly rewarding, 
if not surprising: 
... We would have had a liberal majority (including the 
National Liberals, of course) in the Reichstag today had we 
possessed the proportional representation system. Also the 
goal of a majority composed of the left-liberals and the 
Social Democrats still may be realized most 9uickly with the 
system of proportional representation .... WIth the majority 
system thIS goal would he much farther distant. We must 
therefore strive for proportional representation in order to 
attain more quickly our ultimate political ends.26 
Apparently the left-liberals were neither "economic" nor "idealistic" 
in character. They were by implication more interested in the 
acquisition of political power than with any other consideration. 
P. R. seemed to be significant to Dr. Cahn more as an instrument 
of power politics than as a means of facilitating "the psychological 
motivation of the individual person_" 
Dr. Cahn's advocacy of coalition with the Social Democrats 
reflected an important change in middle-class thinking on the 
socialists in Germany. The latter gradually had acquired in the 
eyes of the left-liberals a certain social and political respectability. 
Although Chancellor Biilow in 1907 denounced the socialists as 
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Reichsfeinde, as enemies of the state, just as violently as Bismarck 
had done in 1878, left-liberals after 1900 gradually began to revise 
their views on the socialists, to regard them as possible allies in the 
struggle with agrarian and conservative forces. 
The socialists themselves were in large part responsible for the 
changing liberal attitude. Revisionist tendencies had developed 
within their ranks as the party acquired strength in Germany. 
Leaders and writers like Eduard Bernstein, Ludwig Quessel, and 
others began to urge revision of the traditional Marxist tenets of 
economic crises and the class struggle. Socialist theory, they con-
tended, must be harmonized with the practical aims contained in 
the party's program of Erfurt, a program which called for democra-
tization as well as socialization of the Reich. The revisionists began 
to call openly for an alliance of workingman and middle-class in-
terests to that end. "Although the interests of the new middle class 
and the workers do not coincide in all respects," wrote Quessel in 
1911, "they are nevertheless not so basically different as to prevent 
an agreement and a modus vivendi."27 Despite official denuncia-
tions by party congresses of collaboration with the middle classes, 
socialists became increasingly revisionist in their day-to-day activi-
ties. Representatives in the various Landtage, particularly in South 
Germany, collaborated openly with left-liberal parties on common 
social and political objectives. Alliances were formed increasingly 
with the latter for runoff election contests to the Reichstag. 
Unanimity between the two groups soon developed on the mat-
ter of suffrage reform. Left-liberal factions like the National 
Socialist party and the German People's party had declared them-
selves by 1899 for P. R. for municipal elections. Despite the vocif-
erous if inconsistent opposition of the Progressive leader Friedrich 
Naumann to P. R., left-liberals came more and more to favor the 
system for Reichstag elections under the influence of publicists like 
Ernst Cahn and following disappointments at the polls.28 
The socialists, for their part, long had advocated P. R. for 
Reichstag elections. Article One of the Erfurt program adopted in 
1891 called in part for 
Universal, equal, direct suffrage with secret balloting for all 
citizens of the Reich over 20 years of age irrespective of sex 
for all elections and plebiscites. Proportional representation; 
and until its establishment, statutory redivision of electoral 
districts after every census.29 
The socialists had grown increasingly irritated prior to 1891 with 
the growing disparity between the proportion of votes polled and 
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seats acquired in the Reichstag. In 1887, for example, the party 
received II seats in the Reichstag; a system of full proportionality 
would have raised the number to 40. In 1890 the party received 
35 seats; the proportional figure would have been 78. The prin-
cipal reason for the party's difficulties in this respect lay in the 
antiquated division of electoral districts for Reichstag elections. 
The population displacements which had accompanied industrializa-
tion had thrown out of proportion the theoretical equality in terms 
of population established in 1871 among the electoral districts. 
Districts ranging in population from less than 50,000 inhabitants 
to more than 300,000 all elected one deputy apiece.30 Since the 
Social Democratic party was most heavily concentrated in the large 
industrial districts, its representation in the Reichstag failed to 
reflect accurately the rapid increase in the number of votes polled. 
As revealed in their party debates, the socialists unquestionably 
expected to gain power in the Reichstag through any plan to effect a 
redistribution of seats based on population. In the words of Wil-
helm Liebknecht to the assembled delegates to the party congres!. 
at Halle in 1890, 
Social Democracy today has a much smaller representation 
in the Reichstag in proportion to its voting strength than the 
other parties; it has, for example, only about one-third the 
representation of the Center. Although the Center receives 
fewer votes than we, it nevertheless has three times as many 
deputies.sl 
Liebknecht concluded with a plea for P. R. to remedy what he 
termed "this flagrant injustice." It was in P. R. rather than an 
actual redistribution of districts that the socialists placed their 
greatest hope. They anticipated gains from either plan, but in 
particular from P. R. Despite their frequent majorities in large 
urban districts, the socialists in 1891 still were a minority party in 
most districts. Redistricting would increase their representation 
considerably. The introduction of P. R. would accomplish the same 
end, the socialists reasoned, and also would enable the party to cap-
ture seats in those districts where it was in the minority. Liebknecht 
expressed this line of reasoning at the congress of Erfurt in 1891 
when he stated: 
Our party would profit greatly from this electoral system, for, 
as you all know, we are scattered all over Germany. We are 
not found only in certain areas like the Center and other 
parties; we are not heavily concentrated in individual locali-
ties. Social Democracy is everywhere in Germany, just as it is 
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everywhere in the world. But we are a young party, and 
those electoral districts in which we now comprise the ma-
jority are comparatively few. With the present system of 
election we lose the greater half of our votes-under the 
proportional system of election the number of our deputies 
would be approximately doubled and even tripled.32 
P. R. was an old demand within the Social Democratic party 
even by 1891. As Liebknecht asserted to the delegates at the party 
congress at Halle in 1890, he had advocated the system "for decades, 
even before there was a Social Democratic Party."33 In 1849 he is 
reported to have delivered a lecture on P. R. in Geneva, Switzer-
land. Articles on the system were published by him in German 
journals in 1866-1867 and again in 1873.34 In the lattersli he ad-
vocated replacing the newly enacted electoral law for the Reichstag 
by one which would reflect accurately the "currents" of "thought 
and feeling" within the electorate. The suffrage should be freed of 
"artificially created divisions" like electoral districts; each ballot 
should be accorded equal weight insofar as possible by requiring 
a uniform vote total for the election of deputies. 
In 1877 and 1878 P. R. was discussed in a series of articles pub-
lished by socialist authors in a party journal, Die Zukunft. The 
writers who advocated P. R. were one in denouncing the electoral 
law for the Reichstag. The present arrangement, they reiterated, 
with division by territorial district and election by the majority 
system, created a parliament which reflected imperfectly the various 
shades of opinion within the electorate. In the words of one writer, 
The parliament is not a valid expression of the popular 
temper; it is not a reflection of the views and the parties 
which prevail within the population. It is rather a represen-
tation in which chance majorities emerge amidst heated 
struggles and wanton irregularities, while large fractions of 
the population are restricted in their representation or robbed 
of it entirely.36 
August Bebel, a leading advocate of P. R. among the socialists, 
viewed representation as a right, not of the individual, but of the 
party. "It should be the purpose of a just party representation," 
he stated in Die ZUkunft in 1878, "that every party has seats and 
votes in the popular assembly in exact proportion to the relation 
between the number of votes which it received and the total num-
ber of votes cast."37 
Only one socialist writing in Die Zukunft in 1877-1878 opposed 
P. R.3S Party members were fooling themselves, he contended, when 
they anticipated increased representation in the Reichstag through 
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P. R. Their anticipations were based on electoral statistics which 
did not reveal accurately the proportional voting strengths of the 
various parties. Many parties, he pointed out, did not nominate 
candidates in districts where they had no chance of election. The 
Social Democrats, however, nominated "test candidates" wherever 
they could, and hence acquired a larger proportional vote. "With 
the establishment of the proportional system with all the possible 
mathematical ingenuities," he concluded, "I fear the relative pro-
portion [between votes received and seats acquired] would turn to 
the disadvantage of the Social Democratic party, for we must not 
forget that the other parties for the most part do not nominate 
test candidates."39 The writer's conclusions-prophetic in view of 
socialist experience with P. R. during the Weimar period-went 
unheeded. The Social Democrats came to regard P. R. as a panacea 
for the party's difficulties with electoral district inequalities. They 
continued to do so long after the party would have benefited more 
from a redistribution of electoral districts than from P. R.40 
Although the socialists consistently advocated P. R. for the 
Reichstag and the Landtage after 1891 with the expectation of 
increased representation, they did not seek to justify the system in 
terms of its supposed advantages to the Social Democratic party. 
The party line in this instance was Gerechtigkeit (justice). Socialist 
speakers in the Reichstag and the Landtage reiterated the accumu-
lation of "injustice" against an electoral arrangement which 
"denied" representation to minority groups. Party theorists even 
peered through the tinted spectrum and discovered P. R. and 
Gerechtigkeit to be essential to the Marxist class struggle concept. 
The cardinal principle of modern political life, according to one 
socialist writing in 1913, 
is division by class and the class struggle. In the first place, 
therefore, every citizen must not isolate himself, but must 
seek his representative together with other members of his 
class in combination with others of like conviction. Secondly, 
he must be represented directly. In no event, therefore, can 
he sanction a representative who is alien or even hostile to 
his class status and political conviction. Thirdly, no group 
composed of individuals of one class combined with those 
of like conviction should lose a single one of its votes.41 
It was the writer's conviction that P. R. was the only system of 
election which could meet these conditions. 
Criticisms of the Reichstag election law and proposals for its 
reform hence reflected the tremendous changes which had accom-
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panied Germany's economic development. Industrialization had 
undermined the economic position of the agrarian forces which 
dominated German society and politics. Industrialization had 
spawned a huge mass of workers whose power was exploited by the 
socialists and later by middle-class liberals in attempts to under-
mine the traditional conservative domination. The suffrage became 
in the struggle an instrument for the preservation or extension of 
power. Competing groups sought in electoral reform a weapon 
against their opponents and a means to enhance their respective 
positions. That P. R. appeared so frequently in the reform proposals 
was due in no small part to the comparative ease with which it 
could be combined with other election procedures and techniques 
like the majority system, occupational representation, and plural 
voting. The system also recommended itself as a technique by 
which competing groups might utilize to the fullest possible ad-
vantage elements of support scattered throughout the Reich. P. R. 
in these respects appeared to be most suited as an instrument for 
power amidst the change and diversity which had come to char-
acterize German society. 
4 / The Participants: Experimentation with 
Proportional Representation 
THE struggle for power in Germany fostered widespread experi-mentation with P. R. by legislative bodies. Participants in the struggle introduced proportional voting for elections to 
federal courts of conciliation in commerce and industry, and later 
for the selection of boards for the administration of Germany's com-
prehensive system of social insurance. Several states under their 
urging also adopted limited proportional voting for municipal and 
Landtag elections. In almost every case the reforms were attempts to 
combat the rising power and influence of the socialist movement. 
Experimentation with P. R. in Germany began in federal in-
dustrial courts.! As part of William II's plan to lessen the attrac-
tion of the socialist movement to German workers, the courts were 
established by law in 1890 primarily as agencies for the settlement 
of financial disputes between employers and workers in industrial 
enterprises.2 They also functioned as boards of conciliation in the 
event of actual or threatened strikes. At first the courts were estab-
lished only upon the initiative of workers, employers, or municipal 
authorities; in 1901 they became mandatory for all municipalities 
(Gemeinden) with more than 20,000 inhabitants. Members were 
chosen in equal numbers by employers and workers for terms rang-
ing from one to six years; a president and one deputy, belonging by 
occupation to neither side, were appointed by municipal authori-
ties. As amended in 1901, the election procedure could include 
P. R. at the option of these authorities.s 
The introduction of P. R., especially as an optional election 
procedure, was directed against the socialist movement. Middle-
class parties and groups which dominated municipal government 
could be expected to introduce P. R. where the socialists held ma-
jorities and withhold it where the latter were in the minority. In 
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the latter event, majority elections would continue tu deprive the 
socialists of representation; in the former, proportional elections 
would end their control of worker representation on the courts by 
according expression to nonsocialist minorities. The consequences in 
either event would be detrimental to the socialists, undermining 
their almost exclusive representation of worker interests on the 
courts and hence their power position in the negotiation of indus-
trial disputes. 
The utilization of P. R. to such ends was denounced by the 
socialists. "You wish to use this suffrage," a Social Democratic 
spokesman asserted to his party's opponents in the Reichstag, "only 
when it benefits you, [only] ... as a means of quelling political 
opponents." Local municipal authorities empowered to adopt or 
withhold P. R. were controlled according to the speaker by "middle 
class parties" which, he predicted, "will make use of proportional 
representation only where they expect to benefit at the expense of 
the Social Democrats. Only where the middle class parties are in 
the minority in industrial court elections, only where they fail to 
benefit from the existing electoral system will they utilize propor-
tional representation."4 
Experience with the optional P. R. provision bore out the 
speaker's prediction. The official publication of the industrial 
courts, Das Gewerbegericht, reported that 
in many places the stimulus for the establishment of pro-
portional representation has come from the groups which 
are unrepresented under the old system. Thus the Catholics 
in Munich and Gmiind, the Evangelical Workmen's Union 
in Potsdam, the workmen's secretary of the Christian Trade 
Union in Mannheim have petitioned the city council [for 
P. R.]5 
Social Democratic majorities presumably were present in each case. 
That P. R. was used principally as a weapon against the party in 
industrial courts was revealed in the writings of its publicists and 
in the resolutions of affiliated trade unions. Although nonsocialist 
unions generally expressed approval of the optional P. R. provision, 
the latter condemned it strongly.6 A resolution drafted by a trade 
union conference in Mainz in 1903 reflected the socialist experi-
ence: 
In consideration that the system of proportional representa-
tion is used by municipal authorities in industrial court 
elections for the purpose of weakening the representation of 
modern trade unions; in further consideration that the sys-
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tern of proportional representation still has not benefited a 
workingmen's minority organized into a trade union, the as-
sembly of cartel delegates, trade union directors, and work-
ingmen industrial court members reject the present optional 
system of proportional representation, which has been used 
as a weapon in the class struggle against the modern workers' 
movement.7 
The utilization of P. R. against the Social Democrats in indus-
trial courts placed them in an awkward position.8 They had com-
mitted themselves to the principle of P. R. in the Erfurt Program in 
1891 and had worked thereafter for the system's establishment for 
elections to administrative and legislative bodies in Germany. The 
first utilization of P. R. on a widespread scale, however, had proved 
detrimental to their interests. They found themselves in the curious 
position of advocating an electoral procedure which in the industrial 
courts had become an antisocialist weapon in the hands of other 
parties and groups. The development evidently caused some soul-
searching among the socialists,9 but failed to produce articulate 
opposition to P. R. "The fact," concluded one writer in 1909, "that 
proportional representation could cost us mandates in a number of 
social-political organizations cannot be decisive. It will be off-set 
again by other gains."lO 
Although the greater number of industrial courts retained the 
majority systemp the 1901 amendment fostered considerable ex-
perimentation with P. R.12 Most of the courts which had adopted P. 
R. by 1905 patterned their electoral laws after two drafts. One came 
from the court in Frankfort a. M., where an unsuccessful attempt 
had been made in 1895 to introduce P. R.13 The other was sub-
mitted in 1902 by the Prussian Ministry for Trade and Industry.14 
The latter recommended a simple quota system whereby the num-
ber of deputies to be elected was divided into the total number 
of votes cast and the resultant quotient was established for the 
election of candidates. It also provided for so-called "open" lists. 
The number of votes which each candidate received and not his 
order of designation on the ticket determined his selection in the 
allocation of seats. Several large cities and towns (Freiburg, Munich, 
VIm) rejected such provisions, found in both the Frankfort and 
Prussian drafts, and adopted "closed systems."15 Allocation of seats 
within lists according to the latter followed the order in which the 
party organization had designated the candidates. Closed lists hence 
limited the choice of the voter. He could vote only for the party 
ticket and not for the candidate. 
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Experimentation with P. R. in various forms in industrial courts 
undoubtedly contributed to its inclusion in 1904 in a law establish-
ing mercantile courts (Kaufmannsgerichten) for merchants and 
shopkeepers and their assistants and apprentices.16 The courts were 
made compulsory in all municipalities having more than 20,000 
persons according to the last census. Their purpose was the same 
as that of industrial courts, to function as unifying and moderating 
agencies, and to decide on financial disputes between employers and 
employees. Like the industrial courts, they were elected one-half by 
the latter and one-half by the former. A bill submitted by the 
government incorporated the optional P. R. provision of the in-
dustrial court law. The Reichstag committee which considered 
the bill, however, voted to substitute compulsory P. R. for all mer-
cantile court elections,l7 Members of the committee declared that 
experience with the system in industrial courts merited its extension. 
One member pointed out that a conference of representatives of 
federal industrial courts meeting at Leipzig had declared by "over-
whelming majority" for compulsory P. R. Although the govern-
ment's representatives emphasized a lack of experience with the 
system in Germany, the committee was almost unanimous in its 
approval of the compulsory P. R. provision. The decision was up-
held by the Reichstag in its final reading of the bill,1s 
The decision reflected the importance of political considerations 
in determining party attitudes toward P. R. Optional provisions 
were introduced by nonsocialist parties for elections to industrial 
courts in order to undermine socialist positions of power. Option-
ality was another matter, however, when applied to elections to 
mercantile courts. There the influence of the socialists, who drew 
the bulk of their support from among industrial workers, would be 
almost negligible. To grant local authorities power to withhold or 
extend P. R. would not greatly affect the representation of socialist 
interests. The power might be used, however, to the disadvantage 
of other groups. Progressives in control of some municipalities, for 
example, might use P. R. against Centrist representation on the 
courts, only to experience the same treatment in municipalities 
controlled by the Center. The minority parties which comprised the 
Reichstag majority hence favored compulsory P. R. as a means of 
guaranteeing representation to affiliated minority groups in the 
mercantile courts. 
Among the 218 courts which were established by the mercantile 
court law, 61 adopted "closed" list systems of P. R., 48 chose 
"open" lists, and the remainder attempted to combine the two 
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systems.19 Those in the first category restricted the choice of the 
voter to the ticket as presented by the party, seat allocations pro-
ceeding in order from the top to the bottom of the list of candidates. 
The systems in the second category left the voter free to choose a 
candidate, those with the most votes receiving the seats allotted to 
the party ticket. The remaining 109 courts adopted list systems 
which may be described as closed in the relative sense. The voter 
could cast his ballot for the entire party list, or could designate 
the candidate of his preference. If a majority of the voters for any 
given ticket expressed candidate preferences, then seat allocations 
proceeded according to the number of votes which each candidate 
received. If a majority of the lists were unchanged, then allocation 
proceeded according to the order of designation. While most 
courts merely copied the electoral laws of near-by industrial courts, 
some experimentation took place. The Prussian Ministry for 
Trade and Industry again published a sample electoral law for 
mercantile courts similar to the one which it had published for in-
dustrial courts in 1902.20 
Partisan motives also brought the adoption of P. R. in 1904-
1905 for elections to Prussian mining councils. The councils were 
established in every mine employing at least one hundred persons 
for the purpose of harmonizing relations between employers and 
workers. After considerable discussion and division on the question, 
the commission of the House of Deputies investigating the govern-
ment's bill amended the latter to permit P. R. for council elections. 
Instrumental to the House's approval was the consideration that 
P. R. in the councils would eliminate the complete domination 
there of the socialists.21 
One of the hardest blows dealt the socialist movement in Ger-
many was the introduction of P. R. in the area of social insurance. 
According to the Sickness Insurance Act of 1883, all workers regular-
ly employed in factories, mines, quarries, and other industrial con-
cerns were granted full medical and surgical benefits and limited 
sick pay. Employees such as overseers, engineers, shop assistants, 
etc., in the above industries as well as those in the postal and tele-
graphic services also were covered.22 The funds, provided one-third 
by the employers and two-thirds by the insured, were administered 
by a number of agencies, depending on the type of industrial enter-
prise. Separate ones were established for those represented by 
guilds, for mining, for construction, for large industries employing 
more than fifty persons, for all municipalities containing at least 
100 workers affected by the law, and for persons not included in 
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any of the foregoing categories. By 1905 almost 12,000,000 persons 
belonged to more than 24,000 agencies. Slightly more than one-half 
the membership was concentrated in the Ortskrankenkassen} the 
local municipal offices listed above in the fifth category.23 With the 
exception of those agencies in the sixth or last category, which were 
controlled by local municipal authorities, executive offices or 
boards for the administration of local funds were elected by the 
employers and the insured in proportion to their contributions, 
viz., one-third and two-thirds, respectively. The agencies were 
granted considerable autonomy in determining the amounts paid to 
members, being able, for example, to extend or restrict benefits, 
depending upon their interpretation of the member's need.24 
The local insurance agencies, in particular the Ortskrankenkas-
sen} came to be controlled extensively by the Social Democrats. As 
the strongest group among the workers, they usually were able to 
win majorities in elections to the agencies. Since the latter were 
composed one-third by employers and two-thirds by the insured, 
the socialists could win majorities even without capturing all the 
worker representation. Their control became significant in view of 
the above-mentioned autonomy enjoyed by the local agencies in 
determining insurance benefits. As revealed by debates in the 
Reichstag over insurance legislation in 1911, the Social Democrats 
were not slow to use their positions in the local agencies to the 
disadvantage of nonsocialist groups. The Conservative leader, 
Count von Westarp, alleged, for example, that salaried employees 
who wished to receive full insurance benefits were forced into 
organizations friendly to the Social Democrats. So great was the 
socialist control of local insurance agencies that von Westarp could 
designate the latter, the trade unions, and the party organization as 
the "three props" of "the Social Democratic power-position" in 
Germany.25 
Nonsocialist parties in the Reichstag destroyed one prop by pass-
ing the National Insurance Act of 1911. In addition to extending 
the scope of sickness, accident, and invalid insurance, the Act also 
reorganized and centralized the administrative machinery. In place 
of the former local sickness insurance agencies controlled by the 
Social Democrats, new ones were created which administered all 
types of insurance covered by the Act. The new agencies were 
elected, not according to the former ratio of one-third by em-
ployers and two-thirds by the insured, but one-half by each. In 
place of the majority and plurality systems which had been used 
previously, P. R. was prescribed for all elections. Higher insurance 
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boards, or courts of appeal, were similarly composed, with P. R., 
however, required only for the election of worker members. The 
system also applied only for the election of worker members of the 
highest organ, the Imperial Insurance Office.26 
The National Insurance Act thus removed the basis for Social 
Democratic domination of local insurance administration. The 
new employer-worker ratio in the local insurance offices and the 
introduction of P. R. for the election of worker members removed 
the possibility of socialist majorities. Although denying that local 
insurance agencies were, as von Westarp claimed, one of the "props" 
of Social Democracy, party speakers denounced the Act not only as 
a denial of the right of the insured to administer local insurance 
funds, but also as an attack upon the socialist movement. Their 
bitterness was illustrated by the attitude expressed toward the intro-
duction of P. R. "When you are in the minority, you bring out 
your proposals for the introduction of proportional representation," 
a party spokesman snapped at a heckler during the Reichstag debate. 
"When you are in the majority, you forget all about introducing 
it."27 
A case in point for the speaker was the Hamburg electoral law 
of 1906, one of the most striking uses of P. R. against the Social 
Democrats during the Second Reich. Prior to 1906 one-half the 
total membership of the lower house (80 deputies) was elected in 
districts under the majority system by persons whose taxed incomes 
had exceeded 1,200 marks for five consecutive years; the remaining 
one-half was chosen by a restricted category of administrative 
officials and former members of the upper house, the Senate. In 
1906 the tax requirement for the first one-half was raised so that 
voters in the 1,200 to 2,500 range elected 48 deputies, and those 
above 2,500 marks elected 24. All 72 deputies were elected at large 
by P. R., with the remaining eight chosen in districts by the 
majority system.28 
The reform came in response to Social Democratic gains in the 
taxed-income category. By 1904 more than 90 per cent of the 
voters within this category went to the polls to cast more than 70 
per cent of their ballots for the socialists. The electoral law con-
sequently was changed to avert Social Democratic control of one-
half the membership of the lower house. The introduction of 
P. R. in the lower income category extended representation to non-
socialist minorities formerly outvoted by Social Democatic ma-
jorities. The latter also lost representation with the removal of 
24 deputies to the upper income category. 
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Minority parties benefited further from the kind of P. R. estab-
lished for elections in the taxed-income category. According to the 
new law, alliances could be declared among parties prior to the 
election. Each alliance counted in the allocation of seats as one 
list. Minority groups without much chance of electing candidates 
singly thus could combine lists and elect candidates. As a majority 
party in the lower income classification, and as a party which tradi-
tionally refrained from electoral alliances with other parties, the 
socialists hence suffered from the P. R. provisions of the Hamburg 
electoral law. 
The socialists also were handicapped by provisions of the Ham-
burg law governing the allocation of seats within lists. Although 
parties presented lists of candidates for election, the voter was not 
restricted to a choice among parties in casting his several ballots.29 
He could cast all for one candidate, or could distribute them among 
several persons on a number of lists. Seats allotted to each party 
ticket were distributed among the candidates with the most votes. 
Party organizations thus had no means to insure the election of 
preferred candidates. Loyal workers placed at the top of the list 
might be bypassed by the voter for popular and perhaps less docile 
candidates further down the list. Open list provisions of this descrip-
tion were particularly harmful to strongly organized groups like 
the Social Democratic party, which exerted a rigid discipline over 
the views and votes of deputies in representative assemblies. 
Similar to the Hamburg law was the reform of the Wiirttemberg 
law for elections to the second chamber, which also appeared in 
1906.30 The law transferred to the upper chamber 23 deputies 
elected by privileged groups (thirteen from the nobility, six from 
the Evangelical Church, three from the Catholic Church, and one 
from the University) and substituted 17 deputies to be chosen by 
the electorate in two large districts. The law also increased the 
number of deputies elected from Stuttgart from one to six. The 
total membership of the second chamber (91) hence remained the 
same. The 23 new deputies were to be elected by a P. R. system 
similar to that found in the Hamburg electoral law. Voters could 
cast several ballots, all for one candidate or could distribute them 
among several on lists presented by different parties.3 ! The latter 
could present lists either singly or in combination with others. A 
similar system was established in 1906 for elections in municipalities 
with more than 10,000 inhabitants.32 
The socialists attempted without success during the debates of 
the Wiirttemberg second chamber on the electoral reform bill to 
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extend P. R. for elections to the entire chamber. Other parties 
favored P. R., but only for Social Democratic strongholds where 
the} were in the minority. Although the socialists eventually joined 
with the German party and the People's party to vote P. R. for 
the election of the 23 new deputies, they did so reluctantly. As one 
party spokesman complained, 
the Wiirttemberg government introduces the system of pro· 
portional representation in order to prevent the "suppres-
sion of intelligent minorities by numerical majorities," in 
order "to counter-balance the vast strength of the masses." 
At the same time, however, the middle classes reject the 
Social Democratic proposal to introduce proportional repre-
sentation for elections to all seats.33 
In elections the same year (1906) to the lower chamber in 
Wiirttemberg, the newly created seats were distributed as folIows: 34 
Neckar and Donau and 
Jagst Schwarzwald 
Party Stuttgart District District Combined 
Votes Seats Votes Votes Seats 
Social Democratic Party 117,136 3 508,420 230,331 4 
German Party 59,315 I 200,275 155,325 2 
People's Party 36,081 1 4.55,180 314,762 4 
Conservative Party 16,527 I 370,021 160,200 3 
Center Party 14,551 0 270,687 599,401 4 
It would appear that the Center party received more votes than 
the Social Democrats, yet won fewer seats. The figures are mislead-
ing, however, for voters in Stuttgart were allowed six votes apiece 
and voters in the other two districts were allowed eight and nine 
votes respectively. Vote totals for Stuttgart hence should be in-
creased by one-third for an approximate picture of the proportional 
vote relationships among the three districts. By comparison with 
other parties in the elections, however, the Center still fared badly, 
receiving in the three districts as a whole proportionally less seats 
in relation to the total number of votes than any other party. In 
Stuttgart the socialists received three of the six seats. Had the 
city been divided into equal electoral districts and the majority 
system retained, the Social Democrats probably would have won 
all six seats.35 The party would have acquired four seats in the 
election had the Center and Conservative parties not utilized the 
combined list provisions of the electoral law to return an additional 
Conservative deputy.3u 
Political parties in Bavaria soon discovered in P. R. an effective 
weapon for use against the socialists in municipal elections. The 
Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution in February, 1908, calling 
for P. R. in all municipalities with more than 4,000 inhabitants, 
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and recommending further that the system be extended to munic-
ipalities below 4,000 upon petition of one-fifth of the qualified 
voters.37 The Bavarian government returned a bill the following 
June embodying the first recommendation, but not the second. The 
bill passed both chambers and became law on August 15, 1908.38 
Eighty-five of the approximately 115 municipalities in Bavaria 
were affected by the law. An election of municipal deputies 
(Gemeindebevollmiichtigen) held the same year under the new law 
produced the following percentage results: 39 
Votes Deputies 
Liberal 38.7 30.0 
Social Democrat 28.8 9.2 
Center 19.4 22.8 
Local groups 4.1 25.3 
Economic and social groups 7.3 4.2 
Unaffiliated 0.5 0.3 
Allied parties and groups 2.2 8.2 
Differences among the two groups of percentages were striking for 
the socialists, who received more than one-fourth of the total vote, 
yet won less than one-tenth of the contests. The disparity was 
greatest in favor of local groups, with the deputy percentage being 
approximately six times greater than that representing the total 
number of votes polled. 
Several factors contributed to the disparities. The socialists 
were most heavily concentrated in large urban municipalities with 
more than 100,000 inhabitants, where the ratio of voters to elected 
officials exceeded that for town and rural areas. Local groups, on 
the other hand, were strongest in the latter, and hence could elect 
more deputies with less votes than the socialists.40 Certain pro-
visions of the electoral law also worked to the disadvantage of 
the socialists. Like the Hamburg and Wiirttemberg laws, the one 
for Bavaria gave the voter practically unlimited freedom in the 
choice of candidates. He could distribute his several votes among 
candidates on different party lists if he wished to do, so. He could 
even write in the names of individuals not found on the official 
lists. Such freedom of selection enjoyed by the voter undoubtedly 
increased the number of contests won by independent candidates. 
Provisions allowing parties to combine lists also contributed to dis-
parities among deputy and seat percentages. Such combinations 
elected 97 deputies with 2.2 per cent of the total vote, whereas the 
socialists received 109 with 28.8 per cent. The Center and liberal 
parties and a number of local groups participated in the combina-
tions, their deputy and vote percentages being consequently higher 
than revealed by the returns,41 
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P. R. appeared frequently in the consideration of electoral re-
form in Baden. As early as 1869 the second chamber debated and 
rejected the system.42 Although the chamber in 1894 passed by 
large majority a left-liberal proposal for P. R., the government re-
jected the system on the grounds that local interests would not 
receive adequate expression.43 P. R. was not established in Baden 
until 1910, and then only for municipal elections. According to the 
electoral reform of that year, the system was introduced for elec-
tions in all municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants. The 
law combined a closed list system with the established three-class 
system of voting.44 Although the war temporarily postponed further 
consideration of P. R. for legislative elections in Baden,45 reform 
proposals began to appear late in 1917. The liberals joined with the 
socialists to petition for universal P. R. in the second chamber, and 
the Center proposed P. R. for large city districts.46 The govern-
ment rejected universal P. R., but declared through a spokesman 
early in 1918 that revision of the electoral system in large cities 
would be permitted. The reform was not inaugurated before the 
end of the Reich. 
The development toward P. R. in Baden prior to 1918 was 
paralleled in other states. Oldenburg and Lubeck adopted the system 
for municipal elections in 1907 and 1908 respectively. The liberal 
and Center parties in Alsace-Lorraine attempted unsuccessfully to 
introduce P. R. for municipal elections.47 A resolution by the 
second chamber in Saxony in 1908 for P. R. for the election of part 
of its membenhip was thwarted the following year by the opposition 
of the first chamber.48 After lengthy debate and despite the sup-
port of the Social Democrats, Progressives, and National Liberals, 
P. R. was rejected in 1917 in the Saxon second chamber largely in 
consequence of the government's opposition. As reported by one 
observer, "the government had declared against turning the 
state over to the masses [i.e., the industrial workers]. That would 
be an injustice to the educated citizenry and the peasants."49 The 
second chamber reversed itself the following year, however, and 
adopted a resolution presented by the National Liberals calling for 
universal P. R. with plural voting. 50 The fall of the Reich inter-
vened before further action could be taken. 
In Prussia in 1918 the resurgent demand to abolish the three-
class system of voting was again rejected by the Lower House. The 
debate produced a compromise proposal, however, which included 
the introduction of P. R. in several mixed-language districts in 
East Prussia containing Polish majorities. Despite endorsement by 
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the Lower House, the proposal was rejected by the Prussian govern-
ment.51 In Bavaria the liberals and the socialists sought unsuccess-
fully prior to 1918 to secure the adoption of universal P. R. for 
La'ndtag elections. A resolution to that effect was rejected in 1917 
by agricultural groups and the Center. Universal P. R. presumably 
would have reduced the number of rural representatives in the 
House.52 In June, 1918, the Landtag rejected a similar resolution 
by the liberals and socialists. One by the Center party calling for 
P. R. in five large cities was accepted, but no reform was enacted 
before the collapse of the Reich a few months later. 53 
Only in one instance was P. R. introduced in federal and state 
legislation enacted during the war. A Civilian Service Law passed 
in 1916 compelled all German men between the ages of seventeen 
and sixty to take employment in certain occupations considered 
vital to the war effort.54 Committees of workers in the various occu-
pations were established in all industries directly affected by the 
law and in all those which employed at least 50 workers. The com-
mittees were elected by P. R. To serve as media for the expression 
of workers' complaints, their purpose was essentially to harmonize 
relations between management and labor. Presumably the purpose 
was aided by assuring, through proportional elections, an adequate 
representation of nonsocialist minorities. 
Opponents of the socialist movement in Germany thus found 
in P. R. an instrument useful in the struggle for power. To combat 
the increasing representation of Social Democrats in state legisla-
tures, the system could be extended to urban districts where their 
voting strengths were most heavily concentrated. To undermine 
socialist domination of the workers' movement in Germany, it could 
be used in elections to the numerous bodies which had arisen with 
social and factory legislation. The effectiveness of P. R. for such 
purposes was enhanced by the numerous refinements to which it lent 
itself. "Open" lists and plural voting offered the worker an op-
portunity to distribute his votes among both socialist and opposing 
candidates, thus endangering the "disciplined" vote sought by 
socialists. Combined list provisions made it possible for minority 
groups without chance of electoral success singly to elect candidates 
at the expense of the socialists, who usually refrained or were 
excluded from such alliances. In these and numerous other ways 
the suffrage justified by its proponents as the most democratic in 
existence was used by entrenched social and political groups against 
a movement which had as its ultimate purpose the democratization 
and socialization of the Reich. 
5 / The Reichstag and Proportional Representation 
EXTENSIVE population changes during the Second Reich under-lay the demand for electoral reform in the Reichstag. Although an approximate equality had been established in 1871 among 
the Reichstag's electoral districts,! rural areas during the ensuing 
decades lost thousands of voters to the urban districts. By 1912 
approximately one-half of the districts had less than the over-all 
average of 36,000 voters, while several had accumulated more than 
100,000, one even exceeding 300,000.2 Despite the presence of such 
inequalities, each district continued to elect one deputy apiece to 
the Reichstag. 
The demand for redistricting came chiefly from those parties 
which were underrepresented by the existing electoral arrangement. 
The Social Democrats were heavily concentrated in the large urban 
districts, and hence led the demand for reform. The Progressives, 
representing the commercial and intellectual middle classes, also 
were strongest in the cities and favored a redistribution of dis-
tricts.3 The National Liberals, drawing their support chiefly from 
business and heavy industry, likewise elected the greatest share of 
their deputies in the Reichstag from the urban districts. Since any 
redistribution in favor of the latter would increase Social Demo-
cratic strength in the Reichstag, however, they were extremely 
reluctant to tamper with the existing arrangement. 
Rural interests within the Center and Conservative parties led 
the opposition to redistricting. Although the Center, as the party 
of Catholicism in Germany, included within its membership repre-
sentatives of all social and economic groups in both town and coun-
try, agrarian interests held the ascendancy. Spokesmen for the party 
in the Reichstag hence opposed any change in the election system 
which might reduce the representation of rural areas, especially 
since an extension of representation in the industrial areas would 
increase the number of Social Democratic deputies.4 Most vociferous 
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was the opposition of the Conservatives, whose voting strength lay 
almost entirely in the agrarian districts. As representatives of the 
conservative regime which dominated Germany throughout the 
Second Reich, they became almost hysterical in denouncing any and 
all attempts to alter the constitution. Spokesmen in the Reichstag 
were emphatic in rejecting any plan for redistricting which would 
decrease the number of deputies elected from agrarian districts to 
the advantage of the Social Democrats concentrated in the urban 
districts. "We do not want that," asserted one Conservative in 1903 
on the floor of the Reichstag. "Neither can we allow it to happen."5 
The elections of 1912 gave fresh impetus to agitation for reform 
of the electoral law for the Reichstag. All the major parties lost 
seats to the Social Democrats, whose representation to the Reichstag 
rose from 43 to 110. The losses were particularly disturbing to the 
National Liberal and Progressive parties, for each received more 
votes in 1912 than in 1907.6 The National Liberal percentage of the 
total vote in 1912 declined only slightly (6.2 per cent) from that in 
1907, and that of the Progressive party for the same years increased 
substantially (17.9 per cent). Yet the two parties lost nine and 
seven seats, respectively, in 1912. 
The losses were attributed principally to the functioning of the 
electoral law. Candidates were elected in single-member districts, 
with a majority of the votes required for election. When none 
received a majority, second or runoff elections were held between 
the two with the most votes. The National Liberals fared badly in 
the first elections in 1912, losing majorities in 15 districts and 
emerging with only four seats. Even more disturbing was the ex-
perience of the Progressives, who lost majorities formerly held in 
12 districts and emerged without a single seatP In subsequent 
elections in districts where no candidate had received a majority 
in the first balloting, the National Liberals and Progressives re-
ceived 41 and 42 seats, respectively. Each party hence was dependent 
upon the unpredictable runoff elections for the maintenance of its 
political power in the Reichstag. Each was a minority party within 
the existing arrangement of districts and might be expected to look 
with favor upon any system of minority representation. 
Agitation for P. R. accordingly developed within both parties 
immediately following the election.s The National Liberals de-
clared in the Reichstag their readiness to adopt P. R. for the large 
industrial districts.9 The Progressives followed by advocating uni-
versal P. R. for Reichstag elections.1° Even the distinguished Progres-
sive leader, Friedrich Naumann, temporarily dropped his opposition 
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to P. R. and concluded reluctantly in the Progressive organ, Die 
Hilfe, that "the outcome of the election now compels us to work 
strongly and persistently for proportional representation."ll The 
Progressives joined with the Social Democrats in the Reichstag in 
1913 in an attempt to establish universal P. R. for Reichstag elec-
tions. The Social Democrats at that time attempted to capitalize 
on National Liberal discontent with the existing system. One spokes-
man for the party asserted during the debate: 
The complaint often has been heard especially from the 
ranks of the National Liberals that sufficient representation 
of industry and trade in the Reichstag cannot be obtained. 
They have complained, for example, that Hamburg had 
three Social Democratic deputies, while the liberals were not 
represented. Certainly, gentlemen, I grant without question 
that it is unjust that strong minorities held by the individual 
parties in many electoral districts remain entirely without 
representation. .,. I should think, therefore, that this party 
[the National Liberal] in particular had all the necessary 
inducement to consider carefully the proportional electoral 
system and the redistribution of electoral dIstricts. The liberal 
parties could acquire considerably more power in the German 
Reich than they have today if they worked diligently for a 
better electoralsystem.12 
The Social Democratic appeal almost worked. The resolution for 
universal P. R. was defeated by one vote.13 
Although the war for a time postponed further agitation for 
electoral reform and P. R. for the Reichstag, Germany's internal 
divisions eventually shattered the Bttrgfrieden and forced recon-
sideration of such questions. The existing power divisions within 
the Reich and the individual states, particularly Prussia, failed to 
reflect the economic and political developments of a swiftly in-
dustrializing state.14 Most of the parties were discontented with a 
political system which failed to accord them full participation in 
the direction of public affairs. The government's new poley of con-
ciliation toward the Social Democrats only temporarily quieted the 
general discontent of the largest single party in the Reichstag. By 
1917 the Progressive and National Liberal parties joined with the 
Social Democrats to demand the creation of a special committee 
for the consideration of constitutional reform. The resolution was 
adopted in the Reichstag on March 30 by a majority of 228 to 33. 
At the initiative of the Progressives, an interparty committee was 
formed on July 6 among the Progressive, National Liberal, Social 
Democratic, and Center parties of the Reichstag for the purpose of 
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fostering unammity on questions of internal political reform.15 
The committe's deliberations soon extended to foreign policy and 
produced the July Peace Proposal. Asserting that Germany was 
fighting a defensive war, the proposal called for a "peace of under-
standing" and the rejection of all plans for territorial annexation 
and "political, economic, and financial oppression." 16 It was 
adopted by a majority composed of Social Democrats, Centrists, and 
Progressives. Although the National Liberals withheld their sup-
port of the proposal and withdrew from the interparty committee, 
they joined with the majority parties in demanding universal 
suffrage for Prussia and parliamentarization of the Reich. 
In its first report to the Reichstag the Constitutional Committee 
recommended an increase in the number of seats in the Reichstag 
and the establishment of P. R. in the large industrial districts. The 
recommendation was debated and adopted by the Reichstag on 
July 6, 1917; a Social Democratic resolution calling for universal 
P. R. was voted down. Both were rejected by the Conservatives. 
Although they had polled slight minorities in several of the large 
industrial districts in the elections of 1912,11 an increased repre-
sentation was unlikely. As members of a party which benefited 
from the existing division of electoral districts, they feared that 
the action might lead to P. R.'s extension throughout the Reich. 
The Center and National Liberal parties supported the commit-
tee's resolution and rejected the Social Democratic proposal. The 
Progressive Party likewise supported the resolution, but indicated 
its willingness to consider universal P. R. should experimentation 
with the system in the large industrial districts prove satisfactory. 
All three had polled sizeable totals in 1912 in several of the large 
districts, and could expect substantial gains.18 
The resolution for P. R. in the large industrial districts con-
fronted the Social Democrats with the same problem which had 
accompanied the introduction of P. R. in other areas in Germany.19 
Again the system would be introduced where their voting strength 
was most heavily concentrated. The Majority Socialists accepted 
the reform proposal reluctantly with the hope that P. R., once 
established, eventually would displace the majority system entirely. 
The Independent Socialists rejected anything short of universal 
P.R. 
In response to the Reichstag's action on the Committee proposal, 
the Reich government submitted a suffrage reform bill to the 
Reichstag on February 16, 1918. According to its provisions, the 
membership of the Reichstag was to be raised from 397 to 441. 
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Thirty-six large single-member districts were to be reorganized and 
accorded 80 deputies, all of which were to be elected by a system of 
P. R. with open lists and the d'Hondt method of allocation.2o Of 
the 36 districts to be reorganized, 27 had returned Social Democratic 
deputies in the election of 1912, two National Liberal, two Polish, 
one Progressive, and four Centrist. A reallocation of seats in the 
new districts on the basis of the 1912 election statistics and the 
d'Hondt method would have given the Social Democrats roughly 
50 and the Poles two, with the remaining 28 distributed somewhat 
equally among the Progressives, Centrists, and National Liberals.21 
The Social Democratic gain hence would have been approximately 
equal to that of the combined gains of the other parties. 
By February, 1918, the relationship between the Reichstag and 
the federal government had shifted. The resignation of Chancellor 
Michaelis had been forced by the Reichstag in October. His suc-
cessor, Count Hertling, first conferred with the Reichstag majority 
and agreed upon basic policy before accepting the chancellorship.22 
The appointment of Friedrich von Payer as Vice-Chancellor placed 
in the Chancellery a leading Reichstag advocate of parliamentary 
government for the Reich. That the former chairman of the 
Reichstag majority's interparty committee used his new position 
in the interests of suffrage reform and P. R. was reflected in his 
statements as official spokesman for the government in the Reichs-
tag. 
During a speech to the Reichstag on February 25, 1918, von 
Payer referred to the electoral reform bill and the opportunity 
which it presented for experimentation with P. R.23 The Con-
servatives assailed the reference immediately on the grounds that 
it contradicted the government's declaration in the bill's preamble 
against the extension of P. R. to the remaining districts of the 
Reich.24 During the sessions of the Constitutional Committee from 
March through June, the Conservative members repeatedly de-
nounced von Payer's speech and challenged representatives of the 
government to state the latter's real position on the extension of 
P. R.25 Reference to the statement in the bill's preamble failed to 
mollify them. As a remonstrance against von Payer, they even 
withheld their vote in committee on a Social Democratic proposal 
calling for universal P. R.26 
The Conservatives renewed their attack upon von Payer when 
the reform bill appeared before the Reichstag on July 8 for its 
second reading. A sharp exchange occurred between the Vice-
Chancellor and the Conservative leader, Count von Westarp, dur-
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ing the debate.27 Von Westarp repeatedly challenged von Payer 
to affirm the government's unalterable opposition to the extension 
of P. R. to other electoral districts. Von Payer merely replied that 
the government was not presently contemplating the extension of 
the system. His statements indicated the effect of his own sympathies 
with P. R.28 upon the government's policy with regard to the system. 
They stood in contrast with the government's failure even to men-
tion P. R. in the presentation of its views to the Reichstag the 
preceding year (July 6, 1917) on the first report of the Constitutional 
Committee.21l A National Liberal speaker had concluded during 
the subsequent debate that the omission implied the government's 
opposition to the system's inclusion in the Committee's recom-
mendation. No clarifying statement had been made by the govern-
ment's representative, Dr. Helferrich.30 
The Conservatives were especially disturbed by an amendment 
voted by the Progressive, Social Democratic, and National Liberal 
members of the committee of the Reichstag which considered the 
reform bill. The amendment called for automatic extensions of the 
mandate and P. R. in those districts which experienced large popu-
lation growths in the future. Each district would receive an addi-
tional deputy for each new unit of 200,000 inhabitants when the 
population exceeded 300,000.31 Although the amendment probably 
would have affected very few electoral districts, it was significant as 
a commitment by the Reichstag to the principle of P. R.'s automatic 
extension. 
The Conservatives rejected the entire reform bill, which in-
cluded the automatic P. R. amendment, on the grounds that it 
would benefit the industrial districts and the socialists. A party 
spokesman asserted in the July 8 debate that the bill 
signifies an important gain for the urban population and 
especially for the organized industrial workers. The un-
restricted numerical principle will lead, indeed, to class 
domination by the industrial working class. Thus the Social 
Democrats will benefit most from this law; and above all, the 
industrial consumer groups of the large cities will be 
strengthened in the Reichstag.32 
Any shift in the balance of political power from rural to urban 
districts, whether by means of P. R. or by redistricting with the 
majority system, would have reduced Conservative strength in the 
Reichstag. The party had remained predominantly rural in com-
position and could have expected no gains in industrial areas under 
P.R. 
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The Conservatives, to be sure, had favored P. R. for elections 
to boards for the administration of social insurance and in other 
areas as a weapon against the socialists. As reflected in contemporary 
literature calling for electoral reform, many even were willing to 
introduce proportional voting in combination with occupational 
representation and other devices for restricting expression in the 
Reichstag of the growing urban population.33 The use of pro-
portional elections without such safeguards, however, was another 
matter. Once substituted for the majority system in the industrial 
districts, P. R. as embodied in the reform bill might easily be ex-
tended in the same form to the remaining districts. For this reason 
the Conservatives opposed the reform bill from beginning to end 
and attacked the Vice-Chancellor, von Payer, so persistently for his 
sympathies with an electoral system which they feared. 
The same unwillingness to alter the antiquated representation 
ratio between industrial and agrarian areas characterized the 
attitude of the Center. One party spokesman asserted in the July 8 
debate that the automatic P. R. amendment would lead to a "one-
sided advantage of the large industrial electoral districts at the 
expense of the remaining electoral districts."34 Although the 
Center opposed the amendment largely for this reason both in 
committee and on the floor of the Reichstag, the party did not 
reject the entire bill. It joined the Progressives, Social Democrats, 
and National Liberals to pass the bill as amended. The Center 
thus compromised its opposition to universal P. R., first by ap-
proving the system for the large industrial districts affected by the 
reform bill, and then by accepting the amended bill with the 
automatic P. R. provision. Tempted by the prospect of increased 
political power through extensions of the mandate and P. R. to the 
urban areas, the Center gradually abandoned the majority system 
which, along with an unequal distribution of electoral districts, 
long had accorded the party representation in excess of propor-
tionate voting strength. The party certainly was aware that it 
would lose seats in the Reichstag if universal P. R. were established, 
for it consistently had received seats in excess of the percentage of 
votes polled.35 There was no indication at that time, however, 
that a P. R. system establishing full proportionality might be 
adopted by the Reichstag parties. The latter had given their 
approval to the d'Hondt system contained in the reform bill, and 
that system favored parties which were geographically concen-
trated.36 The Center therefore could expect that the initial losses 
under any future system of P. R. for elections to the Reichstag might 
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not be as high as one·fourth of its representation.3T The party also 
could expect to extend itself in those areas where it had been denied 
representation as a minority group under the majority system, and 
hence could strengthen its appeal to Catholic working groups. 
The Center's shift toward P. R. in 1918 illustrated the force 
of the movement for universal P. R. by the parties of the political 
left. A Progressive member of the Reichstag, himself critical of the 
reform bill and its P. R. provisions, wrote in the Preussische Jahr-
bucher in June, 1918, that P. R. had received the sudden and almost 
unanimous approval of the parties of the Reichstag: 
. . . One gathered from the debates that almost all parties 
suddenly were convinced of the advantages of the propor-
tional principle as opp'osed to the majority system. Only the 
Right voiced a noisy If somewhat superficial opposition .... 
Suddenly and quite recently an axiom had emerged.3s 
The writer attributed the appearance of the new "axiom" to the 
dominance of partisan political considerations: 
One now encounters this point of view even in parliamentary 
circles: Proportional representation may be detrimental and 
questionable, but we must adopt it because certain political 
ends can be attained thereby. To debate the defects and the 
impossibilities of the law with men of such convictions really 
serves no purpose.39 
The dominance of partisan considerations in the attitudes of parties 
in the Reichstag toward P. R. in 1918 was reflected in their substitu-
tion of closed list provisions for the open list system in the govern-
ment's bill. The voter according to this system could designate the 
candidate of his choice on the party ticket for which he cast his 
ballot. If one· half the voters for a given ticket designated preferred 
candidates, seats would be distributed among those with the most 
votes. If one-half failed to do so, then the allocation would proceed 
according to the sequence of candidates printed on the list.40 The 
provisions were deleted by the Reichstag in an amendment to the 
government's bill. The voter was expressly denied the right to 
choose candidates on party tickets by the stipulation that seat alloca-
tions within the latter were to proceed in order from the first to the 
last candidate listed.i1 Since the party organizations which pre-
sented the tickets decided the sequences, the amendment strength-
ened party control of the choice of candidates. The Center opposed 
the amendment as a restriction of the voter's freedom of expres-
sion.42 The Conservative party rejected it as an instrument of party 
tyranny.43 
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Although the National Liberal party was not a leader in the 
movement of the Reichstag parties toward universal P. R. in 1918, 
the party voted for the suffrage reform bill and for the automatic 
P. R. provision. During the 1870's the party consistently had re-
ceived representation in the Reichstag in excess of proportionate 
voting strength. As the party suffered decline during the 1880's, 
however, it had begun to receive fewer seats than its proportionate 
voting strength.44 In 1890 the National Liberals were jolted by the 
outcome of Reichstag elections in Baden districts. In 1887 they had 
received nine of the 14 Reichstag seats from Baden with approxi-
mately 44 per cent of the votes. In 1890 they received 32 per cent 
of the votes and still constituted the largest single party in Baden, 
but failed to secure a single seatl Other parties had combined against 
them in the runoff elections.45 The significance of the Baden experi-
ence for the party's future was reinforced by the elections of 1912, 
described above. After 1912 the National Liberals were painfully 
aware of their position as a minority party dependent upon the 
unpredictable runoff elections for representation in the Reichstag. 
"It is ... characteristic of our party," concluded one member writ-
ing in 1917, "that more and more our old original seats are overrun, 
that party splintering has made the National Liberal as well as 
other liberal parties dependent upon the runoff election for the 
greatest number of their mandates."46 Universal P. R. might not 
achieve a large increase in representation, but at least it seemed 
to assure the party's continued representation in the Reichstag. 
The Progressives were divided in 1917-1918 on the question of 
universal P. R. for elections to the Reichtag. Their failure to re-
tain a majority of the votes in any district in the election of 1912 
had contributed to demands for P. R. Although the system had 
become a part of the Progressive program, it had not been pushed 
by the party's leaders.47 One of the strongest leaders, Friedrich 
Naumann, even opposed the system. Since P. R. ideally affords ex-
pression to all shades of opinion within the electorate, Naumann 
believed it would destroy Germany's chances for a two-party system, 
which he regarded as requisite to parliamentary government.48 
Other elements within the Progressive party, however, were less 
concerned with a two-party system and parliamentary government 
than with their party's immediate future. They believed that P. R. 
would increase their membership in the Reichstag.49 According to 
one Progressive propagandizing for P. R. in a National Liberal 
publication, the system would bring "a certain win" of 23 seats for 
liberals in the Reichstag. Not least important, the writer claimed, 
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would be "the protection of such electoral districts as Bochum, Duis-
burg, Saarbriicken, and Leipzig, which certainly are gravely threat-
ened at the present time."50 The pressure of discontented Progres-
sives led the party in 1917-1918 to sponsor the petition for P. R. 
for large industrial districts and the amendment for the system's 
automatic extension. The party then united with the Social Demo-
cratic, National Liberal, and Center parties on November 8, 1918, 
to petition for universal P. R.51 
An important factor which underlay acceptance of P. R. by the 
parties of the political left and center was the pressure of local 
groups, particularly trade unions, for increased representation of 
their interests in the Reichstag. One union spokesman writing in 
1909 pointed out that "the Center from 1877 to 1907 had one worker 
in the Reichstag .... "52 According to the writer, the Center, under 
pressure from the workers, nominated a number of worker candi-
dates for election to the Reichstag in 1907. "In several electoral 
districts, like Osnabriick and Saarbriicken," however, "the radical 
worker candidates were withdrawn at the last moment due to the 
objection of the 'better' Centrist people. Lawyers [Justizriite] 
were substituted for the workers."53 Nonsocialist unions also were 
irritated by the number of representatives of socialist unions 
elected to the Reichstag. In 1912, for example, there were 26 repre-
sentatives of the latter in the Reichstag, and only seven and two 
representatives, respectively, of the Christian and independent trade 
unions.54 The views of one union leader in 1918 illustrated the 
pressure of nonsocialist unions upon the parties for the introduction 
of P. R. as a means to increase their representation in the Reichstag. 
Pointing to an increasing difficulty of electing trade union repre-
sentatives in urban districts as a result of the socialist upsurge, the 
writer concluded: 
The members of the Christian-national workers' movement 
wish to remain true to the parties with which they have been 
associated, but they wish better representation within these 
parties .... They wish approximate proportionality with 
other groups in the allocation of mandates. The previous 
treatment accorded our movement in this respect is to be 
attributed less readily to the middle class parties themselves 
than to the electoral system with its majority principle. A 
new means must be found. That means is proportional repre-
sentation, which will provide representatives to the middle-
class parties in those electoral districts in which they pre-
viously failed or no longer are able to elect their candidates.55 
The middle classes also voiced disappointment with the existing 
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electoral system. The workers, one Progressive complained in 1913, 
were represented exclusively in predominantly industrial districts. 
Even in "mixed" industrial and agricultural districts, manufac-
turers, merchants, hand workers, etc., were seldom elected. "Pro-
portional representation," he concluded, "would completely ex-
clude these abuses, for it guarantees representation to the minor-
ity."116 
It is strange that the Social Democrats continued to advocate 
P. R. after 1912. By 1890 they polled more votes than any other 
single party; the popular vote for the party continued to rise 
steadily. By 1912 the Social Democrats were no longer spread thinly 
throughout the country. They held strong majorities in most of 
the large industrial districts, and had sizeable pluralities in many 
other districts. By 1912 the Social Democrats would have benefited 
more from redistricting and a plurality system than from universal 
P. R. They received pluralities in 1912 in 144 electoral districts 
and secured llO seats in the Reichstag.1I7 A system of full pro-
portionality would have allotted the party 134 seats on the basis 
of the 1912 election statistics. Even without redistricting the party 
thus would have benefited more from a plurality system than from 
P.R. 
The failure of the Social Democrats to reject P. R. has led one 
writer in this country to conclude that they were motivated by 
considerations of "justness" and "fairness."lIs The writer apparent-
ly has taken at face value the innumerable appeals to electoral 
Gerechtigkeit which appeared after 1891 in almost every socialist 
writing or speech about electoral systems. He has assumed further 
that the Social Democrats realized that redistricting and the 
plurality system would have benefited them more than P. R. The 
conclusions of at least one contemporary among the socialists suggest 
that the Social Democrats by 1912 were practically incapable of 
considering electoral statistics objectively. Referring to the views of 
"many middle-class publicists" that the majority system would one 
day benefit the socialists to the detriment of the nonsocialists, the 
writer concluded: 
The time when the majority system will begin to benefit the 
Social Democratic Party still seems quite distant. According 
to A. Kolb there were 58 electoral districts in 1903, 53 in 
1907,93 in 1912 in which Social Democratic voters comprised 
over 40 per cent of the total number of voters. These dis-
tricts thus can be regarded as socialist. According to the 
[total] number of votes received [in all districts], however, 
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the Social Democratic Party should have received 127 seats in 
1903,83 in 1907, 138 in 1912 [SiC].1>9 
The writer's use of electoral statistics reflected the typical socialist 
approach. Electoral statistics had significance to the socialists only 
insofar as they revealed the disparity between the percentage of 
total votes polled and the percentage of seats held. It probably 
never occurred to the above writer to count the number of districts 
in which his party had secured pluralities. Had he done so, and 
had he concluded in favor of a plurality system and rejected P. R., 
the evidence strongly suggests that his party would have ostracized 
him. To the present writer's knowledge, there appeared between 
1891 and 1918 only one publication by a socialist which criticized 
P. R.; and significantly, this one appeared anonymously.60 The 
author of the publication maintained that the Social Democrats 
would benefit more from a redistribution of electoral districts in 
Reichstag elections than from P. R. He referred to the socialist 
agitation for P. R. as so much "fuss over nothing," and complained 
that the system had come to be treated, even by 1895, as "a kind of 
axiom."61 The views of another socialist writing in 1909 revealed 
the anger of socialists over the use of P. R. to their disadvantage by 
other parties.62 To maintain, however, that the party was com· 
mitting "a sort of harakari" by advocating P. R. under such cir-
cumstances was not considered "expedient" by the writer. His 
reason: "We could be criticized for not adhering to our principles."63 
The complete lack of critical analysis of P. R. in relation to socialist 
voting strength, even in face of the system's utilization to the party's 
obvious disadvantage, suggests that the Social Democrats were not 
motivated in their advocacy of P. R. primarily by considerations 
of "justness" and "fairness." The Erfurt party congress in 1891 
had decreed P. R. as the electoral arrangement most beneficial to 
the party. Critical analysis of the system by socialists thereafter 
ceased. 
P. R. thus found acceptance in the Reichstag in 1917-1918. The 
suffrage bill presented by the government in February, 1918, was 
amended to include the automatic P. R. provision and passed its 
third reading by the Reichstag on July 10, 1918. It became law on 
August 24 of that year, died with the fall of the Reich in November, 
and reappeared almost verbatim in the electoral law of the German 
Republic. 
That P. R. rather than a plan for redistricting was adopted by the 
Reichstag in 1917-1918 may be attributed partly to the peculiarities 
of the system's growth within Germany. It had been experimented 
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with and adapted to eXIstmg electoral procedures (the majority 
system, election by district, plural voting, etc.) for almost two 
decades. The areas in which P. R. was employed-industrial and 
mercantile courts, social insurance boards, workers' committees, 
large urban districts-reveal the close connection between its growth 
and Germany's industrialization. The system, moreover, had demon-
strated its usefulness to the nonsocialist parties in areas where large 
socialist majorities were present. All the major political parties 
with the exception of the Conservatives had sought P. R. in various 
states for Landtag elections in large industrial districts. That these 
parties introduced P. R. for Reichstag elections in the large in-
dustrial districts was not surprising. They merely extended to the 
Reich the solution they had long advocated for states with similar 
population shifts arising from industrialization. 
Even those like Friedrich Naumann who attempted to rise above 
partisan politics doubted the practicality of redistricting alone as a 
solution, and were attracted by P. R.'s supposed merits. Past experi-
ence in Bavaria and Alsace-Lorraine, Naumann stated in Die Hilfe 
following the election of 1912, illustrated the tremendous difficulties 
involved in redistricting. "A parliamentary majority never has 
been able to free itself from partisan considerations when marking 
off new districts." Highly significant was his second objection to 
redistricting, that "our own experience has shown that population 
growths invalidate any suffrage within 10 to 20 years."64 Naumann 
concluded that P. R. and not redistricting was the solution to the 
problem of district inequalities, for population increases under P. R. 
merely would raise the quotient required for the election of a 
Reichstag deputy.65 His conclusions reflected the effects of swift 
population growths and shifts in pointing up the difficulties of 
redistricting and contributing to P. R.'s acceptance. 
The electoral system which had developed with Germany's in-
dustrialization thus emerged in 1917-1918 as the solution to elec-
toral problems largely created by industralization. Redistricting 
might rectify the adverse balance of rural over urban representation 
in the Reichstag. Redistricting with retention of the majority sys-
tem, however, would not accord seats in the Reichstag to the large 
nonsocialist minorities in the industrial districts. P. R. found ac-
ceptance in the Reichstag in 1917-1918 largely because it appeared 
to offer increased political power to the parties with large voting 
strengths in these areas. 
6 / The National Assembly Elections 
N OVEMBER, 1918, was a time of crisis for the old order in Germany. Beginning in the north, with a mutiny on Novem-ber 4 among the sailors at Kiel, revolts quickly spread 
southward through the major towns and cities of the Reich to 
Munich, where a group of Independent Socialists on November 8 
expelled the Bavarian royal family and proclaimed a republic. 
Kaiser Wilhelm abdicated the following day, and Philipp Scheide-
mann excitedly proclaimed the German Republic to the masses of 
Berlin workers milling about the Reichstag building. Berlin Coun-
cils of Workers and Soldiers shortly convened to vest the powers of 
provisional government in a Council of six socialist Commissars of 
the People. 
The Second Reich lay in ruins. The authority of the military 
had vanished; the monarchy had ceased to exist. The bulwarks of 
conservatism were gone. Political power was a monopoly of the 
proletarians, organized into Councils led by the Social Democrats 
and several left-wing socialist groups, principally the Independents 
and the Spartacists. 
Germany was stunned by the rapidity with which the conserva-
tive regime had collapsed. With minor exceptions, opposition to 
the course of events was nonexistent. Prussian Junkers and the 
industrial bourgeoisie remained quiet, although apprehensive. Re-
sistance was impossible without the support of the monarchy and 
the military. The bourgeoisie moved quickly, however, to forestall 
the socialization of industry which appeared imminent. Within 
days after the collapse of the Second Reich they concluded with 
the trade unions a wage and hour agreement with significant con-
cessions to collective bargaining. They and other middle-class 
liberals and conservatives also raised a cry for the National Assembly, 
which had been promised in an early decree by the provisional 
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government.1 Without representation in the new regime, and with-
out power to force their entrance, they were helpless to influence 
the course of events. Their only hope lay with an elected assembly 
which would provide them voice and vote, and hence an opportunity 
to protect their interests. 
The significance of convening a National Assembly to the power 
position of the Workers' Councils was not lost upon left-wing 
socialists. "The political instruments of power," an Independent 
Socialist declared on November 16, "are today in the hands of the 
workers and soldiers. They must not give up this power. Were we 
to convene the National Assembly at this time that would mean a 
death sentence to the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils .... The 
National Assembly is the road to the rule of the bourgeoisie."2 
The moderate, or Majority Socialists, however, favored an early 
convening of the Assembly. Opposition to government had become 
such a habit that they felt curiously embarrassed by their new posi-
tion of power. A democratically elected assembly would free them 
from sole responsibility for the common welfare. Early elections, 
moreover, might enable them to ride into a majority in the assembly 
on the crest of the revolutionary wave of November.s Such atti-
tudes revealed not only the moderation which had come to char-
acterize Social Democracy in Germany, but also the effects of non-
participation in the affairs of government in undermining the 
capacity for leadership. 
The Majority Socialists were successful in defeating attempts by 
left-wing socialists to postpone calling the National Assembly. On 
November 25 a congress of representatives of the revolutionary 
governments of several states meeting at Berlin voted by over-
whelming majority to convoke an assembly at an early date. 
Strengthened by the decision, the Council of Commissars under 
Friedrich Ebert's leadership promulgated a new electoral law on 
November 30 and decreed February 16, 1919, as the date for elec-
tion. A National Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils meet-
ing the following month rejected the council system as a permanent 
form of government for Germany and upheld the decision for an 
early assembly. The Congress even moved the date for elections 
from February to January 16, and provided for the convocation of 
the National Assembly one month thereafter.4 The Majority 
Socialists had won their point; the base of government was to be 
broadened to include those groups deprived of participation in 
government by the events of November. 
The new electoral law provided for universal, direct, equal, and 
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secret elections with P. R. by all German men and women who had 
completed their twentieth year of age.5 The inclusion of P. R. was 
a foregone conclusion. A shift of the majority parties of the Reichs-
tag toward the system in 1917-1918 had been confirmed in Novem-
ber, 1918. In the midst of revolutionary uprisings early in the 
month, the Social Democratic, Progressive, Center, and National 
Liberal parties on November 8 issued a joint proposal calling for 
universal P. R. and woman suffrage for all Reichstag and Landtag 
elections.6 These provisions and a lowering of the voting age to 
the twentieth year were included in a proclamation four days later 
by the Social Democratic Council of Commissars.7 
The antiquated distribution of electoral districts used for elec-
tions to the former Reichstag was abolished by the November law. 
Existing administrative districts were regrouped into 38 new elec-
toral districts from which 433 deputies were to be elected.s The 
distribution of seats among districts was based on the principle of 
one deputy to an average of 150,000 inhabitants, with a surplus of 
at least 75,000 counted as a full 150,000. District populations and 
seat allotments varied from District 18 (Arnsberg) with almost 
2,500,000 inhabitants and 16 deputies to District 27 (the Palatinate) 
with less than 1,000,000 inhabitants and six deputies. 
The P. R. provisions of the new law were lifted bodily from the 
electoral law of August, 1918. Candidates were nominated in lists 
presented to the chairman of the committee for the entire electoral 
district. Each list could not contain more names than the number 
of deputies to be elected in the district; each required the signatures 
of at least one hundred voters in the district.9 The voter was re-
quired to cast his ballot for an entire list; he could not express his 
preference among candidates. Allocation of seats within the list 
followed the candidates' order of sequence. The November law 
hence established a "closed list" system. 
Distribution of seats among the lists proceeded according to the 
so-called d'Hondt method, one which favored large parties.1° In an 
attempt to secure the highest degree of proportionality, however, 
the November law incorporated the combined list provisions con-
tained in the August law. Small parties or groups were enabled 
thereby to form combinations which counted in the allocation of 
seats as one list. 
Elections to the National Assembly were preceded by a reorgani-
zation of the parties represented in the former Reichstag. l1 Several 
rightist groups, the German party (Free Conservatives), the German 
Reform party, and the Economic Alliance (Wirtschaftliche Ver-
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einigung) joined with the Conservatives to form the German Na-
tional People's party. The new organization was dominated by 
Prussian Junkers and the industrial plutocracy, and drew support 
from lower middle-class and orthodox Protestant elements dis-
satisfied with the new regime. Anti-Semites were attracted by the 
manifestly racial bias. Although frankly monarchical in conviction, 
the party declared its willingness to cooperate with the government 
to be established by the coming assembly. 
Former National Liberals and the Progressives presented two 
new combinations to the electorate: the German Democratic party 
and the German People's party. Most committed to the ideals of 
the new democratic republic were the Democrats. A fusion of 
political democracy, nationalism, and laissez-faire modified by an 
extensive program of social legislation characterized their platform. 
Former Progressives were most numerous within the party, with 
men of liberal convictions like Friedrich Naumann and Hugo 
Preuss playing prominent roles. The party was universal in its 
appeal to all who were democrats and socially minded, but drew 
its support chiefly from the middle classes. 
The German People's party was fashioned from the remnants of 
the National Liberal party. Its leaders were Gustav Stresemann 
and others among the wartime annexationists who championed the 
interests of heavy industry. Equal political rights for all individuals 
were affirmed in the party's platform. Like the conservative Na-
tionalists, however, members of the party regretted the disappear-
ance of the monarchy and withheld commitment to the republican 
ideal. The attitude was largely negative, one of passive resistance 
to any suggestion of socialization or other radical experimentation 
with the nation's economy. 
The party of Catholicism, the Center, adopted a new name, the 
Christian People's party, but soon reverted to its former designa-
tion. Pro-monarchist sympathies were abandoned with obvious 
regret. The party stood ready to support a democratic republic; 
otherwise it remained the same in conviction as well as composition. 
The socialist state was unequivocally rejected. An extension of 
social legislation was favored in deference to the Christian trade 
unions; pressure from the right-wing clericals, aristocrats, and in-
dustrialists, however, precluded any commitment to far-reaching 
economic reforms. The struggle between progressivism and con-
servatism continued within Germany's traditional confessional 
party. 
The Social Democrats (Majority Socialists) retained their name 
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and convictions. Force of habit led them to affirm the Program of 
Erfurt and the Marxist theory of class struggle. They opposed all 
fonns of dictatorship, however, asserting their faith in democratic 
government as the best means with which to achieve social refonn. 
The party sought to identify itself with the political accomplish-
ments of the revolution and the social program of the Ebert regime. 
The Independent Social Democrats assailed the Majority Socialists 
for abdicating proletarian power to a bourgeois constituent as-
sembly. Declaring the necessity for a complete destruction of the 
capitalistic structure, they pressed for immediate and total socializa-
tion. The Spartacists, constituted late in December as the Com-
munists, hurled insults at both groups and boycotted the elections. 
Over 30 million or 83 per cent of the voters went to the polls 
on January 19. The returns confirmed the fears of left-wing social-
ists. Bourgeois parties received a majority of the votes cast. The 
socialist monopoly of political power had ended. The official 
returns, compared with those for the last Reichstag election in 
1912, were as follows: 12 
German National People's Party 
Conservative Party 
German Party (Free Conservative) 
Economic Alliance 
German Reform Party 
German People's Party 
National Liberal Party 
Christian People's Party . 
Center Party 
Gennan Democratic Party 
Progressive Party 
Social Democratic Party 
Independent Social Democratic Party 
Miscellaneous parties and groups 
Total number of deputies 
1919 1912 
44 
19 
91 
75 
163" 
22 
7 
43 
14 
10 
3 
45 
91 
42 
110 
39 
397 
• Subsequent elections by military groups gave the Majority Socialists two additional 
seats and raised the total number of seats in the National Assembly to 423. 
From the standpoint of the parties which gave most unequivocal 
support to the new republican regime, the election was a resound-
ing success. The Social Democrats, Democrats, and Christian Peo-
ple's party accounted for more than 75 per cent of all the votes 
cast and together received 329 of the 421 seats in the new assembly. 
Extremist groups which were lukewarm or in outright opposition 
to political democracy ran a poor race. The Nationalist and People's 
parties together obtained 63 seats; the Independent Socialists 
secured 22. 
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The successes of the democratically oriented parties in the 
January elections were especially striking when compared with the 
composition of the last Imperial Reichstag. The parties of the 
political right, including the National Liberals, together received 
115 seats in 1912. Anti-Semites, Guelphs, and other minority groups 
swelled the nondemocratic composition of the Reichstag to almost 
one-third. The parties which consistently favored parliamentary 
government in the Reich, the Progressives and the Social Democrats 
received 152 seats, or somewhat more than one-third the total num-
ber. The approximate balance in the Reichstag between political 
left and right was tipped in favor of the latter by the preponderance 
in 1912 of right-wing elements within the Center party. 
The returns in 1919 revealed a surprising absence of minority 
groups and independent deputies by comparison with previous 
elections to the Reichstag. In the election of 1912, for example, 
five major parties (Conservative, National Liberal, Center, Progres-
sive, Social Democratic) obtained 345 seats, with the remainder dis-
tributed as follows: 
Hanoverian Guelphs 
Danes 
Reform Party 
Economic Alliance 
Alsace-Lorraine 
Anti-Semites 
Poles 
Unaffiliated 
5 
I 
3 
10 
9 
3 
18 
3 
In elections to the National Assembly, however, six parties received 
all but seven seats, the latter being distributed among four local 
parties or groups. Four seats went to the Bavarian Peasants' Union 
and one apiece to provincial parties in Hanover, Brunswick, and 
Schleswig-Holstein. 
The practical disappearance of minority parties in 1919 was the 
result of several factors. Territorially, Germany was not the same 
in 1912 and 1919. The loss of Alsace-Lorraine and districts adjacent 
to Denmark and Poland removed three separate parties from the 
German political scene. The number was reduced further by 
mergers among parties of similar convictions formed for common 
protection against the socialists. Three minority groups of the 
political right joined with the Conservatives to form the German 
People's party. Anti-Semites, who elected three deputies in 1912, 
also merged with the new conservative front. 
The election law undoubtedly contributed to a reduction in the 
number of minority groups and independent deputies in 1919. A 
The National Assembly Elections / 63 
merging of districts in Hanover and Brunswick destroyed the 
majorities which had returned Hanoverian Guelphs in 1912, reduc-
ing the number of deputies from five to one. The disappearance 
of independent deputies (three in the last Reichstag, in addition 
to three Anti-Semites) was in all probability related to the intro-
duction of the list system of P. R. Candidates for the former Reichs-
tag needed merely to announce their intentions to run for election 
and to furnish the ballots. Nominations for candidacy to the Na-
tional Assembly were to be supported by the signatures of at least 
one hundred qualified voters in the electoral district. The require-
ment was more easily met by party organizations with their numer-
ous workers and helpers than by independents. The latter were 
handicapped further by the provision for combined lists. As in-
dependents, they were not likely to join forces with organized 
political associations. Even if they wished to do so and could find 
a party or group with which to combine, the procedure was com-
plicated for them by provisions of the law which regulated such 
matters. Combinations were to be declared in writing to the 
authorized election officer of the district by the signatories of the 
nomination list or their authorized agents (Article 12). The pro-
cedure was comparatively simple for organized political parties, 
which could authorize their own agents. Independents, however, 
had to secure in support of any combination the same signatures 
which had nominated them to candidacy. Such difficulties placed 
them at considerable disadvantage in comparison with parties or 
groups which could use combined lists with ease and benefit. The 
new election law was plainly one for organized political associations, 
not for independent candidates. 
Did the introduction of P. R. for the elections prevent a Social 
Democratic majority in the National Assembly? According to one 
observer, Dr. Johannes Schauff, who edited in 1929 a study of the 
Weimar election system, "had the majority system of election 
been retained, and if only the electoral districts had been equalized 
in size, the Social Democrats in elections in 1919 to the National 
Assembly ... without question would have acquired far more than 
a majority of the mandates."13 While not as positive as Dr. Schauff, 
another observer, Dr. Ferdinand Hermens, undoubtedly the fore-
most opponent of P. R. in this country and Europe, would like to 
draw the same conclusion.14 Speculating upon the composition of 
the Assembly had elections taken place under the majority system, 
Dr. Hermens states, "It is not certain that a Social-Democratic ma-
jority would have resulted, but it is probable." The conclusion as-
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sumes that the majority system would have forced votes into the 
Social Democratic coffer. It assumes that the Independent Social-
ists would have returned to the Majority fold in order to thwart 
elimination at the polls as a minority party. Faced by the likeli-
hood of socialist success in the election, many voters who under P. R. 
cast their ballots for other parties, in the words of Dr. Hermens, 
"would have jumped on the bandwagon of the victors." 
Would the majority system have constructed in 1919 a "band-
wagon" for the Social Democrats? It had not done so for them 
or for any other group during the Second Reich. Not once during 
the latter period had a single party captured a majority of the seats 
in the Reichstag. Never were there less than five or six competing 
parties. The suffrage, to be sure, had assumed new significance in 
the elections of 1919. Never before had the German people as a 
whole possessed the right of self-government. Never before had 
they been confronted with the task of electing a national parliament 
competent to assume responsibility for the direction of public 
affairs. A workable majority became imperative if the parliament 
were to fulfill its functions adequately. The new role of the national 
parliament, however, appeared to affect German voting attitudes 
very little. Although the socialists received a larger percentage of 
the votes than ever before, the majority of those who went to the 
polls cast their ballots as they formerly had done, for the party with 
the Weltanschauung which suited their particular tastes. The re-
turns do not indicate any widespread concern with the necessity 
for creating a majority party in parliament. Had the German 
voters wished to do so, P. R. would not have stopped them. Although 
unable to choose particular candidates, they were quite free to vote 
for any party nomination list they chose. 
German voters failed to elect a Social Democratic majority to 
the National Assembly, not as a consequence of P. R., but because 
prevailing social and political cleavages were too strong for them 
to do otherwise. The fears and animosities which had characterized 
relations among socialist and nonsocialist groups for more than half 
a century could not be erased in a matter of weeks. Many who had 
cast ballots for left-liberal parties in previous elections during the 
Second Reich apparently voted socialist in the 1919 elections. The 
majority among nonsocialist voters, however, continued to look 
askance at Social Democracy and could not bring themselves to 
entrust the direction of public affairs to the party traditionally re-
garded in Germany as the arch-enemy of the state. 
As revealed by events occurring immediately prior to the elec-
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tions, German voters even had reason to doubt the competence of 
Social Democratic leadership for bringing Germany out of the 
chaos of war and revolution. Beginning January 5 and lasting for 
more than a week, Berlin was the scene of sporadic violence and 
bloodshed as the Communists attempted to overthrow the pro-
visional government of the Social Democratic Council of Com-
missars.15 The latter called for assistance from their worker sup-
porters, but the response was weak and ineffectual. Powerless to 
put down the revolt by themselves, the Social Democrats sought 
allies among their former enemies, the members of the old officer 
caste of the German army. With the aid of generals of the old 
regime, Commissar Noske recruited and brought into action several 
thousand officers and men. Within days the revolt had been sup-
pressed. Germany was saved from the threat of Bolshevism, but 
only with the aid of the military which had supported the conserva-
tive domination during the old regime. 
It appears highly unlikely, therefore, that majority elections 
would have created a Social Democratic "bandwagon" under such 
conditions. Most Germans were not convinced either by past ex-
perience with the socialists or by the course of events immediately 
prior to the elections of the necessity for creating a Social Demo-
cratic majority in the Assembly. In view of the bitterness which 
characterized the relationship among Independents and Majority 
Socialists in 1919, it even appears unlikely that majority elections 
would have enforced a union of the two groups. Since the Inde-
pendents with their scattered votes would have fared badly in that 
event, the majority system might well have decreased rather than 
increased the total socialist strength in the National Assembly. 
What changes in occupational representation were revealed in 
the election return~? The following table classifies by profession the 
deputies of the last Imperial Reichstag and those of the National 
Assembly: 16 
Agriculture 
Industry and commerce 
Public officials (municipal, state, federal) 
Teachers and scholars 
Clergymen 
Lawyers and notaries 
Private officials (trade union, party) 
Doctors 
Authors and journalists 
Persons of independent means 
'Vorkers and employees 
Miscellaneous 
Total number of deputies 
1912 
92 
35 
46 
20 
21 
40 
48 
7 
57 
8 
19 
1 
394 
1919 
34 
30 
48 
32 
11 
31 
132 
2 
64 
4 
27 
8 
423 
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Agriculture declined most among the occupations represented, 
dropping from first in the last Reichstag to fourth in the National 
Assembly. The representation of employers in industry and com-
merce declined slightly, whereas that of workers and employees in-
creased by more than one-half. If the two categories are totaled, 
the representation of industry and commerce in 1919 comprised 57 
deputies, as compared with 34 representatives of agricultural pur-
suits. In 1912 the respective figures were 44 and 92. 
Occupational statistics should be supplemented by a comparison 
with party strengths to gain the most accurate picture of the changed 
numerical representation in the National Assembly of agriculture, 
industry, and commerce. The parties which represented the latter 
and the number of deputies which each possessed in 1912 and 1919 
are listed in the following table. Figures in parentheses give the 
number of deputies engaged in agricultural pursuits.n 
1919 1912 
German People's Party 19 (3) 
National Liberal Party 45 (13) 
German Democratic Party 75 (7) 
Progressive Party 42 ( 5) 
Social Democratic Party 163 
Independent Social Democratic 
22 110 Party 
Total number of deputies 279 (10) 197 (18) 
The parties of the political right which formed the Nationalist 
party after the Revolution represented chiefly agricultural interests. 
In 1912 they polled a total of 60 seats. The addition of 18 deputies 
listed in parentheses in the above table and the greatest share of the 
39 members of minority groups increased the number of agricul-
tural representatives among the parties of the political right in the 
last Reichstag to more than 100. The number was approximately 
halved in 1919 when the Nationalists obtained only 44 seats, of 
which five were held by employers in industry or commerce; agri-
cultural minority groups secured approximately five additional seats. 
Although the Center (Christian People's) party continued in 1919 
to represent both agricultural and industrial-commercial interests, 
the former no longer predominated as they had in the Reichstag of 
1912. More Centrist deputies in the Reichstag were engaged in agri-
culture than in any other pursuit. Private officials predominated 
within the party's representation in the National Assembly, how-
ever, and agrarian deputies (totaling eight in number) shared 
fourth place numerically with the lawyers and notaries. Although 
statistical comparisons are difficult to draw with accuracy, the above 
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figures illustrate a striking reversal of the numerical representation 
of agricultural and industrial-commercial interests. A slight pre-
dominance of the former in the last Reichstag was supplanted by an 
approximate two-thirds majority of the latter in the National As-
sembly. 
The election law was instrumental in producing the phenomenal 
increase of trade union and party officials in the National As-
sembly. Seats won by parties in the election were distributed within 
the nomination lists beginning with the first name designated and 
proceeding in order to the last. No provision was made for regulat-
ing the method of selecting candidates or their sequences on the list. 
Party organizations were left free to determine their own nomina-
tion procedures. They were not compelled to submit proofs as 
they are today in West Germany that candidate lists were chosen 
by democratic processes within the party. In the absence of such 
regulations, it was not at all surprising that party functionaries and 
prominent trade union officials found high places on the various 
nomination lists. Although the lists usually were submitted by 
party leaders to an assembly of the members for approval, they 
were rarely changed.1s 
The appearance of so many party bureaucrats in the National 
Assembly reflected the extent to which party structures were revolu-
tionized by the election law. Under the former majority system used 
during the Second Reich, only the Social Democratic and the Center 
parties maintained organizations throughout the country, and these 
were strongest in districts where the respective voting strengths 
were concentrated_19 In places where constituents were few and 
success was unlikely, decisions on matters of organization and tactics 
generally were left to local party members. The situation was quite 
different under the new election law. Scattered minorities were 
thrown together by the creation of large electoral districts. No 
longer were they potentially useless to the party. With the intro-
duction of P. R. they could be combined and utilized for the elec-
tion of deputies. As expressed by a Democratic election pamphlet 
explaining the new law, "organization" became "trump" for the 
political party_20 Each attempted to organize its supporters through-
out the country; offices were established even in the smallest locali-
ties. Party organizations increased both in number and power. 
The number of full-time party workers mushroomed. As reflected 
in the membership of the National Assembly and subsequent 
Reichstags, political advancement became increasingly a matter of 
working one's way up through the party hierarchy.21 
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The electoral law was widely criticized after the January elec-
tions.22 Complaints were leveled against the law's closed-list pro-
VISIOns. The compulsion of the voter to select a list and not a 
candidate was termed a restriction of the franchise. The latter be-
came a right of the party, not of the individual, when candidates 
were chosen by party organizations. As pointed out by some op-
ponents, districts were so large that candidates were unacquainted 
with their constituents. Many voters cast ballots for the election of 
complete strangers. Control of nominations by the party, others 
argued, led to fierce and disruptive battles among competing cliques. 
Each sought by whatever means possible to place its candidates at 
the head of the party list. Disappointment might lead to secession. 
Party unity was imperiled. 
The principal reasons for complaint against the electoral law 
were to be found in the effects of the d'Hondt method of allocation 
and the provisions allowing parties to combine lists. The effects 
may be illustrated by comparing the following figures. Those in 
columns one and two list respectively the seats which each party 
obtained in the election and the number which each would have 
received without list combinations. Those in column three repre-
sent theoretical proportionality.23 
German National People's Party 44 42 43 
German People's Party 19 17 18 
Christian People's Party 91 87 83 
German Democratic Party 75 75 78 
Social Democratic Party 163 174 160 
Independent Social Democratic Party 22 22 32 
Miscellaneous parties 7 4 7 
The d'Hondt system of allocation clearly favored large parties and 
handicapped small ones. Had other parties not used the law's 
combined list provisions, the Social Democrats would have received 
14 seats and the Christian People's party three seats above full pro-
portionality. The Independents would have lost, and, as the elec-
tion turned out, did lose, ten places. Without the provisions to 
combine lists, three minority groups would have been excluded from 
the Assembly entirely, the Democrats would have forfeited three 
seats and the Nationalist and German People's parties one apiece. 
Even with these provisions, large parties benefited more in the final 
counting than small ones. Although list combinations cut down the 
Social Democratic advantage to three seats above full proportion-
ality, they enabled the Christian People's party to acquire three 
additional mandates, raising its total to 11 above the proportional 
figure. The Independents and to a lesser extent the Majority 
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Socialists were excluded or remained aloof from alliances with 
other parties and thus failed to benefit from list combinations.24 
The parties which fared badly or coveted the gains of others 
from the method of seat allocation or list combinations were most 
critical of the electoral law.25 The Social Democrats were irked by 
the loss of so many seats to alliances among bourgeois parties. The 
experience was reminiscent of Reichstag elections during the Second 
Reich when other parties combined against them in the hated run-
off elections. The Democrats lost no seats from list combinations,26 
and received in the final counting only three seats less than full 
proportionality. They felt cheated, however, when their showing 
was compared with that of the Christian People's party. They had 
received a total of 5,641,800 votes in the election; the latter party 
had received 5,980,200. On the basis of full proportionality the 
respective seat totals should have been 78 and 83. In the actual 
counting, the difference between the two totals amounted to 16 
seats. "The reason for this all-too·great disproportionality," accord-
ing to one Democrat, "one may observe in many places in list com-
binations within individual electoral districts between the Center 
and small parties. A simple mathematical demonstration reveals 
that the chief reason for the advantage of the stronger parties rests 
precisely in the allocation procedure itself."27 
Party attitudes toward list combinations were affected by a 
new system for allotting seats which gained favor in 1919. The sys-
tem, used during the Second Reich for municipal elections in 
Baden, provided a way in which to utilize votes which remained 
after seats had been allotted to party lists. The leftover votes from 
each district could be combined for the election of deputies-at-Iarge. 
The system was accepted on November 24, 1919, by a special com-
mission from the Constitutional Committee,28 and became the 
basis for an electoral law adopted in 1920 by the entire Assembly. 
It seemed to provide political parties with a more attractive alter-
native than list combinations. Not only did the latter, like runoff 
elections to former Reichtags, appear to be "immoral" and "un-
natural," but they also carried no certainty of success. Parties like 
the Democrats might join in several combinations and not gain a 
single additional seat. A system of election providing for the maxi-
mum utilization of all votes seemed to offer each party the assur-
ance that it would not receive less, and its opponents would not re-
ceive more, than a just proportion of seats. 
Criticisms of the electoral law for the National Assembly thus 
were concerned almost entirely with the problem of unused votes 
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and disproportionalities in the allotment of seats among parties. 
Only those which were directed against closed lists, against a restric-
tion of the voter's choice to party lists rather than candidates, im-
plied any real criticism of P. R. itself; and even they were presented 
by individuals who merely favored a proportional system without 
listS.29 So widespread was the acceptance of P. R. in 1919 that a 
representative of the Ministry of the Interior could matter-of-factly 
assert in an official publication that "the universal introduction of 
the system of proportional representation for elections to the N a-
tional Assembly through the Reich electoral law of November 30, 
1918, was greeted with satisfaction on all sides. Nobody has 
criticized proportional representation or demanded retention of 
the old majority system of election."30 The assertions were borne 
out by the subsequent action of the National Assembly in drafting 
and adopting by ananimous vote an electoral law which repre-
sented the ultimate in proportionality. 
7 / The Electoral law of 1920 
PROPORTIONAL representation was retained without question by the National Assembly in 1919-1920. In the provisional constitution drafted early in January, 1919, by Hugo Preuss, 
Secretary of State for the Interior,! the system was prescribed as 
mandatory for elections to all state legislatures and the Reichstag.2 
The provisions were upheld when the Preuss draft was adopted on 
February 10, 1919, by the recently convened Assembly. They ap-
peared in revised form in the final draft constructed by the As· 
sembly and approved by that body on July 31. Discussion and 
debate in committee and on the floor of the Assembly prior to pro-
mulgation of a new electoral law in April, 1920, revealed a striking 
unanimity in favor of P. R. Scarcely a voice was raised in support 
of the former majority system of election. 
"The principle of proportional representation appears to me 
to be incontestable [ausser Streit] . ... "3 This was the view expressed 
by Secretary Preuss on March 20, 1919, to the Constitutional Com-
mittee of the National Assembly. The view was upheld when the 
Committee voted to adopt Article 16 of the provisional constitution 
calling for universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage and P. R. 
for elections to all state legislatures. Dr. Preuss reported during the 
meeting that his ministry was studying and comparing various 
systems of P. R., and suggested a meeting with members of the 
Committee for the purpose of discussing the systems. "I shall then 
determine," he concluded, "the various points of view-chiefly with-
in the Constitutional Committee-regarding the best system of 
proportional representation, and upon this basis will compose a 
draft of the Reich electorallaw."4 
On April 4, 1919, the Committee adopted the following con-
struction of an article regulating Reichstag elections: 
The Reichstag consists of deputies of the German people. 
The deputies are elected in universal, equal, direct, and 
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secret elections by men and women over twenty years of age 
and according to the principles of proportional representa-
tion. 
The particulars will be defined by a Reich electoral law, 
which also shall regulate the election of the Reich president 
and plebiscites.1i 
Committee discussions of the article produced one of the few 
objections to the proportional principle voiced by a member of the 
National Assembly.6 "Proportional representation," the Democratic 
leader, Friedrich Naumann, declared to the Committee,"still has 
certain questionable aspects, even though to all outward appear-
ances it is without question the most equitable system of election." 
The principal objection presented by Naumann concerned the sys-
tem's effects upon the composition of the parliament. By giving ex-
pression to all shades of political opinion in the parliament, P. R. 
was alleged to render impossible the emergence of a two-party system 
on the English model, regarded by Naumann as indispensable to 
parliamentary government. "The consequence of the system of 
proportional representation," he concluded, "is the impossibility 
of parliamentary government; the parliamentary system and pro-
portional representation are mutually exclusive." 
"I should not like to allow Deputy Naumann's statements to 
pass without contradiction," replied Secretary Preuss as he launched 
into a defense of P. R.7 "We never had proportional elections to 
the Reichstag in Germany," he declared, "and yet our parties always 
were numerous as the sands of the sea. With the first proportional 
elections [to the National Assembly] they even have diminished in 
number." Two-party systems, he maintained, were not indispensable 
to parliamentary government; coalitions also could be formed. The 
latter, to be sure, were more difficult to maintain than majorities 
consisting of one party. The possession of political power by the 
parliament, however, would lead to a consolidation among parties, 
"with or without proportional representation." Dr. Preuss thus 
denied the effects of election systems upon the function of parlia-
mentary bodies. That the latter possessed political power sufficed 
to create increasingly compact party majorities. The interpretation 
was the exact reverse of Friedrich Naumann's, which emphasized the 
effects of election systems and seemed to ignore the consequences 
of wielding political power upon the party composition of the 
parliament.8 
Deputy Naumann must have wryly acknowledged to himself the 
truth of one statement reiterated by Secretary Preuss to the Com-
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mittee: "To return from the proportional representation system to 
simple majority elections is a political impossibility."9 Seldom if at 
all can parliaments elected under P. R. be persuaded to discard the 
system. In the case of the National Assembly, each among the 
several parties therein contained deputies returned by minorities 
whose votes formerly were lost under the majority system. Deputies 
so elected would exclude themselves from political life by voting 
to discard P. R. A majority of the deputies to the National As-
sembly, for that matter, owed their selection to party committees 
and organizations which had placed them high on the nomination 
lists. Few could be expected to jeopardize their personal political 
fortunes by voting to return to a system in which selection lay 
with the unpredictable electorate. Neither could central party 
organizations wish to abandon the system which not only had in-
creased their control over nominations, but also had extended them 
into new districts by making possible the utilization of minority 
strengths. P. R. had created an Assembly of vested interests. Seem-
ingly without question the members of the Constitutional Com· 
mittee sustained Dr. Preuss' conclusion: "The sentence 'according to 
the principles of proportional representation' must stand, regard-
less of theoretical points of view one may hold concerning the 
proportional system. The object of further discussion shall be to 
find the comparably best system of proportional representation."lO 
Secretary Preuss and the Committee soon were rewarded by the 
discovery of Baden's so-called "automatic" system of election. As 
described in the new Baden constitution (Article 24), 
each party or group of electors is allowed one member 
for every ten thousand votes cast for its list of candidates. 
In each district the votes remaining unused are added up for 
the whole country and are apportioned representation ac-
cording to the prmciple deSCrIbed above. Every fraction of 
more than 7,500 votes is permitted a seat.H 
The procedure was adopted in principle by the Committee in 
November, and expanded into three variations, or "projects," sub-
mitted for public perusal by the Ministry of the Interior shortly 
after the first of the year.12 
Project A embodied the Baden system in its purest form. A 
uniform vote total (60,000) necessary for the election of deputies 
in all districts was established. Districts sufficient in size to return 
approximately six deputies were to be created. Votes remaining 
after seat allocations in all districts would be accumulated to the 
credit of nondistrict or "Reich" lists presented by the various 
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parties. Seats would be distributed among the latter in the same 
manner as within districts. 
Proj~ct B differed from the above in two respects. Districts 
were to be reduced in size to return approximately four deputies. 
Secondly, another stage in the allocation of seats was inserted be-
tween the districts and the Reich lists. Several adjacent districts 
were to be combined for a second allocation among unused votes 
forwarded from the individual districts. Remaining votes then 
would be sent to the Reich lists. 
The complexity increased with Project C, which was identical 
with Project B, save one important exception. Within any given 
group of districts, parties had two alternatives. They could present 
a separate nomination list within each district, or one for the entire 
group. In the latter event, votes cast for the party within each 
district would be totaled and accredited to the group list. Seat 
allocations in the former event would proceed according to the 
plan in Project B. Unused votes in either case would be sent to 
Reich lists for a second and final allocation. 
As reported by Preuss·' successor as Minister of the Interior, 
Erich Koch,13 Project C "obviously found the greatest public 
approval."14 Small districts were favored over large ones, since the 
latter allegedly depersonalized the relationship between voter and 
deputy. They also necessitated the presentation of long lists of 
candidates by each party. Although Project B also provided for 
small districts, its three stages of allocation placed a tremendous 
burden of work on electoral authorities in preparing for the elec-
tions and allotting the ballots. Project C cut down the work in-
volved, eliminating one stage in the allocation of seats. Under the 
latter, moreover, the greatest number of leftover votes would be 
utilized in the districts and groups of districts. The number of 
deputies elected indirectly from the Reich lists would be reduced 
to a minimum. By making possible the presentation of separate 
lists in each district or a single one for a group of districts, Project 
C also permitted the parties to organize and group their potential 
voting strengths as they wished. 
Were there no complaints against all three projects? Was there 
no recognition of the dangers involved for the future of parlia-
mentary government in according almost complete expression to 
minority groups within the electorate? The German people early 
in 1920 seemingly had neither the time nor the inclination to 
raise questions of such nature. Their political experience had not 
provided them with any widespread knowledge or experience con-
The Electoral Law of 1920 / 75 
cerning the function of parliamentary bodies in democratic systems. 
The Reichstag during the Second Reich never had possessed more 
than the power to advise the government or restrict its actions; 
the political parties never had been exposed to the responsibilities 
of directing public policy. 
Only one deputy in the National Assembly voiced any misgivings 
regarding Projects A, B, and C. "A single year," Anton Erkelenz 
complained in his party journal, Die Hilfe, "has sufficed to produce 
a whole bundle of discoveries of new election systems according to 
the classifications: just, more just, and most just. ... In honor of 
the Kaiser's birthday the Ministry of the Interior has just presented 
us with three among the 'most just' suffrage discoveries. And now 
we can quietly go to sleep. By your leave, my gentlemen of the 
Ministry, there is a limit to the 'justice' of an electoral procedure, 
beyond which each further step toward mathematical fairness is 
quadratically increasing political stupidity."15 Deputy Erkelenz 
warned specifically against the dangers of party splintering inherent 
in all three proposals: 
Not only wiIl there be out-and-out worker, employee, peasant, 
handworker, industrial-trade, etc., candidates. No! The 
vaccine opponents, teetotalers, advocates of temperance, 
Knights Templars, land reformers, officers of the crown, and 
with them the rabbit growers, the vaccinators, the goat breed-
ers ... among others will present their own candidates, will 
wish to count their votes in the Reich. There will be at least 
200 points of view or associations able to poll 60,000 and 
more votes .... 'Justice' in the sense of mathematical equality 
thus will lead politically to self-murder, to absurdity.16 
Although his words seemed to belie the fact, Deputy Erkelenz was 
not opposed to the proportional principle. The introduction of 
P. R. for national elections in Germany was regarded by him as a 
"proper" solution to the "antiquated electoral districting" of the 
former Reichstag election system.17 He was among the first of the 
proportionalists in Germany to give belated attention to the prob-
lem of the function rather than the composition of the parliament. 
From the vantage point of the present, his conclusion may have been 
prophetic: 
With the electoral law the German Republic stands perhaps 
at a crucial turning point in its existence. The electoral pro-
cedure is not a question of mathematical justice. Once uni-
versal proportional representation has been achieved it is 
exclusively a political problem of grave significance. If the 
~epublic allows itself to be led by sentimentalists it will dig 
Its own grave. A parliament consisting of 400 eccentrics can-
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not make policy [Politik machen]. It will become a laughing 
stock.18 
The warning went unheeded. Project C was accepted by the 
Cabinet and became the basis for an electoral law drawn up by 
the Ministry of the Interior and submitted on March 27, 1920, to 
the National Assembly.19 The draft allowed parties the option of 
presenting lists either by district or by groups of districts; leftover 
votes in either case would be accumulated to the credit of lists for 
the Reich. The draft also marked out 122 electoral districts designed 
to elect from three to five deputies, and 21 groups of districts.20 
The swift movement of events during March, 1920, brought 
changes in the projected electoral law even before it was submitted 
to the National Assembly. During the first part of the month, 
parties of the political right moved to dissolve the Assembly on 
the first of May and called for early elections to a new Reichstag. 
The motion was defeated on March 10 after Minister of the Interior 
Koch indicated the number of laws still to be enacted and insisted 
on the need for a thorough study of a new electoral law. The As-
sembly, he declared, could not be dissolved nor elections held before 
autumn.21 Rightist groups subsequently resorted to force. For 
several days during the so-called Kapp Putsch a military regime in 
Berlin attempted to dominate Germany. The regime was ousted 
and the Republic restored only after German workers in a general 
strike brought economic life in the country to a standstill. 
Subsequent disturbances in the Ruhr and ministerial crises in 
the National Assembly made new elections imperative. A govern-
ment competent to deal with the trying questions of the hour must 
have the assurance of public support. To delay the elections was to 
invite continued disorder and uncertainty, perhaps another attempt 
to overthrow the Republic. The Assembly sent the proposed elec-
torallaw to committee and hastily began work on the most pressing 
legislation which remained. 
The committee made extensive revision of the proposed elec-
toral procedure.22 Since the necessity for early elections appeared 
to leave no time for a new distribution of districts, the 122 new 
districts and the 22 groups of districts were abandoned in favor of 
the division used for elections to the National Assembly. After 
slight modifications to rectify certain inequalities in size, 35 dis-
tricts and 17 groups of districts were established. A second change 
by the committee concerned the allocation of seats. The original 
draft left parties the option of presenting separate lists in each 
district or one for an entire group, the latter being counted as one 
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district in the totaling of votes and the allocation of seats. Since 
the committee had discarded the original plan for redistricting, 
several districts were large enough to elect approximately fifteen 
deputies, and hence would necessitate excessively long ballots if 
parties were to present one list for an entire group. There would 
be less likelihood than before that voters would be acquainted with 
all the candidates presented by one party. To remedy the difficulty 
the committee removed the option to present one list for an entire 
group of districts. Leftover votes in each district would go directly 
to Reich lists for the election of deputies.at-Iarge. It was estimated 
on the basis of statistics from the National Assembly elections, how-
ever, that under such an arrangement, with no "middle" allocation, 
approximately 18 per cent of the deputies of the new Reichstag 
might be elected from the Reich lists.28 The largeness of the per-
centage might call in question the compatibility of the mode of seat 
allocation with the constitutional principle of direct elections. The 
solution: provide for a partial utilization of vote fractions in the 
districts before their transference to the Reich lists. If a party 
declared in advance of the election a union of its lists within a group 
of districts, leftover votes could be accumulated to the credit of the 
list with the largest remainder. Fractions then would be transferred 
to Reich lists. 
An atmosphere of haste characterized the debates in the Assem-
bly on the proposed electorallaw.24 Referring to the Kapp Putsch, 
the Social Democratic speaker who reported the bill out of com-
mittee for its second reading on April 22 spoke of the "political 
events" which had made impossible a "thorough consideration" of 
the election system. "The committee therefore found it necessary 
to follow insofar as possible existing statutes and only to make 
either those changes which appeared to be absolutely essential or 
those which received universal approval."25 A Democratic spokes-
man directing his remarks to the "gentlemen on the right" referred 
to the necessity for early elections as a consequence of the "unbe-
lievable agitation of certain parties against the government and the 
majority parties."26 "Time presses," was the keynote expressed 
by a Centrist spokesman.27 An Independent Social Democratic 
speaker recognized the necessity for early elections as a consequence 
of the Kapp Putsch, but expressed his party's disapproval of the 
delay which had attended the drafting of a new electoral law. "The 
constitution, which established the principal features of the suf-
frage," he complained, "was ready three-quarters of a year ago. 
There should have been opportunity during this long period of 
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time to present a bilI which could have been introduced in time 
[for the coming election ]."28 
As viewed by Minister of the Interior Koch, the pressure of time 
had not detracted from the merits of the law drafted by his ministry 
and the National Assembly committee. Speaking before the As-
sembly during the April 22 debate, he declared his "overwhelming 
satisfaction" with the draft, not as a consequence of the "under-
standable pleasure" which he, "the author," derived from it, but 
because the charge never could be leveled against the National 
Assembly that it had indulged in "gerrymandering [Wahlkreisgeo-
metrie] or any other kind of electoral irregularity."29 This was an 
election system, he assured the deputies, which "the man in the 
street" could understandl "If we decide that everybody [sic!] who 
receives 60,000 votes shall be elected, then we shall acquire a popular 
and an easily understandable suffrage. Yes, we shall even experience 
the time, if I may designate this as an advantage, when we shall be 
able to hold victory celebrations on election day evening, namely 
for the reason that under proportional representation not just one 
party wins, but in most cases even all the parties in all the dis-
trictS."30 
The Minister's enthusiasm was echoed in the Assembly debate. 
"The Revolution of November, 1918," the Social Democrats ex-
claimed, "brought to the German people the freest suffrage in the 
world. The bill which lies before us can be held aloft in the progres-
sive countries, yes, in all the civilized lands [Kulturliindern]."31 A 
Democratic speaker pointed with pride to the so-called "automatic 
system" of allocation, whereby each unit of 60,000 votes sufficed 
for the election of one deputy. It was "without doubt" "the most 
just" method available, one which permitted no party an advantage 
over others in the allocation of seats. Charges of gerrymandering, 
or "electoral district geometry," as the Germans quaintly described 
the practice, thus were dismissed by the speaker as groundless. 
"Everybody who participated [in drafting the electoral law] must 
recognize as groundless contentions that the attitudes of the com-
mittee were those of anyone political party."32 Even the Na-
tionalists seemed satisfied with the proposed law. They had ex-
pressed concern early in March over the possibility that any electoral 
law introduced by the majority parties might eliminate "the right 
side of the house."33 During the April 22 debate, however, they 
commended the draft of the electoral law as a "satisfactory piece of 
work," and were supported in this view by members of the German 
People's party.34 
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Despite the universal acclaim received by the proposed electoral 
law, debates in the Assembly seemed to leave little doubt that a 
majority of the parties planned future revisions. Provisions with-
holding the right to vote from members of the armed forces were 
strongly contested by both socialist parties. In yielding to the wishes 
of the majority in the Assembly, the Social Democrats promised to 
reopen the matter immediately in the new Reichstag.35 Both parties, 
particularly the Independents, designated the postponement of 
redistricting as one of the most serious defects of the proposed law. 
The retention of large districts and the creation of groups among 
the latter necessitated the use of long lists of candidates, many of 
whom would be unknown to the electorate. The consequence would 
be to destroy "all connection between the voter and the deputy." 
"I hope," an Independent deputy stated, "that the defects contained 
in the law at least will be remedied immediately by the new Reichs-
tag. They make it difficult for us to vote for the bill. I regard it 
as absolutely necessary that the new Reichstag will not again post-
pone to its termination a reform of the suffrage, but that it will 
proceed very quickly to the matter."36 
The Democrats also left no doubt concerning their plans for 
revision of the electoral law. "It will very likely be a law regulating 
only one election," a spokesman declared, "after which further re-
form will be necessary. It probably would have been best at the 
outset had we designated the heading as a law for the election of 
the first Reichstag."37 The speaker referred in particular to the 
necessity for combining in a future electoral law the advantages of 
P. R. with those of the former single-member district system. The 
latter were designated by him as pertaining to the freedom of the 
voter to cast his ballot for an individual candidate. Such advantages, 
however, could not be included in the present law. The necessity 
for early elections, the speaker contended, made necessary a reten-
tion of the so-called "closed lists," which restricted the voter to a 
choice among parties, not individual candidates. "If we were to do 
away with closed lists, then the procedure of allocating seats among 
candidates would be extraordinarily involved and prolonged. Then 
it would be inconceivable that the Reichstag could be convened 
within a short time after the elections."38 
The parties of the political center and right were less definite 
on the matter of suffrage reform than the Democratic and socialist 
parties. The Centrists and the German Nationalists supported the 
draft, but made no commitments regarding future alterations.30 
A spokesman for the German People's party stated that the measure 
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was "completely in harmony" with the needs of the moment, but 
also referred to it as a "provisional law." The latter's "principal" 
shortcoming, the lack of small districts, he stated, could not be 
remedied due to the necessity for early elections. In the meantime, 
however, material should be assembled "in order to acquire with-
out delay suitable bases for an exact establishment of the small 
election districts."40 
After devoting almost the entirety of its session on April 22 to 
the second reading of the electoral bill, the Assembly proceeded the 
following day to the third reading. Without further debate the 
final vote was taken. Three hundred one deputies voted "ja" to 
make the decision unanimous. The bill became law on April 27 
and was followed on May 1 by an ordinance regulating the details 
for the coming elections.41 
The new electoral law extended the suffrage to all persons, re-
gardless of sex, who were twenty years of age on election day. 
Exceptions included those under guardianship or deprived of civil 
rights by court decisions. By contrast with their situation during 
the Second Reich, bankrupts and paupers no longer were excluded. 
Temporarily prohibited from exercising the suffrage were soldiers 
in the Reichswehr and persons detained in mental institutions and 
prisons. Those imprisoned for political reasons, however, were 
entitled to request arrangements permitting them to vote. Every 
elector whose name appeared on an official list or roll was entitled 
to cast one ballot. To become a candidate for election each voter 
must have attained the twenty-fifth year of age. 
An elaborate election machinery came into being with the law 
of 1920.42 In addition to local precinct boards which supervised the 
casting of ballots and tallied the results, electoral committees were 
established for each of the 35 districts and the 17 groups of districts. 
District committees received the nomination lists, to be presented 
within a 2l-day period prior to the election, and checked the 
authenticity of the 50 signatures required in support of each list. 
After the elections had taken place and the precinct boards had 
totaled and transmitted the ballots, each committee allotted seats 
among the nomination lists on the basis of one for every 60,000 
votes. Fractions then were forwarded either to the committee of the 
group to which the district belonged, or to one for the entire Reich. 
If nomination lists had been joined by prior action of their signa-
tories43 with others within the group to which the district belonged, 
their vote remainders were sent to the group committees for the 
second allocation of seats. If they had not been joined, their re-
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mainders were forwarded directly to a committee for the Reich. 
The committees for each group of districts accorded each combina-
tion of lists one seat for every 60,000 votes. Seats were distributed 
within the combinations among the lists with the largest fractions, 
on the condition that the latter exceeded 30,000 votes. Remainders 
then were forwarded to the committee for the Reich, where they 
joined those sent directly from the districts for a final allocation of 
seats. They were assigned by the committee to their respective lists 
for the Reich, i.e., to separate tickets filed with the committee by 
the same parties or groups which presented candidates in the 
districts.44 Seats were apportioned among the Reich lists on the 
basis of one for each unit of 60,000 votes, with every fraction in 
excess of 30,000 considered equal to the full quota. Reich lists, 
however, were not permitted to acquire seats in excess of the total 
won by their respective counterparts in the districts. 
The provisions allowing parties to join lists within established 
groups of districts were intended as substitutes for the combined 
lists of the electoral law for the National Assembly. The latter 
furnished no means for the utilization of vote fractions other than 
allowing parties to present lists in common within the various dis-
tricts. The 1920 law did not prohibit such combinations, but re-
moved the incentive for their formation by allowing each party 
almost unlimited opportunities for the utilization of its own votes. 
According to the regulations set forth in the law, either type of 
combination (i.e., among different parties within a single district 
or among lists of the same party in several districts) was to be 
registered within the prescribed time limit of fourteen days prior to 
the election. Neither was valid unless an identical combination was 
presented to the committee for the Reich. Seats were allotted 
within either type of combination to lists with the largest fractions, 
provided the latter exceeded 30,000 votes. Unused fractions then 
were forwarded to the respective Reich lists for a final allocation.45 
The distribution of seats within all nomination lists followed 
the sequence in which the candidates were designated. The parties 
or groups which presented lists were permitted to establish the 
sequence. Voters cast their ballots for party tickets, not for in-
dividual candidates. With the exception of time limits required for 
the presentation of district and Reich lists, the law was silent on 
the nomination procedure. Parties or groups were not required, 
as they are today in West Germany, to furnish proof of democratic 
processes in the selection of candidates. 
German voters went to the polls on June 6, 1920. Since elections 
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could not be held in several districts where plebiscites had been 
ordered by the allied powers, 42 members of the former National 
Assembly elected from the areas in question were counted as deputies 
to the new Reichstag.46 The following table lists the total votes 
and seats received by each party in the elections. Figures in paren-
theses represent the number of seats held over from the National 
Assembly.47 
(Majority) Social Democratic Party 
Independent Social Democratic Party 
Center Party 
German National People's Party 
People's Party 
German Democratic Party 
Bavarian People's Party 
Guelph Party 
Bavarian Peasant's Union 
Communist Party 
5,614,456 
4,895,317 
3,540,830 
3,736,778 
3,606,316 
2,202,334 
1,171,722 
319,100 
218,884 
441,995 
112 (19) 
81 
68 (8) 
66 (4) 
62 (2) 
45 (9) 
21 
5 
4 
2 
466 (42) 
The returns were devastating for the parties of the majority coali-
tion of the former National Assembly. In the Assembly the Social 
Democratic, Democratic, and Christian People's (Center) parties to-
gether had 231 deputies, or 54.6 per cent of the total membership. In 
the new Reichstag the representation of the same parties dropped to 
125 seats, or 26.8 per cent of the total. The Democrats suffered 
most among the three parties, declining from 75 seats (17.7 per 
cent) in 19H1 to 45 (9.6 per cent) in 1920. Although membership 
percentages of the socialist parties combined were almost identical 
in the two parliaments (44.2 per cent in 1919 and 45.7 per cent in 
1920), the Majority Socialists lost heavily in the 1920 elections to 
the Independents, dropping from 165 seats (39.0 per cent) in 1919 
to 112 (24.0 per cent) in the new Reichstag. The Center48 emerged 
from the election contest appreciably weakened by the defection 
of its Bavarian wing. The party decreased in membership from 91 
seats (21.5 per cent) in the National Assembly to 68 (14.5 per cent) 
in the new Reichstag. 
The returns clearly indicated a striking decline of republican 
sentiment in Germany. Within little more than a year public sup-
port had been withdrawn from those parties most closely associated 
with the new Republic in favor of the latter's opponents. The gains 
of the parties which favored a return to the old regime had been 
spectacular. The Nationalist and German People's parties together 
acquired more than three and a half million votes over the combined 
total for the two parties in 1919, as compared with a loss of more 
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than three million suffered by the Democrats. The People's party 
alone almost tripled the number of its votes over the previous bal-
loting, and more than tripled the number of seats acquired. Other 
opponents of the Republic scoring gains were the Independent 
Social Democrats and the Communists. The latter had not pre-
sented candidates in the 1919 elections, but did so in 1920 and 
acquired almost one-half million votes. The provisions of the 
electoral law prohibiting parties from acquiring more seats from 
Reich lists than the total received in the districts restricted the 
Communists to two seats in the new Reichstag. The successes of 
the Independents were as spectacular as those of the People's party. 
An increase of more than two and one-half million votes almost 
quadrupled the number of their deputies. The total number of 
seats obtained by the above four parties was 211. The avowed 
opponents of the Republic thus possessed more than 45 per cent 
of the seats in the new Reichstag. 
Several factors contributed to the decline of republican senti-
ment in Germany. Responsibility for military defeat and the en-
suing Treaty of Versailles was foisted upon the republicans by 
rightist groups asserting their "stab-in-the-back" interpretation of 
the November revolution. Economic distress, always a potent factor 
in any election, became widespread with rising utiemployment and 
soaring living costs. As the new Republican government floundered 
from one crisis to another the impression grew among German 
voters that economic ills and political instability were inescapable 
consequences of popular rule. 
Dissatisfaction with Social Democratic leadership also appeared 
to influence many voters, particularly among the workers. Inter-
necine party struggles were accentuated as Majority Socialists in 
the provisional government called in desperation upon the military 
to suppress uprisings in industrial districts like the Ruhr. The 
consequent spilling of proletarian blood increased the vituperation 
of the Independents against a majority group condemned as be-
trayers of the socialist cause, as allies of the forces of reaction and 
suppression which long had dominated German society and politics. 
Nowhere were the tragic effects of democratic inexperience more ap-
parent than in the record of Social Democratic indecision and the 
consequent disillusionment with republican leadership among the 
masses of the German people. 
The elections altered very slightly the proportions in which the 
various occupations were represented in the former Assembly. The 
table which follows compares the deputies in the latter with those 
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in the new Reichstag by listing the percentages engaged in each 
occuption.49 
Agriculture 
Industry and commerce 
Public officials (municipal, state, federal) 
Teachers and scholars 
Clergymen 
Lawyers and notaries 
Private officials (trade union, party) 
Doctors 
Authors and journalists 
Persons of independent means 
Workers and employees 
Miscellaneous 
1919 
7.9 
7.0 
11.4 
75 
2.6 
7.3 
31.1 
0.5 
15.2 
0.9 
6.4 
1.9 
1920 
12.0 
8.1 
15.0 
7.6 
2.0 
3.9 
28.0 
0.9 
14.7 
0.2 
7.3 
1.5 
The preponderance of private officials which appeared with the 
introduction of P. R. in the 1919 elections thus decreased very 
little. Despite a slight increase in percentage representation, agri-
cultural interests remained secondary in importance to those of 
industry and commerce. The parties which represented principally 
the latter, the Democratic, Social Democratic, Independent, and 
People's parties, possessed 300 seats in the Reichstag. The number 
of deputies in the four groups which represented predominantly 
agricultural interests (ten in the People's party, two in the Demo-
cratic) was more than offset by the workers and employees (six) and 
trade union officials (15) in the Center and Bavarian People's 
parties. Industrial and commercial interests thus continued to 
maintain an approximate two-thirds majority in the national 
parliament. 
The returns revealed striking increases in the numbers and 
strengths of minority parties as compared with the results of the 
1919 elections. Four minorities were restricted to a total of seven 
seats in the National Assembly. In the 1920 elections, however, the 
same number of groups elected 32 deputies. The increase of 
minority strength actually was greater than indicated by the official 
returns, since several deputies elected by local groups in combina-
tion with other parties were listed with the latter in the published 
results.50 The statistics reveal that the Nationalists in three separate 
districts were accredited with seven deputies elected in combination 
with local groups. In District 13 (Thuringia) the "Vereinigte 
Landwirtschaftliche Berufsvereinigungen Thiiringens" acquired 
two seats counted in the published results as belonging to the Na-
tionalists, and also sent a remainder of 56,531 votes to the Reich 
lists to secure the election of an additional Nationalist deputy. In 
District 34 (Wiirttemberg), the same party was credited with four 
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deputies, three of whom were elected by the "Wiirttembergische 
Bauern- und Weingartnerbund (Bund der Landwirte)" and another 
by the "Wiirttembergische Biirgerpartei." A remainder of 56,327 
votes from the two groups was forwarded to the Reich lists for the 
election of an additional Nationalist deputy. In District 21 (Hesse-
Nassau), two other local groups, the "Hessische Volkspartei" and 
the "Hessische Bauernbund," combined lists with the Nationalists 
to elect one deputy for the latter. A total of 23,224 votes obtained 
by the combination was forwarded to the Reich lists. The National-
ist party thus was accredited with seven seats as a consequence of 
combinations with local groups, and perhaps obtained as many as 
three additional seats from the vote remainders forwarded in these 
instances to the party's Reich ticket. The party's composition 
swelled the number and strength of minorities represented in the 
new Reichstag to a total of seven groups and 38 deputies. 
In addition to the minorities which won seats in 1920, many 
were unsuccessful in the election. The total votes which they re-
ceived are listed in the following table: 51 
Deutsche Mittelstandspartei 
Deutsche W'irtsehafts- und Arbeitspartei 
Nationaldemokratisehe Volkspartei 
Deutseh-Wirtschaftsbund fUr Stadt und Land 
Deutsehsozialistisehe Partei 
Lausitzer Volkspartei 
Reformgruppe 
Fraktionslose Partei 
Christlieh -soziale Volkspartei"' 
Polenpartei 
11,970 
43 
3,998 
88,652 
7,216 
8,052 
6,814 
169 
66,447 
76,497 
269,858 
• All but 1,228 of the party's votes were sent to the central electoral committee for the 
Reich, where they were combined with those of the Bavarian People's Party to aid in the 
election of three additional deputies for the latter, 
When the above total is added to the 2,624,559 votes polled by the 
seven minorities which were successful in electing candidates, the 
total number of votes received by all local groups and splinter 
parties in the 1920 elections becomes 2,894,417. Seventeen minori-
ties hence polled almost three million votes, or approximately 11 
per cent of the total number cast. 
The electoral law undoubtedly contributed to the striking in-
crease in minority voting strengths in the 1920 elections. Under 
the former d'Hondt system of allocation used for the National As-
sembly, the number of votes necessary for the election of deputies 
varied with the number and strength of the participants. The 
variable quotas worked to the disadvantage of small parties, allotting 
them less than their proportionate share of representation.~2 The 
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electoral law of 1920, however, assured each organization which 
presented candidates the election of one deputy for each unit of 
60,000 votes polled within any given district. The groups of districts 
and the Reich lists presented a variety of opportunities for combin-
ing and utilizing vote fractions for the election of additional 
deputies. Such provisions lost their complexity and assumed in-
creasing political significance as Germans became acquainted with 
the functioning of P. R. systems in numerous state and local elec-
tions during the first year of the Republic. The number and strength 
of minority groups consequently multiplied. 
A classification of seats acquired by each party in the three stages 
of allocation provided by the electoral law reveals the latter's ad-
vantage to small parties. Column I of the following table lists the 
seats acquired by each party in the districts, column II does the 
same for the groups of districts, and column III the same for the 
Reich lists. A final column contains the percentage represented by 
columns II and III in the total number of seats for each party.53 
I II III IV 
(Majority) Social Democratic Party 77 9 8 .18 
Independent Social Democratic Party 66 8 7 .18 
Center Party 47 6 6 .20 
German National People's Party 46 7 9 .26 
People's Party 47 5 8 .21 
German Democratic Party 20 8 8 .44 
Bavarian People's Party 18 .. 3 .17 
Guelph Party 4 1 .25 
Bavarian Peasant's Union 3 1 .33 
Communist Party I I .50 
The figures in column IV illustrate the benefit of the group and 
Reich list provisions for the small parties. With the exception of 
the Bavarian People's party, which obtained almost the maximum 
number of seats possible in three South German districts, the seat 
percentages from group and Reich lists varied inversely with the 
size of the party. The percentages of relatively small parties like 
the Nationalists and the Democrats were considerably greater than 
those of the two largest parties. 
The provisions restricting the number of seats which parties 
could gain from the Reich lists to the total which they had received 
in the districts affected only the Communists and two other minority 
groups. The former received 441,995 votes, but secured the neces-
sary 60,000 only in one district, and hence could not obtain more 
than one additional deputy from the Reich list. Without the pro-
visions in question they could have elected seven deputies from 
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the latter, thereby increasing to eight their total membership in the 
new Reichstag. The Poles and another minority group, the "Deutsch-
Wirtschaftsbund fUr Stadt und Land" amassed 76,497 and 88,652 
votes, respectively. Since the votes were scattered among several 
constituencies, neither possessed the necessary 60,000 in any single 
district, and hence could not utilize the vote totals forwarded to 
their respective Reich lists. 
What might have been the outcome of the balloting in 1920 had 
the electoral law for the National Assembly been retained? The 
probable differences are suggested by the following table. Figures 
in the first column represent the actual results of the election. Those 
in the second column have been constructed by applying the 
d'Hondt method of seat allocation to the election statistics for each 
district. 
(Majority) Social Democratic Party 
Independent Social Democratic Party 
Center Party 
German National People's Party 
People's Party 
German Democratic Party 
Bavarian People's Party 
Guelph Party 
Bavarian Peasant's Union 
Communist Party 
94 
81 
59 
62 
60 
36 
21 
5 
4 
2 
100 
85 
62 
61 
55 
30 
22 
5 
3 
1 
The figures in the second column should be regarded as approxi-
mate. As illustrated by an analysis of the 1919 election statistics,54 
they would have been slightly altered by list combinations among 
the various parties. Elections under the 1919 law, furthermore, 
would not have offered incentives to minorities comparable to those 
of the 1920 system of allocation. Many organizations which pre-
sented candidates in the elections might not have done so had they 
been confronted by an electoral law which obviously handicapped 
small parties. The number of votes wasted on minority parties 
perhaps would not have approached three million. Seat totals for 
the largest parties therefore might have been greater than those 
listed in the second column. The two socialist parties, for ex-
ample, might have gained more than the ten additional seats 
allotted to them in the column. The figures in the latter do not 
indicate, however, that members of the coalition government in 
the Assembly would have gained a majority of seats in the new 
Reichstag had the 1919 electoral law been retained. Although the 
Social Democratic and Center parties undoubtedly would have 
picked up several seats in the latter event, the gains would have 
been offset by the losses of the Democrats. Regardless of the voting 
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procedure, the majority coalition was doomed in 1920 by a mani-
fest decline in republican sentiment. 
The electoral law of 1920 was a monument to the German ap-
proach to politics and parliamentary government. To those who 
drafted and passed the law the creation of an election system de-
signed to produce mathematically exact results logically appeared 
to follow the triumph of democracy in Germany. That the system 
might be incompatible with, or at least endanger the functioning 
of, parliamentary government seemed inconceivable. With little 
or no experience in the responsibilities of wielding political power, 
the members of the National Assembly who passed the law under-
stood neither the dynamics of parliamentary government nor the 
role played therein by the election system. As representatives of 
small parties they were more interested in guaranteeing the 
minority positions of their respective groups than in creating an 
electoral law which might foster the emergence of a majority com-
petent to assume responsibility for directing the affairs of govern-
ment. 
8 / The Implications 
W HAT are the implications of this study for an assessment of the ''''eimar heritage? The foregoing chapters have shown how P. R. gained acceptance during the Second 
Reich in relation to industrialization and its attendant effects, how 
the one fostered and the other gave expression to fragmentation and 
conflict in German society and politics. The concluding chapter 
focuses on the views expressed by the proponents of P. R. (treated in 
Part I) and their opponents (Part II) on the following questions: 
What is the purpose of the suffrage? What should be the role of an 
elected parliament in formulating and directing public policy? 
Does sovereignity rest with the people? What is the proper rela-
tionship between the individual and the state? The views expressed 
on these and related questions suggest that the German people 
during the Second Reich had no real comprehension of democracy, 
that they were little prepared in this respect for the Republic which 
they acquired in 1918-1919. 
I 
The proportionalists' view of the parliament and its purpose 
was revealed in the oft-quoted words ascribed to Mirabeau: "A 
representative body is to the nation what a chart is for the physical 
configuration of its soil: in all its parts, and as a whole, the repre-
sentative body should at all times present a reduced picture of the 
people-their opinions, aspirations, and wishes .... "1 The analogy 
became for the proportionalists a dogma reiterated with almost 
evangelistic fervor. If the parliament did not mirror the wishes 
of the people, they claimed, then it was a perversion of justice, an 
instrument of oppression used by tyrannical majorities against de-
fenseless minorities. 
89 
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Basic to the proportionalists' view of the parliament was their 
interpretation of the suffrage. The term in German means literally 
the right (das Recht) to elect (wahlen). Das Wahlrecht hence in-
volved, according to the proportionalists, not only the right of the 
individual to vote for the candidate of his choice, but also the 
right to elect the candidate. "The constitution [of 1871]," stated 
one writer, "grants every citizen equal suffrage, i.e., the right to 
participate through his act of voting in the formation of the popular 
assembly."2 Year after year, however, countless voters witnessed 
the defeat of their candidates at the polls. Year after year countless 
voters, certain of the impossibility of electing their candidates, ab-
stained from casting their ballots. All were "robbed" of their 
suffrage, deprived of their sacred right to participate in the German 
Schicksal) the German destiny.3 "Under this system the suffrage 
[das Wahhecht] is thus nonexistent. There remains merely a right 
to vote [Stimmrecht]) or a mere possibility of electing, no suffrage, 
i.e., no right of the voter to demand that his vote shall be not only 
counted, but also weighed .... "4 
The interpretation was by implication subversive to the tradi-
tional exaltation of the state in German political theory and experi-
ence. If the suffrage was not a duty performed by the individual 
for the state, if it was rather an individual right existing inde-
pendently in society, then the body created by the exercise of that 
right would seem to function independently of any institution like 
the state. For what purpose, furthermore, did the individual possess 
what was by implication a "natural" right to vote, or in the pro-
portionalist view, to elect? Was the act of voting or electing an end 
in itself, devoid of political consequences? Or was it a means by 
which each individual could participate through the elected parlia-
ment in his government? 
Rarely did German proportionalists assert the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty. Rarely did they contend that political power 
emanated from the people and was exercised by them through an 
elected assembly. Only the socialists gave occasional recognition of 
the implications of responsible self-government inherent in their 
interpretation of the Wah lrech t. "It is a natural and therefore 
sacred right of the people to shape its own destiny," wrote one 
party theorist in 1877, "and the people is powerful and sovereign 
only when it exercises the highest and the ultimate right of decision 
in all areas of legislation."5 Since the Reichstag was not a true 
reflection of the desires and wishes of the German people, he con-
tended, "large numbers of the population" were "robbed" of their 
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franchise. "The sovereignty of the German people" thus became 
"illusory," their "right of representation" became "in practice a 
deceptive right [Scheinrecht]."6 
The stated or implied viewpoint of most advocates of P. R. was 
expressed by a middle-class liberal who dedicated his publication 
"to the memory of Mirabeau" and established as his motto "equal 
rights for all." Asserting a belief in political equality, which he 
regarded as "an inheritance of the French Revolution, a fulfillment 
of the principle of 'egalitt!,' at least in the political realm," he 
concluded: 
The essence of the constitutional state consists partially in 
the right of all the citizens to participate with the ruler 
[dem Herrscher] in working out the destiny [die Geschicke] 
of the people.7 
The force of tradition was strong. An identification of Herrscher 
with people seemed next to impossible for the proportionalists. 
Implicit in the claim that each voter had the right to elect the 
candidate of his choice, that he was misrepresented in the parlia-
ment by any deputy against whom he had voted, was the assump-
tion that he possessed a rigid Weltanschauung.8 He was, according 
to the proportionalists, a person of unyielding political conviction, 
one to whom compromise was unnatural and degrading. He and 
those of similar conviction with whom he associated in a political 
party were sharply separated in the political arena from others 
with different Weltanschauungen. Runoff elections to the Reichstag 
thus were anathema to the advocates of P. R. The voter who had 
been "robbed" of his suffrage through the defeat of his candidate 
in the first election was asked by his party to vote in the runoff for 
one of the two remaining candidates. "When two friendly parties 
which remain separate in the main [first] election for the purpose 
of determining the number of their supporters go together in the 
second election, it is quite in order, natural, and inoffensive. When 
parties, however, which have fought one another violently sud-
denly make common cause, then it is unnatural and creates psychic 
difficulties for leadership and electorate."9 Under P. R., the pro-
portionalists asserted, voters and parties could remain true to their 
principles. No longer would "unnatural" coalitions among antagon-
istic parties cause "psychic difficulties" for party leaders and fol-
lowers. No longer would the voter be misrepresented in the parlia-
ment by a deputy not his very own. "Political purity [Reinlichkeitr 
would be assured.10 
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The assumption that political convictions could not and should 
not be compromised was not without basis in the experience of 
Germans with parties and politics. Unable constitutionally or 
otherwise to control the chancellor, denied any real control of the 
purse strings, its membership banned from ministerial posts, the 
Reichstag during the greater part of the Second Reich was an 
institution set apart from the center of decision and action in 
Germany. Its membership was deprived of that which customarily 
unites parties in programs of constructive action-the necessity for 
compromise. The parties in the Reichstag as a consequence were 
more negative than positive in approach, more inclined toward 
factional struggles than constructive action. Bismarck had con-
tributed further to their incompetence by playing them off against 
one another, and by fostering in Reichstag debates an attitude 
which attributed to political opponents intentions which were 
socially and politically dangerous, if not subversive. Yet the pro-
portionalists' assumption of the impossibility or undesirability of 
compromising one's political convictions involved a questionable 
identification of politicians with voters. Despite Heine's contention 
that every German was his own party,u the attitudes of German 
voters probably were much less absolute and unyielding than those 
of the deputies whom they returned to the Reichstag. In general, 
however, the assumption by proportionalists that German voters 
possessed uncompromising convictions appears to have been re-
latively accurate. 
In addition to their theoretical justification of P. R. in terms 
of the right to elect the candidate of one's choice, proportionalists 
also urged the absolute necessity for including all conflicting points 
of view in the elected parliament.12 To deny representation, they 
declared, to those groups considered dangerous or subversive to the 
established order was to court disaster. Their exclusion from peace-
ful channels of expression would merely drive them into extreme 
forms of revolutionary activity. To grant them unrestricted repre-
sentation in the parliament, however, would open to them peaceful 
opportunities for the settlement of their interests. Their participa-
tion in the legislative process, it was argued, would foster an aware-
ness of the problems of government, of the difficulty and imprac-
ticality of implementing extremist decisions. In short, a moderation 
of radical elements in the electorate would result from their free 
and unrestricted expression in the parliament. 
The middle-class liberals who urged P. R. in this regard as a 
bulwark against revolution illustrated the nature of German experi-
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ence with the socialists. Revisionist rather than revolutionary 
tendencies had been strengthened by the growth of Social Demo-
cratic power in Germany. Suspicion and hostility among socialist 
and left-liberal groups gradually had diminished as each began in 
the Landtage and in the Reichstag to cooperate with the other in 
working toward common political ends. Middle-class liberals were 
not slow to recognize the advantages of yielding to Social Demo-
cratic demands for increased representation in the Reichstag through 
P. R., not only with regard to strengthening socialist tendencies 
toward moderation,13 but also for the purpose of increasing left-
liberal power through possible coalition with the socialists.14 
Would not the expression of conflicting points of view in the 
parliament break down existing party structures? From Switzerland, 
the classic land of experimentation with P. R., came accounts of 
party splintering in cantons where proportional voting was intro-
duced,15 A report by the Swiss Bundesrat issued in 1910, for ex-
ample, concluded that proportional representation in that country 
had "contributed to the crumbling of the old historic parties and 
in general of all large political groupS."16 Even the slight experi-
ence of legislative assemblies in Germay with P. R. produced com-
plaints of party splintering. In Hamburg, for example, almost a 
dozen groups arose in 1906 in the first elections to the second cham-
ber held under the system,17 Although the number soon decreased, 
complaints persisted that the use of P. R., in the words of one critic, 
"gives way to a purely class representation. The economic, con-
fessional, and other special interests supplant in importance those 
which are political."18 
The proponents countered the evidence of party splintering with 
assertions that P. R. merely afforded expression to divisions already 
existing within parties,19 Such divisions occurred regardless of the 
election system; nothing could prevent their continuation. Dis-
cordant elements, they contended, were forced into unhappy unions 
by a system of election like the majority system which denied repre-
sentation to minorities. Personal animosities and ideological con-
flicts within parties were subordinated to the harsh necessity for 
individual survival through collective endeavor. Elimination at 
the polls would result if unity were not maintained. As interpreted 
by its friends, P. R., merely relieved the necessity for unhappy and 
unproductive unions among discordant political groups. Each was 
assured of representation in the parliament, there to express its 
own unadulterated Weltanschauung. Far from splintering the 
party structure, P. R. in the view of its advocates merely afforded 
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expression to the diversity of political conviction already existing 
within Germany. 
Did not the greatest possible reflection of existing social and 
political diversity in the parliament constitute a danger to the 
latter's workability? The proportionalists who bothered to consider 
the question were in almost complete accord. To conclude that an 
increase of parties and groups within the parliament decreased its 
ability to function efficiently was to commit an error of logic. 
" ... The more complete and the more genuine the representation of 
groupings among people in the parliament," one writer asserted, 
"the sooner will occur within the latter a reconciliation of oppos-
ing forces in harmony with the true interest of the total organism 
[des Gesamtkorpers ]."20 
Proportionalists were at their strongest in contending that 
Germany never had used P. R., yet traditionally had possessed a 
multiplicity of parties. How could the charge of party splintering 
be levelled, they demanded, when a score of parties had arisen in 
Germany under the majority system? As expressed in 1885 by one 
of the earliest proportionalists in Germany, 
The majority principle has not prevented the formation of 
a large papal [ultramontanen] party united only by a common 
religious point of view. It has not denied representation to 
a fourth estate [the workers] which subordinates all questions 
of national and religious nature to the socio-economic in-
terest. It has not prevented the shattering of a large party 
on a political-commercial question like that of free trade 
versus protective tariff, not to mention the representation of 
Poles, Alsatians, Guelphs, and other particular interests.21 
The same point of view was expressed by Hugo Preuss in 1919 to 
the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly. "Never 
have we had proportional elections to the Reichstag in Germany," 
he asserted, "and yet our parties always have been as numerous as 
the sands of the sea .... "22 To anticipate a reduction in the num-
ber of parties, to hope for an evolution of the two-party system on 
the English model hence ignored, according to the proportionalists, 
the traditional cleavages of political conviction in Germany. The 
country long had possessed almost half a dozen major parties, not to 
mention the numerous splinter groups. She undoubtedly would 
continue to possess as many, not in consequence of the election 
system, but in response to the "deep-seated differences in political 
attitude indigenous to the German people."23 
The presence of political diversity was for some proportionalists 
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the natural outcome of industrialization. Everywhere that he chose 
to look, Dr. Ernst Cahn, the foremost champion of P. R. in Ger-
many prior to the war, professed to see the emergence of multi-
party systems. The two-party system, he pointed out, had dis-
appeared in Belgium with the rise of the Social Democrats, and ap-
peared to be in the process of doing so in England with the growth 
of an independent workers' party. Even in the United States, he 
contended, the workers' movement might well "put an end" to the 
two-party system. Industrialization thus had mixed new ingredients 
in the traditional political conflict of liberals and conservatives . 
. . . To the opposition present in all countries between the 
more conservative and the more liberal point of view is added 
in all countries with highly-developed industry the opposi-
tion between employers and workers, between the haves and 
have-nots, one eventually expressed politically through the 
formation of an independent workers' party.24 
It followed for Dr. Cahn that the two-party system was completely 
unsuited to Germany. The workers' movement, not to mention the 
growth of individualism, the increasing "intellectual differentia-
tions" so characteristic of modern society, had rendered even more 
diverse than before a society traditionally lacking in "confessional" 
and "national" unity. "The victory of the two-party system here 
[in Germany]," he concluded, "is prohibited by the constant action 
of these factors. That proportional representation retards or makes 
difficult the emergence [of the two-party system] is therefore out of 
the question."25 
That two-party systems were fading out in modern society 
seemed quite logical to proportionalists like Dr. Cahn impressed 
with the impact of economic change upon political parties and 
attitudes, and also by the phenomenal growth of Social Democracy 
in Germany. The conclusion, however, showed slight comprehen-
sion of the role of political parties in democratic societies. Dr. 
Cahn and other proportionalists wrote very glibly about multiple 
and two-party systems in other countries, but failed to recognize 
the effects in democracies of that which was for the most part denied 
political parties in Germany: responsibility for the direction of 
public policy. That there existed pressures in democratic systems 
of government toward the formation of large political units capable 
of acquiring and maintaining political power was a concept for the 
most part alien to the thinking and experience of German pro-
portionalists.26 
Nowhere was the almost exclusive concern of proportionalists 
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with the cOmpOSItIOn of the parliament better illustrated than in 
the writings of jurists and mathematicians. The latter were chal-
lenged by the task of constructing the most perfect system of P. R., 
the one which would mirror the electorate with the highest degree 
of accuracy. They were stimulated to the creation of systems of al-
most unbelievable compexity, systems which abounded in mathema-
tical symbols and algebraic equations. Had the unsuspecting Ger-
man voter chanced to peruse one of their creations, he might have 
been impressed to find himself part of an elaborate equation, to dis-
cover that he had been divided, subtracted, then multiplied into a 
position of considerable importance. Had he sought to compre-
hend the subtleties of his relationship with other elements of the 
equation, he might have been saddened by his ignorance. The 
experts were profound to the point of incomprehensibility. One 
editor of a socialist publication at least had the courtesy to warn 
his readers that the "complicated computations" contained in one 
section of an article on proportional representation could be "easily 
understood only by those trained in mathematics."27 
So enamored did some theorists become with the intricacies of 
P. R. that occasionally they forsook political realities altogether. 
In the words of one professor and jurist, Adolf Tecklenburg, the 
system was an "electoral technique" entirely divorced from politics. 
"Proportional representation," he asserted in one of his numerous 
publications, "has no practical shortcomings, especially none in the 
political sense. The latter would be quite impossible, since pro-
portional representation essentially is an electoral technique con-
cerned solely with the procedure of electing. Whether elections are 
majority or proportional has nothing to do with the realization 
of specific political objectives. The principal problem is to find a 
suitable proportional election system, and one can always be 
found." The justification of P. R., he concluded, lay solely in the 
realm of "pure thought," and especially in that of mathematics.28 
Such utterances must be quoted without comment. Ridiculous 
though they appear to the American, they were seriously intended 
by Dr. Tecklenburg. That they were received so matter-of-factly, 
that they found such congenial company among similar assertions 
by the growing number of proportionalists illustrates the average 
German's inexperience with government and politics during the 
Second Reich. Split into hostile and warring factions by deep-
seated social and political antagonisms, the Germans were more con-
cerned than Englishmen or Americans with the problem of minority 
representation. Little accustomed to participation in the affairs 
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of government, they tended, as reflected in the views of the pro-
portionalists, to regard representation as an end in itself, to exclude 
consideration of the influence of election systems on the capacity of 
the parliament to govern. The tendency was manifest in the asser-
tions of Hugo Preuss, the principal architect of the Weimar Con-
stitution, who declared in 1919 to the Constitutional Committee of 
the National Assembly that the suffrage was "only in a restricted 
sense," a question of parties and politics, that it was "essentially a 
question of technique," one of securing the "best system of pro-
portional representation."21) 
II 
The opponents were devastating in their analysis of P. R. Was 
it technically possible, they inquired, to "mirror" the electorate, 
to reflect accurately in the parliament all shades of opinion in their 
exact proportions among the voters? Was not the attempt futile, 
indeed ludicrous in view of changes of opinion common amolIg 
voters after the election? Would not new elections then become 
necessary at frequent intervals, perhaps every month, perhaps 
every week? Was not the proportionalists' interpretation of the 
Wahlrecht in the last analysis untenable and unsound, divorced 
from reality and dangerous in practice? 
Territorial districts, the opponents claimed, distorted the par-
liamentary "image" of the electorate allegedly reflected by P. R. 
When districts were retained, as they were in Germany where pro-
portional systems were adopted, the number of votes required for 
election varied from district to district. Ten thousand votes might 
elect a deputy in one district; twenty thousand might suffice in an-
other. Votes in the latter thus would have one-half the weight 
possessed by those in the former. It was thus impossible, according 
to the opponents, to speak of an equality among votes under such 
circumstances. Even the most exact systems of allucation, more-
over, left a remainder of unused votes. Some candidates received 
more votes than required for election; others failed to achieve the 
necessary number. Vote fractions remained in either case. Un-
fortunately for the proportionalists, "deputies could not be divided 
into fractions."3o 
As viewed by the opponents, the ideal of equality among votes 
posed a dilemma for the proportionalists. The latter sought the 
highest possible degree of equality through numerous technical de-
vices. In proportion as their systems achieved success in this respect, 
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however, the less comprehensible, the less practicable they became. 
As put by one opponent, 
The "more numerically just," the more impracticable, and 
the more practicable the less "numerically just." One may 
twist and turn as he wishes; the dilemma remains.31 
How did the proportionalists seek to resolve their dilemma? Most 
favored systems which in effect sacrified equality to workability. 
Those like Dr. Tecklenburg who pursued the ideal of equality ad 
absurdum were so far removed from political realities as to be un-
aware of the dilemma. 
The most damaging argument against P. R. concerned, not the 
relation of one vote to another, but the attitude of the person who 
cast the vote. He was, according to the proportionalists, one who 
knew his convictions and strictly adhered to them. The difficulties 
inherent in this assumption were suggested, though not clearly 
enunciated by the opponents. "Were it actually necessary [to mirror 
the views of the electorate]," one writer asserted, "then we should 
have to reelect the parliament every month, perhaps every week . 
. . . "32 If the position of a party shifted on some issue even one 
week after "photographing, i.e., the election," another pointed out, 
consistency with the requisite of equality would require the elec-
torate to be "photographed anew."33 Even the proportionalists 
were known to admit that the voter had not one, but several points 
of view. As lamented by one writer, the individual voter shared the 
viewpoints of many unrelated groups in society. At the polls he 
must make the choice: " ... agrarian or progressive, industrial or 
Catholic, ... as an interested party in a railway line or as a Mal-
thusian. He can do no more than this."34 
Were there not individuals, moreover, who failed to make the 
choice, who did not or could not vote? Many persons in Germany-
soldiers, sailors, women, children, the mentally unbalanced, and 
those in bankruptcy-were disenfranchised by law. Thousands more 
excluded themselves by abstention from the polls. Those who 
actually voted thus comprised only a small fraction of the total 
population. The "will of the people" as expressed through elec-
tions hence became the will of a small minority, one which might 
correspond only vaguely or perhaps not at all to the popular will. A 
parliament so constituted would be a "caricature [Zerrbild]," not 
a true "reflected image [Spiegelbild]" of the popular will.35 
If P. R., and by implication all other electoral techniques, could 
not afford adequate expression to an elusive popular will, if repre-
sentation as interpreted by the proportionalists were, then, an 
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anachronism in modern society, what was the purpose of the 
suffrage? Most emphatically, according to the opponents, it was 
not a "right to elect," a right to place in the parliament the delegate 
of one's choice. To assume the existence of this or any other in-
dividual right contradicted the essence of the state as something to 
which particular wills were subordinated.36 Granted by the state 
to the individual, the suffrage became for most opponents of P. R. 
a "public function" regulated in the words of one writer by the 
"maxim without which a state could not exist: first order, then 
freedom."37 
The suffrage became in this view relative to the interests of the 
state. The individual possessed no inherent right of representa-
tion in an elected parliament. Duties, not rights, were his to per-
form in service of the state. The suffrage was to serve, never to 
oppose the raison d'etat, and hence could vary with time and place. 
It was scarcely possible, concluded one writer, "to formulate an 
ideal suffrage valid at all times, and for all peoples and states. The 
most suitable suffrage is a relative consideration, one which varies 
with differences in time, race, economic condition, and political 
situation."38 
The interpretation, so common in Germany during the Second 
Reich, enabled political theorists to combine seemingly irrecon-
cilable points of view. An editor of the scholarly Zeitschrift fur 
Politik, Dr. Adolf Grabowsky, supposedly a liberal, could assert in 
one breath the validity of universal and equal suffrage for the Reich 
and the three-class system of voting for Prussia.39 "Weare living in 
a world of relativity," he explained, "which even the hallowed 
suffrage cannot transcend. What is right for Germany is not at all 
reasonable for Prussia." Why was universal and equal suffrage 
suited to Germany? Because "it was the most powerful argument 
for the South Germans to join the North German Confederation 
and hence contributed to the unification of Germany." What if it 
ceased to serve the fatherland? "If this suffrage were to place in 
jeopardy, rather than assure the stability of, the Reich, then it 
would become untenable and the time for its abolition would have 
arrived." Why was universal and equal suffrage unsuited to Prus-
sia? Because it would undermine the existing order.40 More than 
eighty-five per cent of the voters in Prussia cast their ballots with 
the third class. Equal suffrage would reduce the dominant ele-
ments, the first and second classes, to impotence; it would under-
mine the "historic position" of the Prussian monarchy and hence 
jeopardize "Prussia's calling in world history." 
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In the Prussian monarchy [Dr. Grabowsky stated] the abstract 
concept of the state has become as though alive. The relation 
of the citizen to the state here is no longer impartial, but per-
sonal. ... In the common interest everybody keeps his place, 
because he knows that the common trust will be returned to 
him a hundredfold. And if the reason of state [Staatsraison] 
-i.e., not a vague theory, much more a bloody necessity-so 
demands, then the individual steps quietly aside. However 
one stands with regard to this system, through which the Prus· 
sian state has become mighty-its completeness and grandeur 
[Grossartigkeit] one must acknowledge."41 
The abdication of individual political and moral responsibility to 
the state could be no more complete than this. 
H the suffrage were relative to the raison d' hat) then it followed 
for many opponents of P. R. that deputies represented the common 
interest in parliament. As stated in the federal constitution (Article 
29), they were not bound by instructions from the voters. "Dep-
uties represent a fixed political viewpoint, to be sure, and are 
generally elected for that reason. In the exercise of their parlia-
mentary duties, however, they act with complete independence. 
They are representatives, not of their constituents, but of the entire 
people [des gesamten Volkes]. They are to express in the parliament, 
not the views of their voters, but their own views, and therefore are 
not bound by orders and instructions."42 It followed for the op-
ponents of P. R. that most exact representation in parliament of 
all points of view within the electorate was of little or no conse-
quence. Since deputies were guided in the performance of their 
parliamentary duties by that which they believed to be in the best 
interests of the nation, the purpose of the suffrage should be to 
select "the most intelligent, the most honorable, and the most com-
petent among the people."43 Not only might individuals with such 
qualifications serve the common interest to a greater degree than 
those who were stupid, dishonorable, and incompetent. They also 
could be expected to preserve an identification of the so-called com-
mon interest with that of the dominant social and political groups 
which they represented. 
What was the role of the parliament as interpreted by those who 
regarded the suffrage as a "public function"? Just as the privilege 
of voting was granted by the state to the individual, so the parlia-
ment owed its existence to the state's magnanimity. It was an 
mstitution set apart from the state.44 Like the individual who 
exercised the suffrage, the parliament could act only in harmony 
with the interests of the state. It was an institution which com-
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plemented, never contradicted, the actions of that which epitomized 
the common good. If it failed to do so, if particular interests gained 
the ascendancy to oppose the state, then it no longer expressed the 
common will and should be dissolved. Parliaments might err; the 
state, never. Participation in the formulation and direction of 
public policy was thus restricted to the ruling few; opposition to the 
established order became subversion. 
Not all opponents of P. R. upheld so completely the conservative 
viewpoint in Germany. Several attacked proportional voting, not 
as subversive to existing power relationships in Germany, but as 
detrimental to the proper functioning of the parliament. Insofar 
as they invested the latter with responsibility for governing and im-
plied or attributed sovereign power to the people, they might be 
described as democratic. Their democracy, however, showed the 
effects of the German experience with government and politics. 
Parties, political power, and public opinion were viewed mostly in 
the abstract. Comprehension of democratic practices and procedures 
was almost negligible. 
As viewed by one writer, proportional representation would 
give rise to small cliques and interest groups in the parliament and 
further existing political divisions within the population. The re-
sults would be highly detrimental to the conduct of government. 
The practical politician ... viewing a new increase in minor-
ity strength [he stated] will take into consideration the difficul-
ties arising in every constitutional government from the ab-
sence of a compact majority upon which it can rely. And 
many will hesitate to strengthen the minorities which negate 
in principle the national, political, or economic bases of the 
existing political and social order.45 
The government in a "constitutional" system plainly was dependent 
in the writer's view upon a majority in the parliament. The people 
by implication were sovereign. The German experience with 
government and politics appeared in the writer's reference to 
minorities opposed "in principle" to the existing order. They and 
the order which they opposed apparently were regarded by him as 
static, as founded upon rigid and unalterable principles, each of 
which involved the negation of the other. It would seem to follow 
from the writer's view that minorities never could constitute in 
the parliament a "loyal" opposition like that in the British House 
of Commons. Never could they cooperate in constructive legislation 
with the party or parties in power. The existing social and political 
order upheld by the latter was by implication antithetical to their 
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cherished principles. How could they support that which they 
sought to abolish? 
The editors of the scholarly journal Annalen des Deutschen 
Reichs published in 1899 an attack on P. R. which asserted the 
necessity for decision in parliamentary government. 
Wherever parliamentarianism exists, especially in an in-
direct democracy [they stated], wherever the parliament thus 
determines the direction [den Gang] of government, wherever 
it possesses political power, there the necessity, if at all pos-
sible, for a strong, prevailing parliamentary majority becomes 
all-important. The system of representation assumes definite 
significance at this point, for it may give rise to strong ma-
jorities. Minority groups will not be handicapped to any 
great extent in the latter event, since it matters little 
whether they are subordinated in the election or in the 
parliament, quite apart from the fact that they can find a 
measure of expreSSIOn through the representative system. 
An old French saying (Naville) runs: "La majorite est Ie 
principe de la decision, la proportionalite est Ie principe 
de la representation." That would sound fine were it not that 
parliamentarianism is a matter solely of decision, i.e., the 
will of the majority, and not of representation, i.e., the in-
terests of the minority.46 
A majority clearly was regarded as essential to a parliament which 
wielded sovereign power. To emphasize "representation" destroyed 
the majority and hence the capacity of the parliament for decision. 
Minorities were excluded by the writers from participation in the 
affairs of government. Whether they were suppressed within or 
outside the parliament was immaterial. They were to be pro-
hibited at all costs from disrupting the parliament by weakening 
the majority. Could they not one day acquire a majority in the 
parliament? Could the present majority not lose the confidence of 
the people and become itself a minority? The writers' silence on 
such matters, their strict compartmentalization of the majority and 
the minority, illustrated the limitations of their view of political 
parties in relation to public opinion. They seemed unaware that 
parties rose or fell in power in a democracy as they gained or lost 
the confidence of the electorate, that they provided the public a 
means with which to assess responsibility for governmental actions. 
Among the opponents of P. R. in Germany, the Progressive 
leader and later chairman of the Democratic party, Friedrich Nau-
mann, appeared to be alone in comprehending the role of political 
parties in a democracy. To a liberal party convention held in 1906 
in Berlin he asserted: 
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Precisely that which causes the splintering, the paralyza-
tion of effort among us will be advanced by proportional 
representation. The important thing is not that everybody 
possesses the opportunity to have his point of view expressed 
1D the parliament, but that there be a body actually com-
petent to govern, so that the word "parliament" acquires a 
political meaning. And that assumes that party splintering 
will be a thing of the past, that we will be able to say: here 
is the Right; here is the Leftl And not until we have right 
and left can we make public policy [Politik machenJ as in 
England, where those who have been in the oppositlon for 
fifteen years must then assume the responsibility for carrying 
out that which they have been talking about. Sheer oppo-
sition without responsibility-that is the background of pro-
portional representation.47 
Contrary to the opinion which seemed to prevail in Germany, 
parties were not ends in themselves, not rallying points for par-
ticularistic points of view to be aired in the parliament. As 
interpreted by Naumann, they were organs with which to imple-
ment democratic government in modern society, competent to 
direct public policy through the parliament so long as they re-
tained the confidence of a majority of the voters. When in the 
minority, they sought to convince the electorate by word and deed 
that their ideas and members were more competent to serve the 
common interest than those of the majority. They were, as Nau-
mann stated in his book, Demokratie und Kaisertum, "necessary 
intermediaries [Zwischenkorper] between the electorate and the 
majority capable of governing to which they aspire .... The essence 
[das Wesen] of the party is the existence of an organization of 
voters for the purpose of winning the majority."48 
Naumann was almost alone in the National Assembly in 1919 
in asserting the necessity for a parliamentary majority. His at-
tempts in the Constitutional Committee to defeat proportional 
representation as an instrument promoting party multiplicity and 
disunity were beaten down by the powerful polemic of his fellow 
Democrat, Hugo Preuss. In a letter written to another party 
comrade in May, 1919, Naumann expressed what he termed "far~ 
reaching pessimism" over the prospects of the new Republic. A 
"peaceful solution" to the "majority problem," to the problem of 
creating a parliamentary majority essential to stable government, 
appeared highly unlikely. The new constitution would leave 
Germany leaderless and divided. "I fear," he prophesied, "that 
we are creating a situation which can be resolved later only by a 
coup d' etat."49 
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The views of those who advocated or rejected P. R. during the 
Second Reich suggested additional reasons for pessimism regarding 
the outlook for the new Republic. Popular sovereignty was a con-
cept for the most part alien to the proportionalists, subversive to 
their opponents. Responsible self-government appeared strikingly 
un-German, an end sought chiefly by the socialist Reichsfeinde, 
the socialist "enemies of the state." Political parties were viewed 
by most writers on P. R., not as means for directing public policy 
and assessing responsibility, but as ends in themselves, as groups of 
like-minded individuals dedicated to the preservation of particular 
Weltanschauungen. Representation became an ideal of reflecting 
minority opinions among the voters in the elected parliament, an 
ideal expressed ad absurdum in the electoral law of the Weimar 
Republic. 
As illustrated by the uses which competing groups made or 
attempted to make of P. R., neither had the Germans practiced 
democracy in their social relations. Industrialists and agrarians 
proposed the system with numerous refinements and in combination 
with other techniques like occupational representation as a means 
of denying full expression in the elected parliament to the rising 
socialist movement. Political parties representing middle-class and 
agrarian groups in municipal councils, state legislatures, and the 
Reichstag extended the system to urban districts where voting 
strengths of socialists were concentrated. To undermine the latter's 
domination of the workers' movement in Germany, Reichstag 
parties introduced P. R. for elections to the numerous boards and 
other bodies which had arisen with social and factory legislation. 
The paradox of the system of representation supposedly the most 
just, and hence the most democratic, yet exalted by its theorists 
into an ideal incompatible with the functioning of democratic 
institutions of government, was made complete by the undemocratic 
ends for which it was employed in Germany. 
Democracy was not precluded in Germany by a heritage of 
social fragmentation and authoritarianism. Yet the Germans in 
1918-1919 appeared strikingly ill-prepared and ill-equipped for 
democratic government. In 1919 Walter Rathenau wrote: 
We have a Republic; nobody seriously desired it. In the 
eleventh hour we acquired parliamentary government; no-
body wanted it.50 
He might have added that very few Germans appeared capable of 
utilizing either one.51 
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